Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics by Bauer, Jon
  
[481] 
JON BAUER∗ 
Buying Witness Silence: 
Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and 
Lawyers’ Ethics 
Lawyers frequently draft settlements that impede other parties’ 
access to relevant evidence through clauses that prohibit the plaintiff 
from disclosing information to anyone with a claim against the 
defendant or forbid all discussion of the facts underlying the dispute.  
This Article argues that lawyers who negotiate these 
“noncooperation” agreements violate Rule 3.4(f) of the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, which prohibits requesting someone other 
than the lawyer’s own client to withhold relevant information from 
another party, and Model Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct 
“prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 
The conventional wisdom among practitioners and legal ethics 
scholars has been that lawyers may ethically negotiate any settlement 
terms that serve their clients’ interests and are not criminal or 
fraudulent.  (Some recent critics of settlement secrecy have argued 
that noncooperation settlements violate obstruction of justice statutes 
or other criminal laws, but the illegality argument is largely 
unconvincing.)  This Article argues that the conventional view has 
looked at the problem through the wrong lens.  In the ethos of the 
ethics codes, third party and societal interests generally take a back 
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seat to client service, but certain types of conduct deemed especially 
harmful to the justice system have long been placed off-limits to 
lawyers because of their special role as “officers of the court.” 
This Article traces the history of one such duty, the principle that 
lawyers must not ask nonclients to refrain from voluntarily disclosing 
relevant information to other parties or their attorneys, and shows the 
important function that it plays in safeguarding the integrity of 
adversary adjudication.  After providing a theoretical justification for 
liberally construing ethics rules that limit client advocacy for the sake 
of the adversary system’s effective functioning, this Article explores 
what the rules mean for settlement practices.  The Conclusion 
addresses the critique that prohibiting lawyers from negotiating 
agreements that their clients could lawfully enter into on their own is 
either futile or paternalistic, and shows that it is neither. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is improper for an attorney . . . to influence persons, other than 
his clients or their employees, to refuse to give information to 
opposing counsel which may be useful or essential to opposing 
counsel in establishing the true facts and circumstances affecting the 
dispute. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . All persons who know anything about the facts in controversy 
are, in simple truth, the law’s witnesses.1 
Defendants should not be able to buy the silence of witnesses with 
a settlement agreement when the facts of one controversy are relevant 
to another.2 
elicia Martinez (not her real name) worked as a machine operator 
in a factory.  She and several Latina co-workers were bilingual 
and frequently conversed in Spanish.  After some other employees 
complained, the shift supervisor ordered the workers in his 
department to speak only English.  Ms. Martinez tried to comply, but 
often found herself unconsciously slipping into her native language.  
The supervisor repeatedly warned her that she was violating his 
directive.  Ms. Martinez became particularly upset when he rebuked 
her for using Spanish while teaching a new employee, who barely 
understood any English, how to run a machine.  She told the 
supervisor that his rule was unnecessary and unfair.  He told her to 
just be quiet and follow instructions.  Shortly thereafter, he notified 
 
1 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935). 
2 Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., No. 4-95-467, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *5 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 16, 1996). 
F
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her that she was being laid off due to a lack of work, although a new 
machine operator had been hired into the department just a few days 
earlier. 
Ms. Martinez sought help from the law school clinical program 
where I teach.  The clinic filed a complaint on her behalf, alleging 
that her employer had discriminated against her based on national 
origin and retaliated against her based on her expression of opposition 
to discriminatory practices in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.3  Three years of litigation ensued, first in a state 
antidiscrimination agency and then in federal court.  After extensive 
discovery, the defendant’s attorneys expressed interest in settlement.  
The negotiations initially focused on money.  When a sum was agreed 
on, the defense lawyers drafted a proposed settlement agreement.  It 
included a provision requiring the plaintiff to keep the settlement 
amount confidential and another clause that read: “Martinez will not . 
. . assist any person who files a lawsuit, charge, claim or complaint 
against [the defendant] unless Martinez is required to render such 
assistance pursuant to a lawful subpoena or other legal obligation.” 
Incentives for compliance were built into the agreement.  Part of 
the settlement would be paid upon signing, with the remainder to be 
paid six months later —but only if she abided by the confidentiality 
terms during that time.  The company could also recover liquidated 
damages in an amount equal to half the total settlement sum if Ms. 
Martinez breached the secrecy or noncooperation clauses.  To avoid 
disclosing the terms of the agreement in public court records, the 
agreement took the form of a private contract; upon its execution, the 
parties would file with the court a stipulation stating that the matter 
was voluntarily withdrawn. 
The students who handled the case presented the proposed 
settlement to our client with client-centered neutrality.4  They 
explained the proposal and discussed alternatives, including going to 
trial or attempting further negotiations, elicited her reactions and 
concerns, spoke of pros and cons, but did not advise her what to do.  
 
3 See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1689, 1726–38 (2006) (discussing the history and mixed success of Title VII 
challenges to English-only policies). 
4 See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 2–13, 270–98 (2d ed. 2004) 
(describing the hallmarks of a client-centered approach to counseling that posits that 
lawyers generally should maintain a neutral stance toward important case decisions and 
assist the client in reaching a decision that accords with the client’s values, priorities, and 
tolerance for risk). 
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Ms. Martinez expressed mixed emotions.  She felt exhausted and 
wanted the case to be over.  She was happy with the size of the 
settlement, but felt bad about not officially “winning” and 
establishing that the company did something wrong.  She was 
comfortable keeping the settlement amount confidential; in fact, she 
wanted to make sure her friends and neighbors did not learn how 
much money she was getting —because if they did, they would 
probably want some.  The noncooperation provision gave her pause.  
She believed that other employees at the company had faced similar 
discrimination, and if they brought claims, she wanted to be able to 
help them, just as some of her former co-workers had helped her.  
Nonetheless, she decided that, on balance, she could accept the 
restriction.  After all, she could still testify if subpoenaed.  She did not 
want to risk delaying the settlement by fighting over it. 
So, the settlement was concluded.  A few months later, Ms. 
Martinez called me, very upset.  She had been contacted by an 
attorney representing a Latina woman recently fired by the company, 
someone she knew and liked.  The attorney said that he was 
considering filing a discrimination complaint and wanted to know 
about any discrimination that Ms. Martinez had seen or experienced.  
She had to tell him that she couldn’t tell him anything.  She asked me 
if I could call the attorney and give him the information.  However, I 
explained that doing so would put her settlement at risk.  She felt 
terrible about not being able to help her friend. 
In retrospect, I wondered whether we had acceded too readily to 
the defense lawyers’ insistence on nonassistance.  Our client’s lawsuit 
had been about her right to speak out against perceived 
discrimination, and it was painfully ironic that the settlement was now 
silencing her on the same subject.  Even more troubling was the 
possibility that the agreement was interfering with another person’s 
ability to prove discrimination.  I never found out what became of the 
co-worker’s claim.  The attorney may have concluded that without 
my client’s evidence, he did not have enough to justify investing time, 
expense, and effort into a case where payment would be contingent on 
success.  If he did take on the case, the agreement would increase his 
client’s litigation costs; a deposition would be required to obtain 
information that, absent the agreement, would have been available for 
free by simply interviewing Ms. Martinez and having her sign a 
witness statement. 
The agreement’s effects would also be felt if the co-worker’s 
claims were investigated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Commission or a state antidiscrimination agency.5  It would bar Ms. 
Martinez from responding to inquiries by an agency investigator, and 
the absence of her corroborating evidence might mean the difference 
between dismissal of the co-worker’s claim and a favorable finding.  
The silence mandated by the settlement agreement may have 
obstructed a tribunal’s fact-finding or prevented a meritorious claim 
from being filed in the first place.  At a minimum, it made it 
significantly more expensive for another litigant to get at the facts. 
Lawyers frequently negotiate settlements that suppress evidence in 
the manner that Ms. Martinez’s story illustrates.  Sometimes this is 
done through agreements that expressly prohibit information-sharing 
with other litigants.  Often, the same result is accomplished by 
settlement clauses that prohibit disclosure, to anyone, of the facts 
underlying the dispute.  In this Article, the term “noncooperation” 
refers to all forms of settlement secrecy that effectively prohibit a 
settling plaintiff from disclosing relevant information to others with 
current or future claims against the same defendant. 
This Article makes the case that attorneys who negotiate 
noncooperation settlements act in violation of their ethical 
responsibilities under binding disciplinary rules.  Rule 3.4(f) of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules” or “Rules”) 
prohibits a lawyer from requesting any person, other than the lawyer’s 
client or the client’s relatives or employees, to refrain from 
voluntarily providing relevant information to another party.6  Lawyers 
who make settlement offers conditioned on noncooperation are doing 
precisely what the rule prohibits.  A strong case can also be made that 
lawyers who ask for noncooperation, or accept a noncooperation 
settlement proposed by the other side, violate Model Rule 8.4(d), 
which prohibits attorneys from engaging in “conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”7 
The requirement that lawyers not seek to induce witnesses to 
withhold voluntary cooperation, though of longstanding vintage (it 
dates back at least to the 1935 ethics opinion quoted at the start of this 
 
5 An administrative complaint is a prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII, see 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2008), and is the only realistic option for litigants not represented by 
counsel. 
6 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008). 
7 Id. R. 8.4(d).  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”), which 
still forms the basis for the ethical rules in two jurisdictions, contains no direct equivalent 
to Model Rule 3.4(f) but does include the “conduct prejudicial” rule.  MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981). 
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Article), remains one of the least well-known of lawyers’ ethical 
duties.  I was unaware of the rule for most of my first decade or so in 
practice, and many lawyers I’ve spoken with either have never heard 
of it or never thought about its implications for settlement 
agreements.  Leading law school ethics texts contain no discussion of 
Rule 3.4(f) or give it only passing mention.8  Its application to 
settlement secrecy has received very little attention.  The issue was 
briefly addressed in one state ethics advisory opinion, which 
concluded that a settlement offer conditioned on noncooperation 
violates Rule 3.4(f).9  Stephen Gillers, in an article contending that 
noncooperation settlements violate federal criminal laws on 
obstruction of justice, noted that Rule 3.4(f) appears to bar lawyers 
from making such requests.10  Professor Gillers, however, gave the 
rule only passing mention, and other commentators (again with little 
analysis) have questioned the rule’s application to settlements.11 
In explaining why the ethics rules should be read to prohibit some 
very common settlement practices, this Article focuses attention on 
the largely forgotten history and purposes of the principle that it is 
unethical and prejudicial to the administration of justice for a lawyer 
to influence a witness to refrain from disclosing relevant information 
to an adverse party.  It also explores the implications of this ethical 
proscription for the practice of settlement, examining the specific 
sorts of settlement terms that the rules should be construed to place 
off-limits or allow. 
 
8 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS (3d ed. 2004); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (4th ed. 
2004); RICHARD ZITRIN ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (3d ed. 2007).  
The most comprehensive current ethics treatise focuses nearly all of its discussion of Rule 
3.4(f) on how it permits lawyers to advise clients and clients’ employees not to cooperate 
with an adversary, while paying scant attention to what the rule prohibits.  See 2 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 30.12 (3d 
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008). 
9 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993); see also Jon Bauer, Settlement 
Provisions Restricting the Plaintiff’s Right to Voluntarily Provide Relevant Information to 
Others Suing the Same Company May Violate Rule 3.4(f) of the Model Rules, EMPLOYEE 
ADVOCATE (National Employment Lawyers Association), Summer 1995, at 158; Laurie 
Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s New Rules 
Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 815 n.142 (2004) (noting that 
such settlements may raise ethical issues under Rule 3.4(f)). 
10 Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on 
Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). 
11 See Joel Cohen & James L. Bernard, Buying Victim Silence, 231 N.Y. L.J., Jul. 28, 
2004, at 4 n.5 (suggesting that Professor Gillers’s “reading of the rule may be broader than 
its text supports”). 
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Part I discusses the varieties and prevalence of noncooperation 
settlements, and situates the issue within the broader public policy 
debates that have surrounded settlement secrecy.  Part II considers the 
standard view of the ethics of settlement secrecy that has informed 
practitioners’ thinking and most of the legal ethics literature, which 
frames the issue as a conflict between client interests and the 
protection of third parties from harm, in which the former takes 
precedence.  The perception that lawyers’ “hands are tied,” that they 
must accept and abide by the client’s decisions concerning secrecy, 
has produced widespread discomfort, particularly in the plaintiffs’ 
bar.  Recent changes to the Model Rules somewhat broaden the scope 
of the harm-prevention exceptions to the lawyer’s confidentiality 
duty, but I conclude that these changes will have little impact.12  
Arguments have also been made that noncooperation agreements and 
other forms of settlement secrecy run afoul of criminal statutes 
concerning obstruction of justice or compounding.13  I conclude that 
the illegality argument is largely unconvincing, and is unlikely to 
make much headway with prosecutors or deter lawyers from 
negotiating noncooperation settlements.14 
If lawyers generally must abide by lawful client decisions, 
regardless of harm to third parties, there is another strand in lawyers’ 
ethical codes, rooted in the lawyer’s role as an “officer of the court,” 
that makes it impermissible to participate in certain actions deemed 
especially harmful to the justice system, regardless of the client’s 
desires.  Part III traces the development and underlying rationales of 
one such duty, the principle that it is improper for attorneys to impede 
voluntary witness disclosures to opposing parties.  It derives from 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) ethical pronouncements dating 
back to the 1920s, and was deliberately carried forward into the 
modern disciplinary codes.  The principle rests on a vision of 
adversary adjudication as a means for uncovering truth and resolving 
disputes fairly, and is intended to further the integrity, accuracy, and 
efficiency of that process.  Several lines of judicial precedent, 
addressing the enforceability of noncooperation contracts and other 
 
12 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3) (2008); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 67–74. 
13 See John P. Freeman, The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S.C. L. 
REV. 829 (2004); Gillers, supra note 10; Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret 
Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 783 (2002). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 79–84 and Appendix. 
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issues, similarly articulate the idea that interference with an 
adversary’s access to ex parte witness interviews is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
Part IV turns to what the rules mean for settlement secrecy.  I start 
with some general interpretive principles, since much depends on how 
broad or narrow a construction is given to ambiguous rule language.  I 
argue that limitations on advocacy that are designed to set ground 
rules of fair competition needed to ensure the adversary system’s 
effective functioning, of which the rule against noncooperation 
requests is one example, should be construed liberally to achieve their 
goals.15 
The remainder of Part IV addresses a number of specific 
interpretive issues that arise in applying the ethics rules to 
noncooperation settlements.  I conclude that, both as a matter of plain 
meaning and regulatory purpose, no exemption for settlements can be 
read into Rule 3.4(f).  And while that rule by its terms applies only to 
the requesting lawyer, Model Rule 8.4 requires plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
say “no” to such requests rather than agree to settlement terms that are 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  I also examine the 
meaning of the phrase “another party” in Rule 3.4(f), which 
determines to whom disclosures must be allowed, and the scope of the 
exception in the rule that allows noncooperation requests to be made 
to a client’s employees.  Finally, I consider the extent to which it is 
permissible to require that certain types of information, including 
settlement amounts, discovery materials, privileged information, and 
trade secrets, not be disclosed, or to restrict the manner in which 
disclosures may be made. 
In the Conclusion, I consider some objections to using the existing 
legal ethics rules to restrict lawyer participation in noncooperation 
settlements.  Questions may be raised about the efficacy and 
appropriateness of barring lawyers from negotiating agreements that 
clients could lawfully enter into on their own.  I explain why, despite 
possibilities of evasion, targeting lawyer involvement is likely to be 
reasonably effective in deterring settlement practices that harm the 
justice system, and why objections founded on client autonomy are 
unconvincing.  Lawyers’ special responsibilities to the administration 
of justice warrants forbidding attorney involvement in conduct that 
 
15 This discussion builds on the insights of an important but little-known essay by 
Robert Kutak, who chaired the commission that drafted the Model Rules, concerning the 
“competitive theory” that underlies the Rules’ approach to ethical regulation.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 220–29. 
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undermines the integrity of adversary adjudication, regardless of 
whether other law forbids it. 
I 
NONCOOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECRET 
SETTLEMENTS CONTROVERSY 
Settlement agreements that prohibit a settling party from 
voluntarily providing evidence in other proceedings appear to be 
common.  Just how common is hard to determine, since the parties 
covenant to keep the existence and terms of the agreement 
confidential as well.  There is ample anecdotal evidence that 
defendants routinely insist on confidentiality clauses that forbid 
disclosure of the settlement terms.16  An unknown, but undoubtedly 
significant, proportion of settlements also prohibit disclosures of 
factual information relating to the lawsuit.  Defendants have strong 
incentives to seek such restrictions in order to avoid adverse publicity, 
decrease the chances of similar suits being filed, and make it more 
difficult for those who bring claims to prove their cases.  Plaintiffs 
and their lawyers who believe that they can obtain a larger payment in 
exchange for promises of secrecy have incentive to agree. 
Secrecy clauses that bar disclosures to other litigants can take 
several forms.  Overt noncooperation clauses, such as the one in Ms. 
Martinez’s settlement, directly prohibit the voluntary disclosure of 
information to others bringing claims against a settling defendant.17  
 
16 See Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About 
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 675–76 (2001) (finding, 
based on interviews with attorneys for corporate defendants and insurance companies, that 
most attorneys insist on secrecy provisions in settlement agreements); Minna J. Kotkin, 
Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination 
Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 113 n.4 (2007) (citing an estimate given by a 
federal magistrate judge that eighty-five percent to ninety percent of employment 
discrimination settlements are governed by confidentiality agreements); Jack B. Weinstein, 
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 511 (1994) (noting, 
based on attorneys’ reports and Judge Weinstein’s “own experience in helping to settle 
thousands of cases,” that “it is almost impossible to settle many mass tort cases without a 
secrecy agreement”). 
17 See, e.g., Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
draft settlement in employment discrimination case that prohibited plaintiff from assisting 
in future investigations of defendant).  Another example is Michael Jackson’s once-secret 
settlement with a minor who had accused him of sexual battery, which contained a clause 
prohibiting uncompelled disclosures to anyone bringing a civil claim against Jackson.  
Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release at ¶ 10(f), Chandler v. 
Jackson, Case No. SC026226 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Jan. 25, 1994), available at 
http://www.thesmokinggun .com/graphics/art3/0616041jacko14.gif. 
 2008] Buying Witness Silence 491 
Broader confidentiality provisions that prohibit discussion of the 
underlying facts or subject matter of the claim,18 making 
“disparaging” statements about the other party,19 or disclosing any 
facts relating to the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant20 will 
have the same effect, unless they carve out an exception for 
disclosures of relevant information to other litigants —which they 
seldom do.21  Settlement provisions that require the return, 
destruction, or nondisclosure of information obtained in discovery can 
also prevent a party or party’s attorney from furnishing evidence to 
litigants in other cases.22 
The facts underlying a settled case are often relevant to other 
claims involving similar conduct by the same defendant, and may be 
highly probative.  The Federal Rules of Evidence express a general 
principle that prior bad acts are inadmissible to prove “the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”23  
 
18 See, e.g., Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
settlement agreement that barred the plaintiff or her attorneys from responding “in any 
way to any inquiry of any kind whatsoever with regard to the facts surrounding the 
case/claim”); Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret: Companies Offer Hefty Sums in 
Exchange for Keeping the Details of Public Hazard Lawsuits Quiet, Plaintiffs Must 
Choose Their Own Interest or the Public Good, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at A1 
(discussing widespread use of such clauses). 
19 See, e.g., EEOC v. Severn Trent Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that such clauses “appear to be fairly common”); Hamad v. Graphic Arts Ctr., Inc., 
No. CIV 96-216-FR, 1997 WL 12955, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 1997) (settlement prohibited 
plaintiff from “doing or saying anything which disparages or derogates” the defendant). 
20 See, e.g., McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., No. 95-0258, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12581, 
at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 1996); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 
1993). 
21 Confidentiality clauses in settlements frequently contain an exception for disclosures 
required by subpoena or court order.  Sometimes even this is lacking.  See, e.g., Hasbrouck 
v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Hamad, 1997 WL 
12955, at *1. 
22 See ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., RESOLUTION ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS (May 
6, 1989), reprinted in James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine 
Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, at 876 (2004) [hereinafter ATLA RESOLUTION] (stating that 
defendants in personal injury actions frequently demand, as a condition of settlement, 
secrecy agreements that, inter alia, require the return or destruction of discovery materials 
and prohibit the dissemination of information contained in pleadings and discovery); 
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of 
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 555–56 (2006) (noting 
that there is anecdotal evidence that settlements are routinely predicated on maintaining 
the confidentiality of discovery materials); Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, 
Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2001) (stating that settlement 
secrecy agreements barring disclosure of discovery information are commonplace in 
sexual harassment, defamation, employment, and mass tort cases). 
23 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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However, the exceptions, which allow such evidence to be admitted 
for a wide variety of other purposes (including proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, knowledge, or propensity to engage in sexual 
abuse),24 tend to swallow the rule.  In fraud, discrimination, sex 
abuse, products liability, and environmental tort cases, information 
relating to similar past misconduct or complaints is routinely held by 
courts to be potentially admissible and within the scope of 
discovery.25  The plaintiff who settles one case is frequently a 
potential witness in another. 
A debate about settlement secrecy has raged on and off for the past 
two decades, fueled by media reports that serious environmental, 
safety, and health risks were kept hidden from public view by 
confidential settlements, sealed court files, and protective orders.26  
The discourse among academics, practitioners, and policy makers has 
largely focused on two issues: whether and under what circumstances 
courts, as public institutions, should be a party to secrecy 
 
24 Id. 404(b) & 413–15; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685–88 (1988). 
25 See, e.g., Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149–56 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(discussing standards for admitting evidence of similar past conduct in civil cases for 
sexual assault or child molestation); Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (in employment discrimination case, evidence of other acts of harassment 
“extremely probative” on issues of discriminatory intent, employer’s knowledge, and 
effectiveness of response); Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995, 999–1002 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(evidence of defendant’s prior air pollution violations admissible to show that defendant 
opened plant with knowledge that it could not comply with air quality regulations with its 
existing technology); Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641, 650 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(evidence of similar occurrences admissible in products liability action for a variety of 
purposes, including to show a lack of safety for intended uses, notice to the defendant of a 
defect or danger, and causation); Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods. Int’l, Inc., No. 
99 C 214, 2000 WL 968818, at *2–*3 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2000) (prior similar acts relevant to 
intent in a fraud case). 
26 The scandals have included sexual abuse by Catholic priests, Bridgestone/Firestone 
tires failing on Ford SUVs, health risks from the Dalkon Shield and silicone breast 
implants, exploding fuel tanks on GM pickup trucks, and hazardous chemical spills.  See, 
e.g., Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 237, 258–63 (summarizing several of these controversies); see also Daniel J. 
Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Versus Court-Sponsored Secrecy, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2006, at 131, 134 (discussing how A.H. Robins hid the safety 
risks of the Dalkon Shield with secret settlements while continuing to market the product); 
Koniak, supra note 13, at 783–85 (discussing how secrecy agreements delayed the recall 
of Firestone tires for years, resulting in deaths); Matt Carroll et al., Scores of Priests 
Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (discussing how the Archdiocese of Boston used secrecy 
clauses in settling child molestation claims against at least seventy priests over a decade); 
Benjamin Weiser, Forging a “Covenant of Silence”: Secret Settlement Shrouds Health 
Impact of Xerox Plant Leak, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1989, at A1. 
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agreements;27 and whether secrecy provisions that suppress 
information about health or safety dangers should be outlawed.28 
The antisecrecy arguments have led to some reforms.  Several 
states have enacted “sunshine in litigation” laws that limit the ability 
of judges to enter secrecy orders and declare out-of-court settlements 
that conceal health or safety hazards to be contrary to public policy 
and unenforceable.29  The federal district court in South Carolina has 
adopted a rule prohibiting the sealing of settlement agreements filed 
with the court.30  More generally, there has been an evolution in the 
judicial stance toward court-ordered secrecy.  Courts have intensified 
their scrutiny of stipulated protective orders and sealing requests, 
placing greater weight on the public interest in access to 
information.31  Judicial involvement in agreements that impede other 
litigants’ access to relevant information has also fallen into disfavor.  
Judges increasingly insist that protective orders provide for discovery 
 
27 The battle lines have been drawn between secrecy advocates, who see courts as 
dispute-resolution mechanisms and favor giving judges broad leeway to enter and enforce 
secrecy orders to make litigation more efficient and promote settlement, and 
confidentiality critics, who view adjudication as a “public good” and argue that the public 
has a right of access to information generated by court processes, and that judges have a 
responsibility to scrutinize parties’ secrecy agreements to ensure that public interests are 
protected.  See generally Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of 
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999) 
(discussing both sides of the debate and advocating a balancing approach). 
28 See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be 
Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883 (2004) (arguing that statutes, court rules, and professional 
ethics rules should be strengthened to prevent settlements that bar disclosure of 
information concerning dangers to public health or safety); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Disclosure Dilemma, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at D1 (arguing that restrictions on 
settlement confidentiality will be ineffective in promoting public safety). 
29 Statutes or court rules to this effect have been enacted in Texas, Florida, Louisiana, 
Washington, and Arkansas.  For descriptions of the state laws and discussion of their 
limited effectiveness, see Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the 
Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 375, 394–400, 417–33 (2006); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 
(West Supp. 2008).  Even in the absence of legislation, some courts have refused to 
enforce agreements that hide information about health or safety risks, deeming them 
contrary to public policy.  See, e.g., C.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). 
30 D.S.C. Local R. 5.03(E).  See generally Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy, 55 
S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004) (articles discussing the South Carolina rule). 
31 See, e.g., Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943 
(7th Cir. 1999); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); Gleba v. 
Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 98-230, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 364 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 6, 2001). 
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sharing with plaintiffs in similar cases32 and refuse to enforce private 
noncooperation agreements when they interfere with discovery or 
informal investigation in another proceeding.33 
None of these reforms prevent lawyers from negotiating 
noncooperation agreements that are effective in achieving their ends.  
Having the settlement take the form of a private, out-of-court contract 
obviates the need for judicial approval.34  The prospect that a 
noncooperation agreement will be found unenforceable if challenged 
by a third party seeking information does not prevent settling parties 
from entering into one.35  The agreement can be structured to give the 
plaintiff ample incentive to comply by making future payments 
contingent on continued silence, or by creating the risk that if a court 
does find the agreement valid, the plaintiff who breached will be 
liable for liquidated damages or attorney’s fees.36  As Ms. Martinez’s 
case illustrates, even without judicial enforcement, such agreements 
can prevent relevant evidence from reaching other litigants.  As a 
 
32 See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 
2003); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Doré, 
supra note 9, at 812–13; Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and 
Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 67, 92–93 (2000); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery 
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 493–500. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 185–203. 
34 See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the presumption 
of public access to judicial proceedings does not extend to settlement agreements 
embodied in private contracts, where only a stipulation of dismissal has been filed with the 
court); Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case 
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 732 (2004) (explaining that 
the South Carolina district court rule against sealed settlements is designed to address 
“court involvement in the business of enforcing secrecy” and does nothing to prohibit 
“bilateral secrecy covenants between the litigants”). 
35 Cf. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 344 (1998) (noting that regulation through contract law will not 
prevent private parties from pressuring others to agree to silence, but will deprive them of 
a court’s assistance in enforcing such promises).  In addition, the state “sunshine laws” 
that declare agreements concealing health or safety hazards to be void and unenforceable, 
see supra note 29, generally will have no effect on secret settlements in many types of 
litigation in which they are common, such as employment discrimination and fraud. 
36 In a column in the New York Law Journal, two big firm lawyers advised that, 
“because enforceability of a confidentiality agreement may be ‘problematic’ on public 
policy grounds, it should contain, if deemed appropriate, a liquidated damages provision, a 
staggered payment schedule, or both, to diminish the likelihood of an unwanted 
disclosure.”  Joel Cohen & Joseph Strauss, Confidentiality Agreements and Crime, N.Y. 
L.J., Dec. 23, 2002, at 4; see also Koniak, supra note 13, at 805 (noting that parties can 
easily work around unenforceability by providing for payments over time).  Ms. 
Martinez’s settlement included both a liquidated damages provision and staggered 
payments.  See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
 2008] Buying Witness Silence 495 
result, valid claims may never be brought or will be rendered harder 
to prove.  Even when they do not succeed in suppressing evidence 
entirely, noncooperation settlements impose the substantial costs of 
taking a deposition, or obtaining a judicial ruling, on parties who 
otherwise would have been able to obtain relevant information 
informally, and at minimal expense, from a willing witness.37 
II 
THE STANDARD VIEW AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Can an attorney ethically demand, or agree to, a settlement 
conditioned on noncooperation in other proceedings?  The question 
has generally been examined only as a part of the broader question of 
whether lawyers can ethically agree to secrecy concerning the 
settlement terms and underlying facts of the case.38   The standard 
response to that question is concisely summarized by the authors of a 
treatise on litigation ethics: 
“Zealous advocacy” may require that the defense lawyer request 
confidentiality, and the client’s interests may mandate that the 
plaintiff’s lawyer accept [it] to obtain a favorable settlement. 
 . . . .  
 . . . [I]t seems clear as a matter of legal ethics that the lawyer’s 
paramount obligation is to the client. . . . [T]he ultimate decision to 
participate or not to participate in a settlement coupled with a “gag 
order” is the client’s.39 
The underlying assumption is that as long as it is legal for the client to 
agree to secrecy, it is not unethical for a lawyer to assist the client in 
accomplishing her lawful objectives.  The ethics rules’ animating 
principles of loyalty, zeal,40 and client autonomy require abiding by 
 
37 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 115 (discussing the importance of informal 
witness interviews because of “the considerable expense of formal discovery, which can 
be prohibitive for many plaintiffs”). 
38 The major exception is Gillers, supra note 10. 
39 WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 580 (1996) (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, U.S. District 
Court Judge Jack Weinstein observed, “Since the ethical rules require that attorneys obtain 
a swift and optimal recovery for their clients, the plaintiffs’ attorney seems to have little 
choice but to accept a favorable settlement offer on secrecy terms.”  Weinstein, supra note 
16, at 511. 
40 A lawyer’s obligation to “represent [a] client zealously within the bounds of the law” 
was the mantra of the Model Code.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 
7, EC 7-1, EC 7-19, DR 7-101 (1981).  The disciplinary provisions of the Model Rules 
articulate blander and weaker-sounding duties of “competence” and “reasonable 
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the client’s decision, even if it imposes costs or injustice on third 
parties.41 
The basis for the standard view is readily apparent from the ethics 
codes’ key provisions relating to client decision making and 
settlement.  Model Rule 1.2 requires the lawyer to “abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation” and “whether 
to settle a matter.”42  These obligations are subject to an outer 
limitation: the lawyer must not counsel or assist the client in “conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,”43 or take actions on 
behalf of the client that “will result in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.”44  The only ethics rule that 
explicitly rules out settlement terms that may be desired by a client is 
Rule 5.6(b), which forbids a lawyer from participating in the offering 
or making of a settlement agreement that restricts the lawyer’s right to 
practice.45  In addition, the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, contained 
 
diligence,” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (2008), but the preamble and 
commentary make it clear that “the basic principles underlying the Rules . . . include the 
lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within 
the bounds of the law.”  Id. pmbl. para. 9; see also id. pmbl. para. 2 & R. 1.3 cmt. 1; 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 71 (noting that zealous advocacy remains a 
“pervasive ethic” under the Model Rules). 
41 See Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 22, at 19 (noting, with respect to settlement 
secrecy, that “[u]nder the existing ethical scheme the plaintiff attorney’s duty of loyalty 
requires putting the client’s interests ahead of all others. . . . [T]he plaintiff’s attorney has 
no affirmative ethical obligation to consider the interests of third parties or the general 
public”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (2008) (“Responsibility to 
a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client,” so 
long as the legally protected rights of third persons are not violated.); Susan P. Koniak, 
The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1395–96 & n.24 (1992) 
(describing the idea that a lawyer should do everything possible within the law to further 
the client’s cause, “no matter what moral wrongs are perpetrated on others in the process,” 
as “a classic formulation of the legal profession’s ethos”). 
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008); see also MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981). 
43 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008).  Similarly, under the Model 
Code, it is impermissible for a lawyer to “[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the 
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 
7-102(A)(7) (1981). 
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2008); see also MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1981). 
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2008).  Model Rule 5.6(b) and the 
nearly identical Model Code provision, DR 2-108(b), clearly prohibit settlement clauses 
that bar the plaintiff’s lawyer from representing future clients in suits against the same 
defendant.  The ABA’s and several states’ ethics committees have construed the rule to 
also prohibit settlements that would bar a lawyer from using (as opposed to disclosing) 
information obtained during a representation.  Thus, a lawyer could not be prevented from 
making use of the knowledge gained in one case as a basis for deciding what records or 
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in Rule 1.6, requires, with narrow exceptions, that the lawyer not 
reveal any information relating to the representation unless authorized 
to do so by the client.46  Based on these provisions, ABA and state 
ethics opinions, and most commentators, have concluded that it is 
ethically permissible for lawyers to agree to keep the underlying facts 
of a case confidential as part of a settlement.47 
Lawyers who represent defendants in civil litigation tend to 
endorse the view that they are, and should be, free to negotiate any 
lawful settlement terms that will benefit their clients.48  Some 
plaintiffs’ attorneys likewise have no qualms about making secrecy 
“an item for barter on the road to resolution,”49 using it as leverage to 
gain larger recoveries for their clients and bigger contingent fees for 
 
witnesses to subpoena in future cases against the same defendant.  See ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-417 (2000); Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of the 
Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 98-F-141 (1998); Colo. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal 
Ethics Op. 92 (1993).  Agreements that would prevent a lawyer from disclosing 
information about the defendant that is a matter of public record have also been found to 
be impermissible practice restrictions.  See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 335 (2006); 
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 730 (2000).  All of these 
opinions take the view that settlements barring disclosure of nonpublic facts learned in the 
course of representing a client are permissible under Rule 5.6(b). 
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008); see also MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981). 
47 See ethics opinions cited supra note 45; see also N.C. State Bar, 2003 Formal Ethics 
Op. 9 (2004); SECTION OF LITIGATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR 
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 4.2.6 (2002); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective 
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 489–90 (1991); Joel S. 
Newman, Gagging on the Public Interest, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 371, 372–73 (1990); 
Anne-Thérèse Béchamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public 
Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 155 (1990); Heather Waldbeser & 
Heather DeGrave, Current Development, A Plaintiff’s Lawyer’s Dilemma: The Ethics of 
Entering a Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 825–26 (2003).  But 
see Alan F. Blakley, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: Ethical Obligations of Officers of the 
Court in Possession of Information of Public Interest, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 65 (2003) 
(arguing that attorneys’ general duties as officers of the court sometimes require them to 
make disclosure in the public interest). 
48 The argument for client autonomy is usually coupled with a substantive defense of 
settlement secrecy as way to protect legitimate privacy, business, and reputational 
interests, and to help deter frivolous lawsuits.  See, e.g., Stephen E. Darling, Confidential 
Settlements: The Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. REV. 785 (2004); Epstein, supra note 28.  
But see ZITRIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 569 (stating that many in-house counsel and 
defense lawyers wish they could refuse to help clients hide the truth about safety dangers). 
49 Joseph A. Golden, Secrecy Clauses, A Negotiated Restraint on Free Speech, 73 
MICH. B.J. 550, 550 (1994).  Golden, a plaintiffs’ employment lawyer, writes, “A desire to 
‘teach the company a lesson’ or ‘make an example of it’ has made for difficult 
negotiations, not between the parties, but between plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel.”  Id. at 
551. 
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themselves.  But many in the plaintiffs’ bar have strong misgivings 
about the public harms caused by secret settlements.  The Association 
of Trial Lawyers of America (“ATLA”) has issued a resolution 
denouncing secrecy agreements that bar disclosure of discovery 
materials and the underlying facts of settled cases as detrimental to 
public health and safety, the proper functioning of the civil justice 
system, and the interests of individual victims.50  ATLA encourages 
attorneys to refuse to enter into secrecy agreements.51  Civil rights 
and public interest lawyers have also expressed concern that 
agreements requiring that the terms of settlement be kept confidential 
undermine the public and deterrent purposes of enforcement efforts.52 
The standard view of the ethics rules, however, leaves lawyers who 
would like to “just say no” to secrecy agreements with little room to 
maneuver.  In their book The Moral Compass of the American 
Lawyer, Richard Zitrin and Carol Langford describe the dilemma 
faced by a products liability lawyer representing a widow in a 
wrongful death suit against the manufacturer of her deceased 
husband’s implanted heart valve.53  When the plaintiff’s discovery 
yielded documents proving that the defendant knew about dangerous 
design flaws in its product, the defendant’s lawyer offered a 
settlement significantly larger than what the plaintiff would be likely 
to recover at trial, contingent on strict secrecy and the return of all 
discovery documents.  The plaintiff’s lawyer agonized about how to 
present this offer to her client.  She was concerned that others could 
die if the heart valve’s dangers were not exposed, but was also aware 
of “the guiding principle that her first duty is to her client, not the 
public at large.”54  When the attorney met with the client and her 
family, she discussed both the monetary advantages of accepting the 
offer and “how other people with similar heart valves could be hurt or 
even die unless the truth became known,” but did not advise them 
what to do.55  After thinking it over, the family decided to accept the 
 
50 ATLA RESOLUTION, supra note 22, at 876.  In 2006, ATLA changed its name to the 
American Association for Justice. 
51 See id. at 877. 
52 See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
927 (2006); Newman, supra note 47, at 372. 
53 See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER 183–85, 205–08 (1999).  The account is a composite based on actual 
situations that the authors encountered in their legal ethics consulting practices.  See id. at 
4. 
54 Id. at 185. 
55 Id. at 206. 
 2008] Buying Witness Silence 499 
offer.  Later, the attorney regretted not having expressed her own 
moral concerns more forcefully, and wished that she had given her 
client “the big speech” about all the other families who lost loved 
ones because of the defective heart valve and “what they would have 
to go through to fight their case from scratch.”56   Prospectively, she 
and her partners decided to add a provision to the firm’s retainer 
agreement stating that the client will not accept any settlement with 
secrecy conditions that hide safety dangers.  However, the lawyers 
understood that the retainer provision was unenforceable.57 
The story provides a vivid illustration of the limited scope of action 
that the ethics rules afford to attorneys concerned about the dangers of 
secret settlements.  Moral counseling is authorized, and even 
encouraged, under both the Model Rules and the Model Code.58  
Thus, it is entirely permissible to raise the issue with the client, 
whether by presenting the moral ramifications as one relevant factor 
for the client to consider, as the attorney in the heart valve case did, 
or — as she later wished she had done— i n the form of advice that 
openly expresses the lawyer’s viewpoint and is designed to persuade 
the client to concur.59  Some plaintiffs’ lawyers have reported great 
 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 207–08.  The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers takes the position 
that “[r]egardless of any contrary contract with a lawyer, a client may revoke a lawyer’s 
authority to make . . . decisions” that are reserved to the client, including “whether and on 
what terms to settle a claim.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 22 (2000).  The commentary to the Model Rules is to the same effect.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2008).  The lawyer’s duty of candor to 
the client would require letting the client know that she has the right to revoke such an 
agreement.  See id. R. 1.2(c) (client’s “informed consent” must be obtained to any 
agreement limiting the scope of representation); id. R. 2.1 (duty to give client “candid 
advice”). 
58 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008) (“In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”); MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7–8 (1981) (“In assisting his client to reach a proper 
decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a 
decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.”); see generally Larry O. Natt 
Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients 
on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365 (2005) (discussing Rule 2.1 
and other provisions bearing on moral counseling, and concluding that attorneys are at 
times obligated to discuss moral and other nonlegal issues with their clients). 
59 See Béchamps, supra note 47, at 156 (suggesting that lawyers concerned about secret 
settlements engage their clients “in a dialogue regarding their joint responsibility for 
certain community-shared values, such as fairness to others, especially in cases of public 
interest”).  How to conduct moral counseling effectively, and in a manner that is respectful 
of the client’s dignity and autonomy, is a difficult issue.  For a thoughtful discussion, see 
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success in getting clients to agree to and stick with a policy of no 
settlement secrecy,60 but more of the practitioner literature suggests, 
not surprisingly, that moral counseling will be unavailing with many 
clients who have compelling needs for cash or closure.  As one 
plaintiffs’ lawyer put it: 
A client who is desperate for funds for medical care or other 
expenses . . . may have no choice but to accept what the defendant 
offers.  Putting the public good before the client’s interests . . . 
would be a breach of the lawyer’s ethical duty to the client if it 
meant the defendant’s refusal to settle.61 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by numerous plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.  Despite strong misgivings about settlement secrecy, they 
feel that their hands are tied.62 
 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A 
NUTSHELL 261–99 (4th ed. 2005). 
60 An article written by partners in a San Francisco plaintiffs’ firm reports that, in 
“seven years since our law office stopped accepting these [secrecy] agreements, not one 
case has failed to settle or has settled for less as a result of this policy.”  Maja Ramsey et 
al., Keeping Secrets with Confidentiality Agreements, TRIAL, Aug. 1998, at 38, 40.  During 
the first client interview, they explain the reasons for their policy and secure the client’s 
commitment not to accept a secret settlement.  “Let clients know that when a settlement is 
being presented to them, their commitment may waver, but you will remind them of their 
desire to see justice done.”  Id. at 39.  Although “most clients with whom you have 
developed trust will support you . . . , once an acceptable settlement amount has been 
offered, some may just want to end the case.”  Id. at 40.  With these clients, the firm goes 
into full persuasion mode.  In one case, the firm offered to reduce its fees by $25,000 to 
show how important resisting confidentiality was to them, and the client then agreed to 
stand firm —with no reduction in fees — and the case still settled for the amount originally 
offered.  See id. at 40–41; see also TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS 
ACCOUNTABLE 152–54 (2008) (discussing noneconomic motivations that led many 
plaintiffs and their attorneys in clergy sexual abuse cases to resist financial incentives to 
accept secret settlements); James A. Lowe, How to Fight Protective Orders: Strategies 
and Sources of Support, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 76, 77–78 (stating that most plaintiffs will 
accept their lawyers’ advice to refuse settlement offers conditioned on complete 
confidentiality because of their desire to help others and prevent future deaths). 
61 Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRIAL, June 1999, at 55, 
56. 
62 “[T]hey offer a big settlement if you’ll keep quiet. . . . You’re representing a client, 
not a public interest.  I have clients with injuries who need the money.  What are we 
supposed to do?  Our hands are tied.”  Siegel, supra note 18 (quoting a Seattle plaintiff’s 
attorney).  For similar attorney statements, see Carroll et al., supra note 26; Davan 
Maharaj, Firestone Recall Puts Spotlight on Secret Liability Settlements, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 2000, at A3; Sacha Pfeiffer, Crisis in the Church: Critical Eye Cast 
on Sex Abuse Lawyers Confidentiality, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 2002, at A1; Weiser, 
supra note 26.  For practitioner articles expressing this view, see Philip H. Corboy, Secret 
Settlements: The Challenges Remain, TRIAL, June 1993, at 122, 122–24; E. Marla Felcher, 
Safety Secrets Keep Consumers in the Dark, TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 40, 48–49; Martin H. 
Freeman & Robert K. Jenner, Just Say No: Resisting Protective Orders, TRIAL, Mar. 1990, 
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When the issue is framed as a conflict between the client’s right to 
decide and the interests of the public or third parties, the ethics rules 
do in fact effectively tie the lawyer’s hands.  Under the Model Rules, 
lawyers are required to “abide by a client’s decisions” concerning the 
objectives of the representation and whether to settle a matter, and to 
“consult with the client” about the means to be employed in pursuit of 
these ends.63  Assuming that the decision to include a secrecy clause 
in a settlement can be categorized as a question of means — how to 
effectuate a settlement — r ather than as one of objectives or “whether 
to settle,” the leeway that the Model Rules provide is still exceedingly 
narrow.  The commentary to Rule 1.2 notes that “lawyers usually 
defer to the client regarding such questions as    . . . concern for third 
persons who might be adversely affected.”64  “Usually” does not 
mean “always,” and the rule on its face does not require the lawyer to 
defer.65  If the lawyer does not accept the client’s decision, however, 
the only recourse available to the lawyer is to withdraw from the 
representation — and even that may be impossible if the tribunal 
denies permission to withdraw.66  In the end, the lawyer has little 
 
at 66, 70; James L. Gilbert et al., The Price of Silence, TRIAL, June 1994, at 17, 18; 
Eugene I. Pavalon & Thomas G. Alvary, Protective and Secrecy Orders: Time for Change, 
TRIAL, Mar. 1991, at 110, 113; Nicole Schultheis, Court Secrecy: A Continuing National 
Disgrace, LITIG., Winter 2002, at 29, 29–30. 
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008). 
64 Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 2.  Another rule prohibits the use of means “that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person,” even if desired by a 
client.  Id. R. 4.4(a).  The “no substantial purpose” qualification leaves the rule with little 
content.  Settlement secrecy clearly serves purposes that benefit one or both of the 
contracting parties. 
65 See also id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (stating that a lawyer “is not bound . . . to press for every 
advantage that might be realized for a client” and “may have authority to exercise 
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued”).  
The Model Code is more categorical in endorsing client authority to decide whether to use 
means that may harm others.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 
(1981) (“[T]he decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because 
of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for [the lawyer].”). 
66 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2008) (permitting a lawyer to 
withdraw if “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or 
with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement”); id. R. 1.16(c) (requiring the 
lawyer to comply with applicable law requiring a tribunal’s permission to withdraw and to 
continue the representation if the tribunal so orders).  Under the Model Code, a lawyer’s 
disagreement with a client’s decision affords a permissible basis for withdrawal only “in a 
matter not pending before a tribunal.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
110(C)(1)(e) (1981); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL 
STUDY 159, 393–97 (1988) (analyzing the Model Code and Model Rules and concluding 
that they “put ultimate decision-making authority about whether to forgo an unjust action 
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choice but to assist the client in settling on any terms that the client 
deems acceptable, so long as those terms are not criminal, fraudulent, 
or placed off-limits by an ethics rule. 
Recent changes to the confidentiality provisions of the Model 
Rules may have the indirect effect of making it impermissible for 
lawyers to enter into some settlement secrecy arrangements that hide 
safety risks.  The exceptions to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality 
contained in the original version of Model Rule 1.6 had no apparent 
application to the issue of settlement secrecy.  Lawyers were 
authorized to disclose information to prevent “imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm,” but only in situations where the danger 
stemmed from an intended criminal act by the lawyer’s own client.67  
In 2002, the ABA broadened this exception, which now reads as 
follows: “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm.”68  The danger need not come from the client, or involve an 
intended crime.  Thus, under the new rule, a plaintiff’s lawyer may 
blow the whistle on serious continuing safety risks arising from the 
defendant’s conduct, even if the lawyer’s client agreed to keep the 
information confidential.  Professor Susan Koniak has argued that in 
jurisdictions that adopt the new rule, it is unethical for a lawyer to 
agree to a settlement that bars the lawyer from disclosing such 
information, because “discretion given . . . for the purpose of 
protecting the courts, third parties, or society as a whole should not be 
available as an asset for the lawyer to trade away for her own 
pecuniary benefit or that of her client.”69 
 
in the hands of the client, [and] the lawyer’s autonomy is ultimately limited to 
withdrawal”). 
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (authorizing disclosure “to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result 
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm”).  A parallel provision in the Code permits 
disclosure of the client’s intention to commit a crime and any information necessary to 
prevent it.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981). 
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).  In 2003, in response to the 
Enron and corporate fraud scandals, the ABA House of Delegates added further exceptions 
to the confidentiality rule that permit disclosures to prevent a client crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury to others, or to prevent, rectify, 
or mitigate the financial harm caused by such conduct.  These exceptions apply only in 
situations where the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services in furtherance of the 
crime or fraud.  See id. R. 1.6(b)(2) & (3). 
69 Koniak, supra note 13, at 808; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, 
Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 284–85 (2006); Fred C. 
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Nonetheless, for several reasons the ABA’s broadening of the 
confidentiality exception is unlikely to have much of an impact on 
settlement secrecy.  Nearly half of the states have not adopted the 
ABA’s new bodily harm exception and continue to restrict such 
disclosures to situations related to preventing the lawyer’s own client 
from committing a crime.70  Where the rule has been adopted, it kicks 
in only when death or serious injury is “reasonably certain.”71  A 
lawyer faced with a settlement offer that is financially advantageous 
to the client, and to the lawyer herself, will have strong incentive to 
conclude that any danger posed by the conduct covered by a 
confidentiality agreement falls short of this threshold.72  The bodily 
harm exception has no application to nonphysical injuries, such as 
 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 51–57 (2005) (arguing that discretionary rules such as the one permitting disclosures to 
protect third parties from harm require that lawyers exercise conscientious discretion, and 
it is an abuse of discretion to enter into an agreement never to disclose).  Several states, in 
adopting the ABA’s revised bodily harm rule, have made the disclosure duty mandatory 
rather than discretionary.  See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) 
(2006); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2008); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).  In those jurisdictions, it is clearly unethical for an attorney 
to agree not to make disclosures that are mandatory under the rules.  Cf. ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994) (concluding that in 
circumstances where Model Rule 8.3 requires a lawyer to report misconduct by another 
lawyer, a settlement agreement barring such disclosure would violate the Rules). 
70 As of the end of December 2008, the ABA’s new version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) 
had been substantially adopted in twenty-nine states. 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).  The official comment says 
that the “reasonably certain” requirement is satisfied when there is “a present and 
substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date.”  Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 6.  
However, the language of the rule itself suggests a more stringent standard.  A few states 
adopting the rule have eliminated the “reasonably certain” requirement or replaced it with 
a “reasonably likely” standard.  See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) 
(2006); GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(ii) (2008); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 20:1.6(c)(1) (2008). 
72 See David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL 
ETHICS 125, 128–29 (1999) (arguing that a proposed rule prohibiting lawyers from 
negotiating settlement agreements that suppress information about substantial dangers to 
public health or safety would be ineffective because lawyers will resolve doubts in favor 
of concluding that the danger is insufficient to trigger the rule).  There is reason to believe 
that lawyers tend to resolve all doubts against making disclosures harmful to their clients’ 
interests.  See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer 
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 128–30 (1994) 
(finding, based on a survey of New Jersey attorneys, that in situations where a state ethics 
rule required them to report information to prevent bodily harm, a majority failed to do so, 
and less than nine percent of attorneys who faced situations where the rule required 
disclosure to prevent financial injuries to others complied). 
 504 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 481 
those caused by employment discrimination.73  In addition, the rule 
only authorizes disclosures necessary to prevent future death or injury 
from occurring, not disclosures aimed at helping other victims recover 
compensation for their past injuries.74  Finally, the rule’s effect on 
secrecy agreements is, at most, to prohibit a lawyer from promising 
not to disclose certain information.  Noncooperation agreements that 
bar the lawyer’s client from submitting to voluntary witness 
interviews, and thereby increase the cost to other parties of gathering 
evidence, are unaffected. 
Arguments against settlement secrecy that are premised on the 
public interest in disclosure and the need to protect others from harm 
are morally powerful, but the framework of the existing ethics rules 
does very little to accommodate them.  The dominant paradigm 
reflected in the ethics codes posits that in the long run, society is best 
served if lawyers keep their clients’ confidences and pursue their 
clients’ interests, and that lawyers have “no responsibilities to third 
parties or the public different from that of the minimal compliance 
with law that is required of everyone.”75  Lawyers who would like to 
“just say no” to secret settlements because of their public harms, 
without violating the rules themselves, are largely stuck.  To break 
out of the bind would require either a change in the law or a radical 
rethinking of lawyers’ ethics.  As for the first, little headway has been 
 
73 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).  The provisions of the 
ABA’s new confidentiality rule that allow disclosures to prevent injuries of a nonphysical 
nature apply only where the harm arises from a client’s crime or fraud in which the 
lawyer’s services have been used.  See id. R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).  Many states have rules 
authorizing disclosures aimed at preventing financial injury to others, but nearly all such 
rules are limited to situations where such disclosure is necessary to prevent client crime or 
fraud.  See Disclosure: Crimes and Frauds, Lawyers’ Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
§ 55:901 (2008) (describing state rules).  New Jersey appears to be the only state that has 
enacted a confidentiality exception broad enough to allow disclosures aimed at preventing 
financial injuries caused by “illegal” (not just criminal or fraudulent) conduct by a client 
or nonclient.  N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)–(c) (2006). 
74 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).  Disclosures for the 
purpose of rectifying financial injuries are allowed under the new ABA confidentiality rule 
and the rules of some states, but only in situations where the harm resulted from a client 
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the lawyer’s services were used.  Id. R. 1.6(b)(3); 
Disclosure: Crimes and Frauds, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 55:901 
(2008) (describing state rules). 
75 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 8 (1998) (characterizing the 
“Dominant View” of legal ethics); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
para. 8 (2008) (positing that zealous advocacy and preserving client confidences ordinarily 
serve the public interest). 
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made in enacting legislation to outlaw secrecy agreements.76  With 
respect to the latter, legal scholars have sought to redefine the 
lawyer’s role to place greater weight on “ordinary morality” or 
achieving justice than on client interests,77 but ABA rule drafters and 
the state courts responsible for adopting disciplinary codes have 
shown little interest in departing from the traditional paradigm.  The 
ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission rejected a proposal to amend the 
Model Rules to prohibit lawyer involvement in settlements that hide 
information about health or safety risks from the public, unanimously 
agreeing “that the ethics rules were not the vehicle for solving this 
problem.”78 
In recent years, several commentators have argued that 
noncooperation agreements and some other types of settlement 
secrecy are, in fact, already illegal.  Stephen Gillers has attacked 
attorney involvement in noncooperation settlements on the ground 
that such agreements violate federal obstruction of justice laws.79  
Susan Koniak and John Freeman have argued that settlements 
suppressing information about unlawful conduct amount to the crime 
of compounding.80  These are arguments that operate within the 
premises of the standard view; they assume that a lawyer may 
ethically negotiate any lawful settlement terms but rely on the outer 
limitation the rules set on zealous advocacy: a lawyer must not 
counsel or assist in conduct the lawyer knows to be criminal.81  The 
flip side of this ethical analysis is that if the criminality of such 
settlements is unclear, it does not violate the rules for an attorney to 
 
76 See Koniak, supra note 13, at 809 (arguing that, in order to prevent lawyers from 
negotiating secrecy agreements that hide information about wrongful conduct, “other law 
needs to outlaw these agreements”); supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing 
legislative efforts to regulate settlement secrecy). 
77 See LUBAN, supra note 66; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 49–
80 (2000); SIMON, supra note 75. 
78 Comm’n on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ABA Ctr. for Prof’l 
Responsibility, Minutes, pt. V (Feb. 16–17, 2001), available at http://www.abanet 
.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-02-16mtg.html.  The proposed rule would have barred lawyers from 
participating in settlements that “restrict the availability to the public of information that 
the lawyer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to . . . health or 
safety.”  Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t 
Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 116 (1999). 
79 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 5, 12–13. 
80 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 835–37; Koniak, supra note 13, at 793–95, 802. 
81 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981); Freeman, supra note 13, at 845; Gillers, supra 
note 10, at 13; Koniak, supra note 13, at 806–07.  
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negotiate settlement terms that will serve the client’s interests.  There 
have been no court decisions finding criminal liability based on 
settlement secrecy, or even any known prosecutions.  While 
acknowledging uncertainty in the law,82 Gillers takes the view that, at 
a minimum, lawyers have a professional obligation to advise their 
clients that noncooperation agreements expose them to a significant 
risk of criminal liability,83 advice that probably would be sufficient to 
dissuade most clients from pursuing such agreements. 
The absence of prosecutions, however, is not simply a matter of 
prosecutorial forbearance.  It is very unlikely that a settlement that 
prohibits voluntary disclosures to private litigants would be found to 
be criminal.  (The reasons, which are complex and may not be of 
interest to all readers, are addressed in the Appendix to this Article.)  
Certain types of noncooperation provisions do run a high risk of 
violating criminal statutes — those that make no exception for 
disclosures in response to a subpoena or court order, forbid voluntary 
disclosures to a court or government agency when an official 
proceeding is known to be pending or imminent, or prohibit 
informing law enforcement authorities about criminal conduct (under 
certain circumstances).  As a general matter, however, the risk of 
criminal liability for a carefully drafted noncooperation agreement is 
minimal.84  Therefore, attorneys have no obligation to refrain from 
noncooperation settlements because they “know” them to be criminal, 
or to warn their clients that they face significant risk by entering into 
such settlements. 
III 
THE RULES AGAINST REQUESTING WITNESS NONCOOPERATION 
The standard view of the ethics of settlement secrecy, with its 
focus on the client’s autonomy to pursue any lawful objective and the 
lawyer’s duty to abide by client decisions, leaves lawyers with little 
choice but to participate in settlements that hide relevant facts from 
other litigants.  The standard view, however, overlooks a crucial 
dimension of lawyers’ ethical obligations.  It conceptualizes the 
problem as a conflict between client interests and the potential for 
 
82 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 3, 16; see also Koniak, supra note 13, at 794–95, 806. 
83 Gillers, supra note 10, at 3, 12, 16. 
84 See infra Appendix, text accompanying notes 353–55, 360–61, 363, 369–70 
(discussing circumstances under which noncooperation provisions may violate criminal 
statutes and drafting approaches that avoid any significant risk of criminal liability). 
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harm to third parties or society.  Under the ethics rules, the lawyer’s 
fundamental duties to clients — zealous advocacy, respect for client 
autonomy and confidentiality —nearly always trump concerns for the 
welfare of outsiders.  However, another strand in the ethics codes 
imposes significant limitations on lawyer conduct that are designed to 
protect the integrity of adjudication and the proper functioning of an 
adversary system of justice.  These duties do not depend on what 
clients want or what “other law” allows.  They are obligations that 
derive from the lawyer’s role as an “officer of the legal system” with 
“special responsibility for the quality of justice.”85  Two such duties 
have direct bearing on the propriety of lawyers offering or accepting 
settlements conditioned on noncooperation: the requirement that 
lawyers not ask potential witnesses to withhold voluntary cooperation 
from other parties, and the prohibition of attorney conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Model Rule 3.4(f) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . request a 
person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant 
information to another party.”86   An exception allows such requests 
to be made to a relative, employee, or other agent of the client, 
provided that “the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s 
interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such 
information.”87  The rule has its roots in an influential and widely 
accepted formal ethics opinion issued by the American Bar 
Association in 1935.88  It rests on the idea that the fair and efficient 
functioning of the adversary system requires that litigants and their 
lawyers have an unfettered opportunity to seek information relevant 
to their claims, and that the decision whether to cooperate should be a 
voluntary one made by the witness.  When lawyers try to obstruct 
voluntary cooperation, they are interfering with the proper 
functioning of the adversary system by making informal witness 
interviews, an essential tool of case preparation, unavailable to their 
adversaries, and requiring them to resort to more costly, and often less 
effective, means of gathering evidence. 
How significant a barrier Rule 3.4(f) poses to noncooperation 
settlements depends on questions of interpretation.  The rule generally 
 
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008). 
86 Id. R. 3.4(f).  The Restatement recognizes this duty as well.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116(4) (2000). 
87 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1)–(2) (2008). 
88 See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935), discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 105–11. 
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prohibits a lawyer from requesting a nonclient to “refrain from 
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party.”89  The 
rule’s language contains no exception for requests made as part of a 
settlement offer, but can an implicit settlement exception be read into 
the rule?  Does the phrase “another party” apply only to a person who 
is formally a party in a pending case, or does it also extend to 
individuals or entities with potential claims against the lawyer’s 
client?  Under the narrower reading, most noncooperation 
agreements, which are aimed at potential future claims, would lie 
outside the rule’s scope.  A great deal also depends on how broadly or 
narrowly one reads the exception allowing such requests to be made 
to an employee or agent of the client.  Does the exception allow 
noncooperation agreements in settlements with former employees, or 
in severance agreements made prior to an employee’s termination? 
Model Rule 8.4(d), which carries forward an identical provision 
from the Model Code, declares that it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice.”90  It may be invoked in situations not covered by Rule 
3.4(f)’s express terms but implicating its core purposes, such as when 
a plaintiff’s lawyer accepts a noncooperation clause offered by 
opposing counsel, or a defense lawyer demands that a plaintiff not 
testify voluntarily at a trial or hearing.91 
A closer look at the origins and development of the principle that 
requests for witness noncooperation are improper will help to shed 
light on the prohibition’s purpose and how the applicable ethics rules 
should be interpreted.  The idea that obstructing access to informal 
witness interviews interferes with the proper functioning of the 
adversary system, and is therefore impermissible conduct for 
attorneys, was well-established by the 1930s and familiar to the 
drafters of modern ethics codes.  An extensive body of judicial 
precedent, developed in several different contexts, disapproves of 
efforts to obstruct litigants’ access to informal witness interviews for 
the same reasons.92 
The general question of what interpretive approach to follow in 
construing ambiguous or vaguely framed professional conduct rules 
 
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008). 
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981). 
91 See infra notes 246–63, 279–81 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra Parts III.A–D. 
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also requires attention.  Ethics rules should not be read like penal 
statutes; they should be construed in a way that is not unmoored from 
the rules’ language but strives to give full effect to the underlying 
principles implicit in the codes’ structure and purposes.93  
Approached in this way, the rules can and should be construed to 
forbid attorneys, with few exceptions, from negotiating settlements 
conditioned on noncooperation.94 
A.  Origins of the Principle 
The ABA’s first ethics code, the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics, contained a provision suggesting that a public prosecutor 
should not request a witness to refrain from disclosing exculpatory 
evidence to defense counsel,95 but otherwise offered scant guidance 
on how far a lawyer may go in influencing a nonclient’s cooperation 
with an adversary.96  Case law and treatises on legal ethics through 
the early twentieth century also had little to say on the subject.97  The 
first ethical standard on access to witnesses came in 1928, when the 
 
93 See infra Part IV.A. 
94 See infra Part IV.B. 
95 ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908) (“The suppression of facts or the 
secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly 
reprehensible.”). 
96 Canon 9 made it clear that the lawyer’s own client could be advised not to speak with 
an opposing attorney.  See id. Canon 9 (prohibiting lawyer communications with a party 
represented by counsel about the matter in controversy).  Other canons admonished all 
lawyers to “treat adverse witnesses . . . with fairness and due consideration” and to “deal . . 
. candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses.”  Id. Canons 18, 22. 
97 Some early ethics treatises, in general terms, condemned interference with a witness’s 
availability or testimony.  See 2 EDWARD M. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW § 818 (1914) (“[A] lawyer who in any manner attempts to suppress truth, or to 
prevent a witness from appearing in court . . . is guilty of misconduct . . . .”); GEORGE 
WILLIAM WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS § 191a (2d ed. 1920) (stating that it is 
unethical for an attorney to tamper with an adverse witness so that he cannot testify, or 
offer direct or indirect inducements to influence the witness’s testimony).  In an 1888 
federal disciplinary decision, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller declared that a 
lawyer would deserve disbarment had he done what he was accused of: arranging to get a 
witness drunk, hiding him to prevent him from being deposed, and seeking to induce the 
witness to change the content of his testimony.  See In re Thomas, 36 F. 242, 242–44 
(C.C.D. Colo. 1888).  However, Justice Miller determined that the lawyer’s actual intent 
was merely to interview the witness before his deposition to find out what he had to say.  
See id. at 245.  He expressed distaste for the lawyer’s conduct, and lauded the English 
practice of barring barristers from speaking with witnesses outside of court, but concluded 
that under the American system interviewing an opponent’s witnesses cannot be 
considered misconduct.  See id. at 244–46.  The decision did not address whether urging a 
witness not to voluntary cooperate with an opponent would be unethical. 
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ABA adopted Canon 39, providing that a lawyer “is not . . . to be 
deterred from seeking to ascertain the truth from [a witness] in the 
interest of his client,” even if the witness is “connected with or 
reputed to be biased in favor of an adverse party.”98  This was 
amended in 1937 to read, “A lawyer may properly interview any 
witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or 
criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party.”99 
A corollary principle, making it unethical for a lawyer to interfere 
with the right and duty recognized in Canon 39 by requesting 
witnesses not to speak with opposing counsel, evolved in a series of 
ABA formal ethics opinions in the 1920s and 1930s.100  In 1928, the 
ABA’s ethics committee determined that a criminal defense lawyer 
acted ethically when, without the prosecutor’s knowledge or consent, 
he met with a prosecution witness to request an affidavit retracting 
trial testimony that the lawyer had reason to believe was false.  The 
committee found the lawyer’s actions proper because “in no sense is 
[the witness] the prosecutor’s client, and in no aspect has the United 
States Government, or its prosecuting attorney, a vested interest in or 
ownership of the witness.”101 
The committee further developed the idea that no lawyer can claim 
“ownership” over a nonparty witness in 1934, when it held that the 
plaintiff’s attorney in a slip-and-fall case could interview store clerks 
 
98 ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 39 (1928). 
99 ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 39 (1937).  The Canon added that in 
interviewing such a witness the lawyer should “avoid any suggestion calculated to induce 
the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth” or “affect his free and untrammeled 
conduct when appearing at the trial.”  Id. 
100 The ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances began issuing 
advisory opinions in 1924, and its interpretations of the vaguely worded Canons were 
widely accepted as authoritative by bench and bar.  See Ted Finman & Theodore 
Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A 
Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 
UCLA L. REV. 67, 70–71, 80 (1981); see also John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar 
Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 
264 (1970) (noting that the Model Code’s drafting committee relied heavily on opinions of 
the ABA ethics committee when it codified existing ethical standards that had developed 
under the Canons). 
101 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 12 (1928).  Canon 39 had 
not yet been adopted when this opinion was issued, and the committee rested its 
conclusion on the duty of zealous representation contained in Canon 15.  See id.  In 1933, 
the committee rendered a similar opinion on the propriety of defense counsel interviewing 
prosecution witnesses, this time relying on Canon 39.  See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics 
and Grievances, Formal Op. 101 (1933). 
 2008] Buying Witness Silence 511 
who had witnessed the accident.102  The committee found the Canon 
prohibiting communication with a represented party inapplicable 
because the opposing lawyer represented the store owner, not the 
owner’s employees; Canon 39’s duty to seek out the truth was 
controlling.103  The opinion invoked the interests of the adjudicatory 
system as well as the lawyer’s duty of zeal: “The ascertainment of the 
truth is always essential to the attainment of justice and it is the duty 
of the attorney to learn the facts by every fair means within his 
reach.”104 
Formal Opinion 131, issued in 1935, crystallized the rule against 
requests for witness noncooperation, and gave the fullest expression 
to the reasons behind it.105  The opinion began in rule-like fashion: 
 It is improper for an attorney, by virtue of his personal or 
professional relations, to influence persons, other than his clients or 
their employees, to refuse to give information to opposing counsel 
which may be useful or essential to opposing counsel in establishing 
the true facts and circumstances affecting the dispute.106 
While acknowledging “the duty of lawyers charged with the 
responsibility of representing clients against whom claims are 
presented to do every just and proper thing to defend them,” the 
committee found that a more fundamental commitment was at stake: 
“However, when controversies arise, and claims are asserted, the 
interests of justice . . . require that the truth in the field of fact as well 
as of law be ascertained so far as is humanly possible.”107  Based on 
Canon 39 and other provisions,108 the committee reasoned that 
noncooperation requests are improper, because “[n]o lawyer should 
endeavor in any way, directly or indirectly, to prevent the truth from 
being presented to the court in the event litigation arises.”109  It cited 
its earlier opinions as standing for the proposition that witnesses 
 
102 See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 117 (1934). 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
105 See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 In addition to quoting from Canon 39, the committee recited broad statements from 
other canons concerning the lawyer’s duties of candor, fairness, and fidelity to the law.  
See id. (quoting Canons 22, 15, 32, and 39). 
109 Id. 
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cannot be viewed as belonging to one side or the other110 and 
concluded, “All persons who know anything about the facts in 
controversy are, in simple truth, the law’s witnesses.  They are the 
human instrumentalities through which the law, and its ministers, the 
judges and the lawyers, endeavor to ascertain truth, and to award 
justice to the contending parties.”111 
Three years after Formal Opinion 131 was issued, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.  The Supreme Court’s famous 
decision in Hickman v. Taylor112 made it clear that the liberal 
discovery regime ushered in by the rules did not render the ex parte 
witness interview any less important for the ascertainment of truth 
and the presentation of relevant facts to the tribunal.  In holding that 
witness statements obtained by a lawyer are generally shielded from 
discovery,113 the Court stressed that in an adversary system ex parte 
witness interviews are essential to each side’s ability to sift through 
the facts and present them effectively at trial: 
Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that [the lawyer] 
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from 
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy 
without undue and needless interference.  That is the historical and 
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our 
system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their 
clients’ interests.114 
If witness statements were discoverable, Hickman reasoned, the 
impairment of counsel’s ability to gather facts in private would 
undermine the quality of information presented to the court and the 
end result in terms of justice. 
Logically, the same would hold true if counsel were prevented at 
the outset from speaking with witnesses outside the adversary’s 
presence.  A line of judicial precedent that emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s built upon both Hickman’s reasoning and the ABA Canons to 
 
110 “We have held that it is proper for a lawyer to interview persons even though they 
be persons who might, as is frequently inaccurately said, be the ‘other side’s witnesses.’”  
Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Ops. 12 (1928) and 117 
(1934)). 
111 Id. 
112 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
113 See id. at 508–14.  The statements at issue in Hickman included both signed written 
statements that the defendants’ lawyer obtained from witnesses after interviewing them 
and memoranda prepared by the lawyer recounting what other witnesses told him during 
interviews.  See id. at 498. 
114 Id. at 511. 
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prohibit interference with informal witness interviews.  In Gregory v. 
United States,115 an influential 1966 opinion by J. Skelly Wright, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed a murder and 
robbery conviction because the prosecutor advised witnesses not to 
speak to defense counsel unless he was present.116  The court held 
that the prosecutor’s actions violated the defendant’s due process 
rights and was inconsistent with Canon 39’s recognition of the 
propriety of conducting witness interviews without opposing 
counsel’s consent.117  The opinion’s rhetoric was redolent of both the 
ABA ethics committee decisions and Hickman: 
Witnesses . . . are the property of neither the prosecution nor the 
defense.  Both sides have an equal right, and should have an equal 
opportunity, to interview them. 
 . . . Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, 
was unencumbered by the presence of defense counsel, and there 
seems to be no reason why defense counsel should not have an 
equal opportunity to determine, through interviews with the 
witnesses, what they know about the case and what they will testify 
to. . . . 
 . . . . 
 A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth.  
That quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal 
opportunity to interview the persons who have the information from 
which the truth may be determined.118 
Gregory has been widely followed,119 and its reasoning has not 
been limited to criminal cases, where a prosecutor’s special 
 
115 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
116 See id. at 187–89, 192.  There were also other grounds for reversal. 
117 See id. at 188–89.  The court also found that the prosecutor’s actions undermined the 
purposes of a federal statute requiring disclosure of witness identities.  See id. at 187–89. 
118 Id. at 188. 
119 See David S. Caudill, Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact 
with Victims, Survivors, and Witnesses in the Era of Victims’ Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 103, 105–06, 113 (2003).  The decisions frequently invoke the themes that a 
witness is neither side’s property and must be allowed to exercise his or her own free will 
in deciding whether to be interviewed, and that attempts to influence the witness’s 
decision undermine the truth-seeking function of an adversary trial.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 601, 603–04 (10th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. 
Trantino v. Hatrack, 408 F. Supp. 476, 481 (D.N.J. 1976), aff’d, 563 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 
1977); Johnston v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 356 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Coppolino v. 
Helpern, 266 F. Supp. 930, 935–36 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mota v. Buchanan, 547 P.2d 517, 
520, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263–65 (Or. 1981); Lewis 
v. Court of Common Pleas, 260 A.2d 184, 188–89 (Pa. 1969); State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 
474, 478–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
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obligations to serve justice and the general unavailability of 
depositions lend extra support to its rule.  In IBM Corp. v. 
Edelstein,120 the Second Circuit overturned a trial judge’s order that 
prohibited witness interviews unless opposing counsel was present or 
a transcript was prepared, deeming it “contrary to time-honored and 
decision-honored principles . . . that counsel for all parties have a 
right to interview an adverse party’s witnesses (the witness willing) in 
private.”121  From Hickman and Gregory, the court drew the lesson 
that the truth-finding function of adversary litigation is undermined if 
counsel cannot conduct confidential witness interviews, which help to 
“insur[e] the presentation of the best possible case at trial.”122  
Depositions, the court found, are no substitute because the presence of 
opposing counsel and a court reporter hinders the lawyer’s ability to 
freely 
explore the witness’ knowledge, memory and opinion — f requently 
in light of information counsel may have developed from other 
sources. . . . It is the common experience of counsel at the trial bar 
that a potential witness, upon reflection, will often change, modify 
or expand upon his original statement and that a second or third 
interview will be productive of greater accuracy.123 
The two leading legal ethics treatises in use when the Model Code 
and Model Rules were drafted, Henry Drinker’s 1953 Legal Ethics124 
and Raymond Wise’s late 1960s treatise of the same name,125 both 
 
120 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). 
121 Id. at 42. 
122 Id.; see also id. at 42–44. 
123 Id. at 41.  The court went on, 
 In contrast to the pre-trial interview with prospective witnesses, a deposition 
serves an entirely different purpose, which is to perpetuate testimony, to have it 
available for use or confrontation at the trial, or to have the witness committed to 
a specific representation of such facts as he might present.  A desire to depose 
formally would arise normally after preliminary interviews might have caused 
counsel to decide to take a deposition. 
Id. at 41 n.4. 
124 HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).  The Model Code’s preface states that 
the drafting committee that developed the Code “relied heavily upon” Drinker’s work.  
Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., Preface to the 1977 Version of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, in AM. BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY xix, xx (1979) [hereinafter ANNOTATED CODE].  As recently as 1981, 
Drinker was viewed as “the best known treatise in the field.”  Finman & Schneyer, supra 
note 100, at 80 n.52. 
125 RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS (1st ed. 1966).  Wise published a second edition 
in 1970 and supplements through 1979.  Until the early 1980s, Wise served as “the only 
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cited Formal Opinion 131 and endorsed its principle that requests for 
witness noncooperation are unethical.126  An extensive discussion of 
the issue could also be found in Harvard law professor Robert 
Keeton’s trial practice text.127  Keeton noted the potential tactical 
advantages of advising witnesses not to discuss the case with the 
opposing party or counsel; such advice, if followed, will “increase 
your adversary’s difficulties of preparation and your own chances of 
superior preparation.”128  It forces your adversary to take depositions, 
allowing you to keep tabs on what your adversary has learned and 
gain insight into your opponent’s theory of the case.129  “The nature 
of these tactical advantages,” Keeton continued, “demonstrates that 
the practice of encouraging witnesses not to talk to the opposing party 
or his representatives is opposed to the interests of full and fair 
development of facts.  Primarily for this reason, the practice has been 
held to be ethically improper.”130  He cited to ABA Formal Opinion 
131.131 
B.  Noncooperation Requests Under the Code 
The ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the 
“Code”), promulgated in 1969 and quickly adopted in nearly all the 
states,132 was intended to systematize and update the ethical 
principles that had developed under the canons, and to provide clear 
rules that could serve as a basis for discipline.133  The Code did not 
 
comprehensive and up-to-date treatise on attorneys’ professional responsibilities.”  Finman 
& Schneyer, supra note 100, at 80 n.51. 
126 See DRINKER, supra note 124, at 86; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 294 (2d ed. 
1970). 
127 ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS (1st ed. 1954). 
128 Id. at 328. 
129 Id.  Keeton pointed out that the adversary who is deprived of a witness’s voluntary 
cooperation will be at a disadvantage in gathering information even if he conducts a 
deposition because “it is practically impossible to anticipate all the matters on which the 
witness might be able to testify; the help of the witness in volunteering additional 
information which he thinks might be material is important.”  Id. 
130 Id. at 328–29. 
131 Id. at 329 n.3.  Keeton added, however, that “it is at least doubtful that this view 
prevails in all jurisdictions.”  Id. at 329. 
132 See ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, at ix; Sutton, supra note 100, at 255–56. 
133 See Sutton, supra note 100, at 257–58, 264.  The drafting committee made a 
deliberate decision to maintain no records of its proceedings.  Some legislative history and 
indications of the drafters’ intent can be discerned from changes made over the course of 
three published drafts, footnotes included in the Model Code to indicate sources that the 
committee drew upon, and later interviews with the committee’s Reporter.  See MODEL 
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explicitly address the issue of witness noncooperation requests, and 
its provision relating to contacts with witnesses was far from a model 
of clarity.  Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 7-109(B) makes it unethical for 
a lawyer to “advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave the 
jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making himself 
unavailable as a witness therein.”134  The related Ethical 
Consideration (EC 7-27) explains that such advice is prohibited 
because it “interferes with the proper administration of justice.”135  A 
footnote to EC 7-27 references ABA Formal Opinion 131, although 
the use of a “cf.” designation leaves it unclear whether the opinion 
was cited as an example of what the rule prohibits or merely to note a 
general similarity of purpose.136  Narrowly construed, the disciplinary 
rule’s language can be read as covering only efforts to induce a 
witness to duck a subpoena or not show up in court.137  On the other 
hand, requesting a witness to withhold voluntary cooperation has the 
purpose and possible effect of hiding potential testimony from 
adverse parties, thereby rendering it unavailable to the tribunal, and 
thus plausibly could be viewed as violating DR 7-109(B).  One state 
supreme court and another state’s ethics committee have read the rule 
this way.138  The reach of the witness secretion rule remains of 
 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl n.1 (1981); ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, 
at xi, xiii. 
134 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(B) (1981).  The infelicitous 
phrase “secrete himself” was taken from a 1962 California bar rule that prohibited 
attorneys from advising a witness “to avoid service of process, or secrete himself, or 
otherwise to make his testimony unavailable,” and 1908 ABA Canon 5, which discouraged 
the “secreting of witnesses” by a prosecutor.  Id. DR 7-109(B) n.90. 
135 Id. EC 7-27. 
136 Id. EC 7-27 n.45. 
137 See State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263–64 (Or. 1981) (stating that the express terms 
of DR 7-109 were not violated when a prosecutor advised prospective witnesses not to 
speak to the defense; the court nonetheless found the conduct improper based on policies 
implicit in the ethics rules and procedural statutes); Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., 
Ethics Op. 84-3 (1984) (concluding that a prosecutor’s policy of advising witnesses not to 
talk to defense counsel unless a prosecutor is present does not directly violate DR 7-109, 
but is nonetheless improper because it runs counter to the policies reflected in the rule and 
the Gregory line of cases); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 30.12, illus. 30-8, at 30-
25 (interpreting DR 7-109(B) as not prohibiting advising witnesses not to submit to 
informal interviews with opposing counsel, because this does not render them 
“unavailable” as witnesses, since they can still be subpoenaed). 
138 See Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas, 260 A.2d 184, 188 & n.3 (Pa. 1969) (citing 
DR 7-109(B), inter alia, as basis for concluding that it was impermissible for a district 
attorney to request a witness not to talk to defense counsel); Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal 
Op. 2005-132 (2005) (attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying for an adversary, if 
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practical importance in California, which has an ethics rule nearly 
identical to DR 7-109(B) but no other rule that could be construed to 
cover witness noncooperation requests.139 
The Code’s “catch-all” disciplinary rule forbidding “conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice”140 can also be read to 
carry forward the principle of Formal Opinion 131.  This rule 
replaced language in earlier drafts that would have prohibited all 
conduct “degrading to the legal profession.”141  The change was made 
in response to criticism from many members of the bar that the 
original language was “too vague to constitute ‘fair notice’” of what 
was prohibited.142  Given that Formal Opinion 131 and the Gregory 
line of cases were well established at the time of the Code’s adoption, 
treating witness noncooperation requests as “conduct prejudicial” 
would not offend notions of due process.  In 1974, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court showed no hesitation in disciplining a criminal 
defense lawyer who urged two witnesses, who were not his clients, to 
 
successful, has practical effect of “causing a witness to secrete himself” and therefore 
violates an Oregon ethics rule derived from DR 7-109(B)). 
139 CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-310(A) (2008) (“A member shall not  . . . 
[a]dvise or directly or indirectly cause a person to secrete himself or herself or to leave the 
jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making that person unavailable as a witness 
therein.”); see also infra note 247 (discussing Oregon rule based on the Code’s witness 
secretion provision).  The California rules do not include Model Rule 3.4(f) or the ABA’s 
“conduct prejudicial” rule.  An argument for reading California’s witness secretion rule 
broadly finds support in its wording (which adds the phrase “directly or indirectly” to the 
Code prohibition) and in the public policy expressed in the California Evidence Code, 
which states that, except as authorized by statute, “[n]o person has a privilege that another 
shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter.”  CAL. EVID. CODE § 911(c) (West 
1995); cf. McPhearson v. Michaels Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(concluding, based on section 911, that “it would be contrary to public policy to permit a 
party to litigation to dissuade or otherwise influence the testimony of a percipient witness 
through a private [settlement] agreement”).  The State Bar of California recently proposed 
adding a rule substantially identical to Model Rule 3.4(f) as part of a package of ethics 
rules revisions.  COMM’N FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, STATE 
BAR OF CAL., DISCUSSION DRAFT, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 20 (March 2008), R. 3.4(h). 
140 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981). 
141 ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, at 12. 
142 Id. (citing interview with John Sutton, the Code’s reporter).  The concern for “fair 
notice” apparently did not extend to an equally broad and vague provision that did make it 
into the Code, prohibiting “any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer’s] 
fitness to practice law.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) 
(1981).  This provision was dropped in the Model Rules, while the provision on “conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice” was retained.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983); see infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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cooperate as little as possible if questioned by law enforcement 
officials, on the basis of the Code’s “conduct prejudicial” rule.143 
Despite the absence of explicit language in the Code addressing the 
issue, commentators at the time believed that Formal Opinion 131’s 
rule against requesting witness noncooperation remained intact.  In 
the 1970s editions of his legal ethics treatise, Raymond Wise took the 
view that the Code’s rule against secreting witnesses and suppressing 
evidence carried forward the principle of Opinion 131.144  Robert 
Keeton made no change in his analysis of why noncooperation 
requests are unethical in the second edition of his trial practice book 
in 1973,145 and other Code-era treatises expressed similar views.146 
C.  Noncooperation Requests Under the Model Rules 
Dissatisfaction with the Code and a desire to repair the legal 
profession’s image after Watergate led the ABA in 1977 to appoint a 
commission, chaired by Omaha attorney Robert Kutak, to review 
professional conduct standards.147  The Kutak Commission released a 
discussion draft of new Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 
January 1980,148 and, after holding public hearings and reviewing 
 
143 In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15, 17–18 (N.J. 1974). 
144 See WISE, supra note 126, at 109 & n.32; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 97 & 
n.15, 459 (question 109), 494 (answer to question 109) (2d ed. Supp. 1979). 
145 ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 339–40 (2d ed. 1973); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 127–31 (discussing Keeton’s analysis). 
146 The ABA approved the Model Rules in August 1983, but it was not adopted by a 
majority of the states until 1988.  See ABA Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/mrpc/chron_states.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).  Charles Wolfram, in his 1986 
legal ethics treatise, stated that “[w]itnesses do not ‘belong’ to either party and generally 
should be as available for interviews to one side as to the other.”  He relied on the Gregory 
and Edelstein line of decisions, and did not mention the new Model Rule 3.4(f).  CHARLES 
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.2 (1986).  Another mid-1980s treatise, 
citing Formal Opinion 131 and Keeton’s discussion, concluded that it is “almost certainly 
ethically improper” to attempt to dissuade a nonparty witness from cooperating with an 
adversary.  DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 245 n.2 (1984). 
147 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC. OF 
THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 77, 82–93 (1981); Ted Schneyer, 
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 688–93 (1989). 
148 COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, DISCUSSION 
DRAFT, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1980) [hereinafter DISCUSSION 
DRAFT]. 
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extensive comments, issued its proposed final draft in May 1981.149  
The ABA House of Delegates debated the proposal over the next two 
years, made some amendments, and adopted the Model Rules in 
August 1983.150 
The Kutak Commission’s discussion draft expressly provided that 
a prosecutor shall not “discourage a person from giving relevant 
information to the defense,”151 but otherwise dealt with the issue of 
witness noncooperation obliquely, in rules that barred “improperly 
obstruct[ing] another party’s access to evidence” or “seek[ing] 
improperly to influence a witness.”152  Commentary to the 
obstruction rule stated that “a lawyer may properly advise a client 
against giving a statement or other evidence except under the lawyer’s 
supervision,” implying that a nonclient may not be given such 
advice.153  Although the drafters probably meant to carry forward the 
principle of Formal Opinion 131, the absence of an express 
prohibition for anyone but prosecutors could have been read to mean 
that requests for witness noncooperation were not generally barred. 
In response to bar criticism of the vagueness and potentially broad 
scope of the duties expressed in the discussion draft, the Kutak 
Commission, in its proposed final draft, replaced the prohibitions of 
“improper” conduct relating to evidence and witnesses with 
provisions making it impermissible for a lawyer to “unlawfully 
obstruct another party’s access to evidence” or “offer an inducement 
to a witness that is prohibited by law.”154  At the same time, the 
commission added a new subsection (f) to define a duty that went 
beyond what other law required. 
Rule 3.4(f) closely tracked the approach of Formal Opinion 131 by 
making it impermissible for a lawyer to “request a person other than a 
client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to 
 
149 COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROPOSED 
FINAL DRAFT, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981) [hereinafter PROPOSED 
FINAL DRAFT]. 
150 See CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–
2005, at viii-ix (2006) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
151 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 148, R. 3.10(e). 
152 Id. R. 3.2(b)(1), 3.7(b)(2). 
153 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 
154 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4(a) & (b) (emphasis added); see 
Schneyer, supra note 147, at 707–08. 
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another party.”155  Like the earlier ABA pronouncement, it 
recognized an exception allowing such requests to be made to the 
client’s employees.156  The exception was extended to cover 
nonemployee agents and relatives of the client as well, while adding 
the proviso that the lawyer must “reasonabl[y] . . . believe that the 
person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from 
giving such information.”157 
The official comment that appeared in the Proposed Final Draft 
(and was ultimately adopted by the ABA) offered little explanation 
for subsection (f).  The comment noted generally that “[t]he 
procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a 
case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties,” and 
that all of Rule 3.4’s restrictions are designed to secure “[f]air 
competition in the adversary system.”158 
When Rule 3.4 was taken up by the ABA House of Delegates, 
Geoffrey Hazard, the Kutak Commission’s Reporter, opened the 
discussion of subsection (f) by noting that no direct counterpart 
appeared in the Code.159  He described it as an effort “to deal more 
 
155 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4(f).  The Proposed Final Draft also 
dropped the Discussion Draft’s prohibition of prosecution requests that a witness not 
cooperate with the defense.  See id. R. 3.8.  The commission presumably viewed it as no 
longer necessary in light of the addition of a rule spelling out a similar obligation for all 
attorneys. 
156 Id. R. 3.4(f)(1); cf. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 
(1935) (stating that “[i]t is improper for an attorney . . . to influence persons, other than his 
clients or their employees, to refuse to give relevant information to opposing counsel”). 
157 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4(f)(1) & (2).  In the ethics treatise 
that he later cowrote, Geoffrey Hazard, who served as Reporter to the Kutak Commission, 
explained that this caveat is designed to protect the client’s relatives or employees from 
receiving advice that might cause them harm from a lawyer who is not representing them 
and has no obligation to look out for their interests.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 
30.12 at 30-23; see also id. § 30-12, illus. 30-7 (illustrating the rule with the example that a 
lawyer representing a criminal defendant cannot urge the defendant’s brother, who is also 
a suspect, to refrain from seeking a grant of immunity and testifying against the lawyer’s 
client). 
158 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4 cmt.  The only sentence in the 
commentary specific to subsection (f) explains that requests to a client’s employees are 
allowed because “the employee may identify his interests with those of the client.”  Id.  
This is followed by a cross-reference to Rule 4.2, which prohibits lawyers from 
communicating with a party represented by counsel unless the person’s lawyer consents.  
That rule bars contacts with some— b ut not all — e mployees of a represented entity.  See 
infra note 180. 
159 A Code comparison submitted with the Model Rules suggested that Model Rule 
3.4(f) was similar to DR 7-104(A)(2), which prohibited giving advice to an unrepresented 
person whose interests may differ from those of the lawyer’s client.  MODEL RULES R. 3.4 
Model Code Comparison (1983).  The analogy is weak; a noncooperation request, if 
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precisely than present law” with a problematic issue.160  Four state 
and local bar associations had filed amendments seeking to strike the 
provision.161  A representative of the Philadelphia Bar Association 
presented the case for eliminating subsection (f).  He argued that it 
was unnecessary given “our open and wide-ranging discovery 
process,” and that lawyers have good reason to suggest to witnesses 
that they give information only in a deposition, in order to protect 
against the risk of witness tampering or other abuses in unmonitored 
ex parte interviews.162  Former ABA President David Brink then 
spoke to oppose the amendment.  He defended the provision as 
supplying “needed guidance to lawyers in an area where they would 
otherwise be very much in doubt as to how to proceed,” and as 
furthering both “the need for [a]ccess to all useful information” and 
the need to protect nonclients from advice that might be contrary to 
their interests.163  In the final speech opposing the amendment, a 
delegate gave powerful expression to the rule’s value in an era of 
skyrocketing litigation costs: 
[W]e’re turning once again here to obligations of attorneys as 
officers of the court.  This deals with a very, very common way of 
suppressing evidence.  There are some clients, of course who can 
afford to take the depositions of every witness that you name and 
[in] some answers to interr[o]gatories, you might name 30, 40, 
maybe 100 witnesses.  There are other clients who cannot afford to 
do that until they determine whether or not that witness has 
something pertinent to say about the case.  What you are suggesting 
in the proposed amendment here is that you deprive the client of the 
inexpensive way of finding out whether or not a deposition is 
desirable.  I suggest this is just a way which lawyers in the past 
have used, and if we don’t prevent the lawyers in the future to use 
to suppress evidence, to obstruct the paths of justice and to make it 
more difficult to get at the heart of the case.164 
 
openly made in the interest of the lawyer’s client, can hardly be considered “advice.”  If it 
were, asking an unrepresented witness to provide information would be equally 
impermissible. 
160 ABA House of Delegates Transcript, Tape 8, at 47 (Feb. 8, 1983) [hereinafter ABA 
Transcript] (on file with author). 
161 Explanatory statements filed with the amendments criticized Rule 3.4(f) for going 
too far in restricting a lawyer’s ability to protect a client’s interests, or for addressing a 
discovery issue that was better left to the courts.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, 
at 465–67. 
162 ABA Transcript, supra note 160, Tape 8, at 48–49, 52 (statement of Michael 
Bloom). 
163 Id., Tape 8, at 50. 
164 Id., Tape 8, at 51–52 (statement of Mr. Carpenter). 
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The amendment was then defeated by a voice vote.165 
The Model Rules’ legislative history sheds little light on the 
intended scope of Rule 8.4(d), the “conduct prejudicial” rule.  The 
Kutak Commission’s proposed final draft omitted the Code’s catch-all 
prohibitions of conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” 
or “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”166  
Hazard, in particular, appears to have disliked their vagueness and 
potential for discriminatory enforcement.167  The National 
Organization of Bar Counsel, the disciplinary enforcers’ trade group, 
lobbied strenuously to keep the Code provisions, deeming them 
proven approaches that were needed to reach the many different 
forms of conduct that could reveal a lawyer’s unfitness.168  The 
commission ultimately was persuaded to support an amendment 
offered in the House of Delegates to include the Code language in 
Model Rule 8.4.  The matter was voted on very late in a very long 
day, and the amendment passed without any substantive 
discussion.169  The official comment to Rule 8.4 was drafted before 
the “conduct prejudicial” provision was added and contains no 
discussion of it.170 
 
165 Id., Tape 8, at 53; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 466. 
166 Compare PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 8.4, with MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) & (5) (1981). 
167 Later, in his coauthored treatise, Hazard expressed the view that such an “open-
ended rule is dangerous” and gives disciplinary authorities an opening to harass unpopular 
lawyers.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12; see also id. § 65.5, at 65-11. 
168 See NAT’L ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE 
ON THE PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2, 
15–16 (June 4, 1982) (on file with author); Schneyer, supra note 147, at 709–10. 
169 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 808–09; ABA Transcript, supra note 
160, Tape 12, at 14–15.  Hazard and Hodes’s treatise asserts that “[t]he debate leading to 
adoption of Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of Delegates made clear that it was intended to 
address violations of well-understood norms and conventions of practice only.”  2 
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12.  The records of the House of Delegates 
meeting, however, reveal no such discussion.  A delegate did rise to oppose a different 
amendment, which would have forbidden “any other conduct that adversely reflects” on 
the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 810, on the 
ground that it is “so vague     . . . [and] provides absolutely no guidance to the lawyer who 
wants to stay out of disciplinary difficulty.”  That amendment failed.  ABA Transcript, 
supra note 160, Tape 12, at 15–17; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 810.  As 
previously discussed, the issue of “fair notice” had been of concern to the drafters of the 
Code when they came up with “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” as a 
replacement for conduct “degrading to the legal profession.”  See supra text accompanying 
note 142. 
170 See PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 8.4 cmt; MODEL RULES R. 8.4 
cmt. (1983). 
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D.  Decisions After the Adoption of the Code and Model Rules 
Several lines of precedent that have emerged since the ABA’s 
adoption of its modern ethical codes have addressed, in varying 
contexts, the issue of access to witnesses.  Disciplinary decisions and 
procedural rulings by courts and advisory opinions by ethics 
committees have found violations of Model Rule 3.4(f) in a variety of 
settings, including requests by prosecutors that witnesses decline 
defense interviews,171 attempts by criminal defense attorneys to 
convince witnesses not to cooperate with the prosecution,172 requests 
made by lawyers in civil cases that witnesses not disclose information 
to an opposing party,173 requests by one side’s lawyer that a witness 
not speak with the opposing attorney unless the first lawyer is present 
at or has advance notice of the interview,174 and efforts to dissuade a 
fact or expert witness from testifying on behalf of an adversary.175  A 
state supreme court, in imposing a sixty-day suspension on an 
attorney who made a noncooperation request, described Rule 3.4(f) as 
“a vital canon of professional acquittal” whose violation was a 
“grievous assault upon the truth-seeking function of the judicial 
process.”176  Similar types of requests or inducements offered to 
witnesses have been found to constitute conduct “prejudicial to the 
 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 601, 603–04 (10th Cir. 1986); 
State Bar of Mich., Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-134 (1999); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 
99-14 (1999). 
172 See, e.g., In re Alcantara, 676 A.2d 1030, 1034–35 (N.J. 1995); State Bar of Nev. 
Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 23 (1995); cf. State 
Bar of Mich., Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997). 
173 See, e.g., Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1258–59 (8th Cir. 1993); Briggs v. 
McWeeny, 796 A.2d 516, 523–24, 540 (Conn. 2002); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., 
Op. 93-20 (1993); cf. Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1216–17 
(W.D. Mich. 1991) (finding no Rule 3.4(f) violation where letter merely informed former 
employees of their right not to be interviewed and did not “constitute an inducement not to 
voluntarily provide information”). 
174 See, e.g., Davis v. Dow Corning Corp., 530 N.W.2d 178, 179, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-14 (1999); cf. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
of Pittsburgh, PA v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-11, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 346 
(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1990) (not ruling on whether such conduct violated Rule 3.4(f) 
but referring the matter to Delaware’s Disciplinary Counsel). 
175 See, e.g., Harlan, 982 F.2d at 1257–59; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Cox, 48 P.3d 
780, 785–86 (Okla. 2002); cf. In re Kornreich, 693 A.2d 877, 878, 883 (N.J. 1997) 
(disciplining attorney who violated Rule 3.4(f) by attempting to dissuade a person from 
appearing in court). 
176 Cox, 48 P.3d at 786. 
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administration of justice” under Model Rule 8.4(d) and the equivalent 
Code provision.177 
The policies favoring unimpeded witness access also have weighed 
heavily in decisions interpreting the scope of the ethics rule that bars a 
lawyer from communicating with a represented person or entity 
unless that party’s lawyer consents.178  When an attorney is 
investigating a claim against a corporation or government agency, the 
no-contact rule has the potential to stand as a wholesale barrier to 
informal interviews if it is read to cover current or former employees 
of the organization.179  Most of the decisions by courts and ethics 
committees have construed the rule narrowly to allow ex parte 
interviews of all former employees and many categories of current 
employees.180  Considerations of both efficiency and the truth-
seeking goals of adversary litigation feature prominently in the 
justifications given for this result.  For example, in Niesig v. Team 
 
177 See cases cited infra note 254; see also Alcantara, 676 A.2d at 1034–35 (finding that 
statements urging witness noncooperation violated Rule 8.4(d) as well as 3.4(f)). 
178 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981). 
179 See generally Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a 
Litigant’s Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, 
Privilege Doctrines, and Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868 (2003); Jerome N. 
Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The Scope of 
the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1274 (1988).  The ABA’s ethics committee, as we have seen, dealt with this problem 
in 1934 and concluded that the policies favoring unimpeded access to witnesses should 
prevail, at least in situations where the represented employer is an individual.  See Formal 
Op. 117, discussed supra text accompanying notes 102–04.  Subsequent interpretations of 
the rule by ABA code drafters, ethics committees, and courts have taken into account that 
corporate entities can only act through their employees and agents; if the rule shielding a 
represented party from contacts from an opposing lawyer is to mean anything for them, it 
must extend to at least some employees.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 
cmt. 7 (2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (1983); John Leubsdorf, 
Communicating with Another Lawyer’s Client: The Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s 
Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 695 (1979). 
180 The decisions are not uniform, but this has been the strong general trend.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 100 reporter’s note (2000) 
(reviewing differing positions taken by courts and ethics authorities).  In 2002, the ABA 
sought to bring clarity to this area by revising the official comment to Model Rule 4.2, 
which had been highly confusing in its original version.  The revised comment provides 
that the rule does not apply at all to former employees and that current employees are 
covered only if they supervise or regularly consult with the organization’s lawyer 
regarding the matter in question, have authority to bind the organization with respect to the 
matter, or are persons whose acts or omissions in connection with the matter may be 
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008). 
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I,181 New York’s highest court cited the need to preserve “avenues of 
informal discovery . . . that may serve both the litigants and the entire 
justice system by uncovering relevant facts, thus promoting the 
expeditious resolution of disputes.”182  The court invoked Hickman v. 
Taylor and the Second Circuit’s Edelstein decision in arguing that ex 
parte interviews serve justice by allowing the lawyers for each side to 
develop and refine competing versions of the facts in private.183  
“Costly formal depositions that may deter litigants with limited 
resources, or . . . interviews attended by adversary counsel, are no 
substitute for    . . . off-the-record private efforts to learn and 
assemble, rather than perpetuate, information.”184 
The idea that the administration of justice is harmed by agreements 
that restrict a witness’s freedom to disclose information relevant to 
other cases is the central theme in a large and growing body of case 
law finding such agreements unenforceable.  In EEOC v. Astra USA, 
Inc.,185 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld an 
injunction prohibiting an employer from using noncooperation 
clauses to prevent employees who had settled sexual harassment 
claims from making voluntary disclosures to the EEOC, which was 
investigating similar complaints against the company.  The court 
found such agreements contrary to public policy and 
unenforceable.186  Astra’s argument that the EEOC could obtain the 
 
181 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990) 
182 Id. at 1034. 
183 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 112–14, 120–23 (discussing 
Hickman and Edelstein, respectively). 
184 Niesig, 553 N.E.2d at 1034.  For similarly reasoned opinions, see, e.g., Cram v. 
Lamson & Sessions Co., Carlon Div., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261–62 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Siguel v. 
Trs. of Tufts Coll., No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2775 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 
1990); Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 797 N.E.2d 905, 909–11 (Mass. 
2003); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., 59 P.3d 1237, 1242, 1248 (Nev. 2002); Wis. State 
Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. E-07-01 (2007).  The Supreme Court of Washington has 
pushed the principle a step further, holding that in situations where the no-contact rule 
does not prohibit a plaintiff’s attorney from interviewing the defendant’s employees, it is 
impermissible for the defendant to instruct its employees not to meet with opposing 
counsel.  See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984).  In a similar 
vein, the New York Court of Appeals recently ruled that a plaintiff who puts her medical 
condition in issue cannot interfere with defense counsel’s ability to privately interview the 
plaintiff’s treating physician by refusing to sign a HIPAA authorization.  See Arons v. 
Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831, 837–38 (N.Y. 2007). 
185 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996). 
186 See id. at 744–45.  The harm caused by impeding the EEOC’s ability to effectively 
investigate employment discrimination was held to outweigh any detriment to the public 
interest in promoting settlements.  The court found it unlikely that the unavailability of a 
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employees’ testimony by issuing subpoenas was rejected on the 
grounds that public policy favors a “free flow of information” to an 
agency charged with vindicating wrongs.187  Requiring the agency to 
resort to its subpoena power would “stultify investigations” and 
“significantly increase the time and expense of a probe.”188  Other 
decisions have invalidated settlement provisions that impeded 
voluntary cooperation with the EEOC or other agencies on similar 
public policy grounds,189 or based on statutes prohibiting retaliation 
against a person who takes part in an investigation or enforcement 
proceeding.190 
The same ideas are at work in decisions upholding claims by 
employees who were discharged or disciplined for their willingness to 
testify on behalf of private parties in litigation.  Testimony by public 
employees has been accorded First Amendment protection against 
employer retaliation on the theory that uninhibited witness testimony 
 
nonassistance provision would create any substantial disincentive to settlement.  See id. at 
744. 
187 Id. at 745. 
188 Id. 
189 See EEOC v. Int’l Profit Assocs., No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 21, 2003); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 8421, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17484 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (following Astra and holding confidentiality 
agreements preventing voluntary disclosures to EEOC to be void as against public policy); 
Lana C. v. Cameron P., 108 P.3d 896, 902 (Alaska 2005) (voiding child custody 
settlement insofar as it prevented mother from disclosing past child abuse allegations 
against father in a domestic violence petition, because agreements “preventing an 
individual from providing evidence relevant to litigation or investigations are contrary to 
public policy”); Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 196 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(finding stipulated gag order that barred disclosures to state medical board concerning 
doctor’s molestation of minors void because contrary to public policy). 
190 See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 85 F.3d 89, 94–96 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(holding that employer violated Energy Reorganization Act’s antiretaliation provision by 
conditioning settlement of employee’s claim on agreement that would preclude his 
voluntary appearance as a witness in judicial or administrative proceedings); EEOC v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 671 F. Supp. 351, 357–58 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (construing ADEA’s 
antiretaliation provision to bar enforcement of clause in retirement agreement that 
prohibited assisting others in the prosecution of any age discrimination claim); United 
States v. City of Milwaukee, 390 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (finding 
employer’s use of confidentiality policy to bar employees from speaking with Justice 
Department attorneys unlawful retaliation under Title VII); see also Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waiveable Employee Rights 
(April 10, 1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html.  But see 
EEOC v. SunDance Rehab. Corp., 466 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that company did 
not violate antiretaliation statutes by offering  separation agreements that could penalize 
voluntary disclosures to EEOC, although these provisions might well be unenforceable). 
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is essential to the justice system’s proper functioning.191  
Antiretaliation provisions of discrimination laws have been construed 
to protect those who provide information to private litigants and offer 
to testify on their behalf, based on the idea that effective enforcement 
depends on the initiative of individual plaintiffs and their “access to 
the unchilled testimony of witnesses.”192 
The idea that obstructing access to relevant witness testimony is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice has been the linchpin of 
decisions addressing noncooperation clauses in the context of 
discovery disputes.  The leading cases are Kalinauskas v. Wong193 
and Wendt v. Walden University, Inc.,194 both of which involved 
efforts by the defendant in a sex discrimination suit to prevent the 
plaintiff from seeking deposition testimony from former employees 
who had entered into settlement agreements with secrecy provisions.  
In Kalinauskas, the court weighed the public policy of encouraging 
settlement against the danger that a defendant could use a secrecy 
agreement to hide relevant factual information from others whom it 
injures through similar misconduct, and concluded that “settlement 
agreements which suppress evidence violate the greater public 
policy.”195  The Wendt court gave pithy expression to the principle: 
“Defendants should not be able to buy the silence of witnesses with a 
settlement agreement when the facts of one controversy are relevant 
to another.”196  These cases, and others that have followed them, 
allow discovery of potentially relevant factual information that 
underlies a settled case, and declare any contractual agreement that 
would penalize a witness for making such disclosure to be void.197 
 
191 See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
192 Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
193 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993). 
194 No. 4-95-467, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 1996). 
195 Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 367. 
196 Wendt, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *5. 
197 See Sparks v. Seltzer, No. 05-CV-1061, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61398, at *13–*14 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006); Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods. Int’l, Inc., No. 99 C 
214, 2000 WL 968818 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2000); Hamad v. Graphic Arts Ctr., Inc., No. CIV 
96-216-FR, 1997 WL 12955 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 1997); McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., No. 95-
0258, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12581 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 1996); Chambers v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2002); cf. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) (holding that judgment 
issued by a state court barring a witness from giving testimony could not operate to 
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The principle has been extended to voluntary, ex parte witness 
interviews conducted outside the formal discovery process.  In In re 
JDS Uniphase Corp. Securities Litigation,198 the lead plaintiff moved 
to have confidentiality agreements signed by the defendant’s former 
employees declared void as against public policy to the extent that the 
agreements interfered with the ability of the plaintiff’s lawyers and 
investigators to interview them about matters relevant to the 
litigation.199  A federal magistrate judge agreed, holding that it would 
be contrary to public policy to allow employers to “muzzle” ex-
employees with agreements that prevent them from assisting private 
litigants who are seeking to vindicate federally protected rights.200  
While the defendant could properly use a confidentiality agreement to 
safeguard privileged information or trade secrets, the “whistleblower-
type information about allegedly unlawful acts” sought by the 
plaintiff did not fall into these categories.201  The company had no 
right to “use its confidentiality agreements to chill former employees 
from voluntarily participating in legitimate investigations into alleged 
wrongdoing” and could not prevent them from meeting privately with 
plaintiff’s counsel to provide relevant information.202  Other decisions 
have used similar reasoning to void confidentiality agreements that 
prevented a plaintiff’s lawyer from conducting ex parte interviews or 
 
prevent parties in litigation before another state’s courts from taking witness’s deposition).  
A few decisions have refused to allow discovery of information covered by a 
confidentiality agreement in situations where the facts underlying the settled case were 
found by the court to be irrelevant, or of very little relevance, to the current proceeding.  
See Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 460–62 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); 
Flynn v. Portland Gen. Elec. Corp., No. 88-455-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11219 (D. Or. 
Sept. 21, 1989). 
198 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
199 See id. at 1129–32.  At the time the motion was filed, formal discovery was 
unavailable because of a provision in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
that stays all discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending.  See id. at 1132–34. 
200 See id. at 1136–37. 
201 Id. at 1135. 
202 Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1133.  A federal district court in another case upheld and 
enforced a nondisclosure agreement that was limited to trade secrets and other traditionally 
protected commercial information, rejecting a former employee’s claim that he had a right 
to volunteer information about defective gambling equipment to a company suing his 
former employer for breach of contract.  See Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 
913, 916–17, 924–25 (D. Nev. 2006).   The court viewed JDS Uniphase and similar cases 
as “persuasive authority,” id. at 920, but found their principle inapplicable when the 
disclosure implicated trade secrets, the former employee initiated the disclosure rather than 
being asked for information as part of an agency’s or litigant’s investigation, and the 
disclosure did not expose illegal or harmful activities of public concern.  See id. at 921–23. 
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predeposition conversations with witnesses in cases brought under 
federal employment statutes.203 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  
The principle that litigants and their attorneys should be able to 
conduct ex parte interviews with willing witnesses to gather evidence 
in support of their claims, free of adversary interference, has a long 
history, with its roots in early twentieth-century ABA ethical 
pronouncements that have been carried forward into the modern 
professional conduct rules, and a long line of judicial decisions aimed 
at preserving witness access and invalidating attempts to block it.  
The principle rests on the idea that when lawyers seek to ascertain the 
facts from witnesses, they perform a function essential to the 
administration of justice.  Ex parte witness interviews serve the 
adjudicatory system by allowing each party to get at the unvarnished 
facts, shape those facts into a persuasive presentation, and present 
competing versions of the truth to the tribunal.  Witnesses are free 
agents and may decline to be interviewed, but adversary interference 
with a witness’s decision whether or not to cooperate undermines the 
principles of fair competition on which the system depends.  
Witnesses do not belong to either side in a dispute, and neither side 
should be able to claim or create a property interest in their testimony.  
Noncooperation settlements increase the costs to adversaries, public 
agencies, and the courts of getting at the facts, undermining both the 
system’s efficiency and its effectiveness in determining the truth and 
adjudicating cases fairly. 
 
203 See Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4484, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995).  In Hoffman, a federal magistrate judge ruled that a nondisclosure agreement signed 
by the defendant’s current and former employees could not be used to prevent plaintiffs’ 
counsel from interviewing them about the wage practices at issue in the litigation.  See 
Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4.  In Chambers, an age discrimination suit, 
the court found that confidentiality agreements signed by former employees would 
adversely affect the plaintiff’s ability to gather relevant information and held that, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, “it is against public policy for parties to agree not to reveal, 
at least in the limited contexts of depositions or pre-deposition interviews concerning 
litigation arising under federal law, facts relating to alleged or potential violations of such 
law.”  Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 444 (footnote omitted). 
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IV 
APPLYING THE MODEL RULES TO SETTLEMENT SECRECY 
AGREEMENTS 
A.  How to Read the Rules 
Before addressing the specifics of what the ethics rules mean for 
settlements with noncooperation requirements, the broader question 
of how to go about interpreting the rules requires some attention.  The 
ethics rules are a binding code for lawyers, and violations can lead to 
disciplinary sanctions.204  In this sense, they are a form of legislation, 
and the tools ordinarily used to construe statutes — c onsiderations of 
text, structure, and purpose— c an appropriately be used.205  It would 
be a mistake, however, to treat the ethics rules like criminal statutes 
and apply a presumption that ambiguities should be construed in favor 
of the accused.206  That approach would invite lawyers to push the 
boundaries of the rules wherever possible to maximize advantage for 
their clients or themselves,207 and is inconsistent with the premises of 
professional self-regulation. 
 
204 The progression from Canons to Model Code to Model Rules has been marked by a 
movement away from broad statements of ethical standards and aspirations in favor of 
concrete and enforceable rules.  See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of 
Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249–60 (1991); David Luban & Michael Millemann, 
Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41–53 
(1995); Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 4 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 953, 953–60 (1980). 
205 Lawyers’ ethical codes differ from ordinary legislation in the sense that they are 
drafted by the ABA, a private body that has no legislative authority.  However, it is 
reasonable to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that when a particular 
jurisdiction adopts the ABA’s rules, it shares the ABA’s intent.  Disciplinary rules also 
differ from legislation in the sense that the regulation of attorney conduct has long been 
recognized as an inherent judicial power.  In interpreting the rules that they themselves 
have enacted, courts may feel freer to make their own policy choices than when dealing 
with legislation enacted by a separate branch of government.  See Niesig v. Team I, 558 
N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that when interpreting professional conduct rules 
adopted as “the legal profession’s document of self-governance,” as opposed to statutes 
passed by “a coequal branch of government,” courts are “not constrained to read the rules 
literally or effectuate the intent of the drafters, but [may] look to the rules as guidelines to 
be applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at stake”); Bruce A. Green, Doe 
v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 
534–42 (1989). 
206 See Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 122 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the “rule of 
lenity” applicable to criminal cases does not apply to bar disciplinary proceedings, which 
are quasi-judicial in nature). 
207 See Luban & Millemann, supra note 204, at 57 (arguing that the penal code-like 
appearance of the Model Rules invites lawyers to “push the edges of the envelope” in 
construing the limits of what they may do on behalf of clients or to maximize their own 
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Society’s grant of self-governance to the legal profession “carries 
with it,” in the words of the Model Rules’ preamble, “a responsibility 
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest” and 
“properly applied” to fulfill lawyers’ role in this social compact.208  It 
follows that “[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason” 
that “should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal 
representation and of the law itself.”209  When there is ambiguity as to 
how the rules apply in a given situation, lawyers are required to 
“exercise . . . sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the 
basic principles underlying the Rules.”210  Consistent with this 
framework, courts enforcing the rules have generally eschewed 
narrow-construction canons of interpretation in favor of an approach 
that construes ambiguities in light of the purposes a rule is designed to 
serve.211 
What can the purposes of legal representation tell us about the 
application of the ethics rules to settlements requiring witness 
noncooperation?  The lawyer’s role as client advocate, with its 
hallmark duties of loyalty and zeal, would appear to support a narrow 
reading that allows lawyers to negotiate any lawful settlement terms 
which serve client interests, while a lawyer’s duties as an “officer of 
 
income); Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REV. 975, 977–
78 (1990) (discussing the strong pressures lawyers face to resolve all ethical doubts in 
favor of the client). 
208 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. paras. 12–13 (2008); see also Schneyer, 
supra note 147, at 695–96 (discussing the Kutak Commission’s “vision of the Model 
Rules as a professional covenant with the public”). 
209 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 14 (2008).  The influential 1958 
report written by Lon Fuller and John Randall, as cochairs of a joint committee of the 
ABA and the Association of American Law Schools, similarly cautioned that “a letter-
bound observance of the Canons is not equivalent to the practice of professional 
responsibility,” which “must derive from an understanding of the reasons that lie back of 
specific restraints.”  Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report 
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958) [hereinafter Joint Conference 
Report]. 
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (2008). 
211 See, e.g., EEOC v. HORA, Inc., No. 03-CV-1429, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11279, at 
*34 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005) (noting, in disqualifying lawyer for various rule violations, 
that even if the application of the rules to her conduct was unsettled, “calculating one’s 
behavior to merely comply with the wording of the professional rules, while doing 
violence to their spirit, is fundamentally inconsistent with a lawyer’s responsibilities to the 
parties, to the community at large and to the [c]ourt”); Fla. Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938, 
940 (Fla. 1994) (disciplining attorney for seeking to induce crime victim not to testify at 
sentencing hearing and citing the preamble in finding that, even in the absence of a clear 
prohibition spelled out in a rule or binding precedent, a lawyer is responsible for using 
sound judgment that is guided by the Model Rules’ purposes). 
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the legal system”212 would cut in favor a broad construction that 
forbids lawyer participation in agreements that impair the truth-
seeking function of adjudication.  The Model Rules’ preamble treats 
the lawyer’s roles as a client representative and officer of the court as 
equal in importance and generally complementary.213  For the 
“difficult ethical problems” that arise when they conflict, lawyers are 
told to consult the “terms for resolving such conflicts” embodied in 
particular rules, and how the balance has been struck in “the 
framework of these Rules” as a whole.214  Accordingly, we need to 
examine the theory that underlies the policy choices that the rule 
drafters made in deciding when duties to the legal system should 
trump obligations to the client, and consider the place of the rule 
prohibiting witness noncooperation requests within the framework of 
those principles. 
There are two basic stories that can be told about the Model Rules’ 
vision of lawyers as officers of the court.215  The plot line of the first 
story runs roughly as follows.  The Kutak Commission set out with 
high aspirations to expand lawyers’ obligations as court officers.  Its 
membership included Judge Marvin Frankel, who had prominently 
advocated changing the priorities of legal ethics to make its defining 
principle the ascertainment of truth, rather than the advancement of 
client interests.216  The commission’s initial drafts217 would have 
 
212 “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008). 
213 See id. para. 8. 
214 Id. para. 9. 
215 The vision that had been articulated in the Model Code was a very thin one, 
essentially treating a lawyer’s client-centered and systemic duties as being one and the 
same: “The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his 
client zealously within the bounds of the law . . . .”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981) (footnotes omitted).  Nonetheless, the Code included some 
limits on advocacy, designed to codify certain obligations of lawyers as officers of the 
court, that went beyond merely prohibiting the illegal.  See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as 
Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 49–61 (1989) (listing and assessing such 
obligations under the Code). 
216 See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1031 (1975).  For discussion of the apparent influence of Frankel and other critics of 
adversary ethics on the Kutak Commission’s early drafts, see Schneyer, supra note 147, at 
700–01; James H. Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 
CONN. L. REV. 948, 972–73 (1980). 
217 These included the officially published discussion draft, supra note 148, and an 
earlier draft that was leaked to the press.  Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite 
Committee, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Aug. 27, 1979, at 26. 
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created radical new duties, including requirements that lawyers 
disclose material adverse facts and law to the tribunal, treat other 
litigants fairly, exercise restraint in litigation tactics, and provide 
unpaid legal services for the public good.218  These proposals 
produced a flood of criticism from the organized bar, and the ABA 
retreated, in the end requiring little more of lawyers than that they not 
participate in criminal or fraudulent conduct.219 
The second story is the one told by Robert Kutak himself, in an 
essay that he wrote shortly before his death in 1983.220  Kutak 
acknowledged that the commission had made significant changes in 
response to the heated criticism its initial proposals received.  
However, he insisted that the choices the commission ultimately made 
were not the product of unprincipled political compromise, but 
instead reflected “an earnest desire to find coherent and workable 
solutions” in conformity with lawyers’ roles as both client 
representatives and officers of the court.221 
The contours of the officer-of-the-court duties in the commission’s 
final product rested, in Kutak’s view, on the “competitive theory”222 
that underlies our nation’s legal, political, and economic institutions.  
One fundamental tenet of this ideology is that “competing individuals 
have no legal responsibility for the competence of their counterparts 
 
218 The discussion draft’s reception in the press emphasized and largely welcomed the 
expansion of the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court.  See Schneyer, supra note 147, at 
696.  The New York Times described it as setting out “fundamentally to alter” lawyers’ 
duties to clients by requiring that increased weight be given to “the duty to be fair and 
candid toward all other participants in the legal system, even adversaries.”  Id., quoting 
Linda Greenhouse, Lawyers’ Group Offers a Revision in Code of Ethics: Draft Says Client 
Interests Could Be Placed Second, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1980, at 6. 
219 Versions of this story can be found in ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 53, at 106–
07; Gaetke, supra note 215, at 69–71; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal 
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 600–01 (1985); Stark, supra note 216, at 964–80; Jill M. 
Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The Origins and Applications of 
Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157, 160–65 (1994).  Ted Schneyer, in his 
superb study of the Model Rules’ drafting and adoption, gives an account that also 
portrays the Model Rules as the product of political struggles and compromises among 
different segments of the bar and competing conceptions of legal ethics.  Schneyer, 
however, sees the end result as reflecting no single outlook, rather than representing a 
victory by forces favoring a “hired-gun” ethos.  See generally Schneyer, supra note 147. 
220 Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD 
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 172 (David Luban ed., 1983).  Kutak 
sounded similar themes in his introduction to the commission’s proposed final draft. 
221 Id. at 172–73; see also Robert J. Kutak, Chairman’s Introduction to PROPOSED 
FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, at i, ii. 
222 Kutak, supra note 220 at 174. 
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on the other side of the transaction and, consequently, have no 
obligation to share the benefits of their own competence with the 
other side.”223  Since “individual competencies in employing a given 
process may vary,” it is understood that competitive processes “will 
not in every instance guarantee a correct result or in every case 
advance the common interest”; instead, the system is justified by a 
belief that, in the aggregate, it produces more correct outcomes than 
alternative approaches.224  Accordingly, competitors in an adversary 
system have no general duty to act for the benefit of others, volunteer 
adverse information, or ensure just results.225  At the same time, 
“[u]nderlying the basic theory that free competition . . . will maximize 
good results is the assumption that the process of competition is not 
distorted by conduct that bears no relationship to individual 
competence.”226  Thus, force and bribery are unacceptable as tools of 
competition.  While there is no general duty to disclose, information 
that is volunteered cannot be false or deceptive.  “[T]hose who are not 
sufficiently competent to ask the right questions” are out of luck, but 
the person who asks the right questions “is entitled to the fruits of that 
competence” in the form of an honest answer.227  Information that is 
relevant to a matter “cannot be concealed or destroyed with the 
purpose of preventing its availability.”228 
 
223 Id.  Justice Jackson relied on the same basic conception in Hickman v. Taylor to 
justify the Court’s holding that attorney work product should be shielded from disclosure: 
“[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.  Discovery was 
hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits 
or on wits borrowed from the adversary.” 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
224 Kutak, supra note 220, at 174. 
225 Id. at 174–75. 
226 Id. at 175. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 176.  The idea that limitations on advocacy can be derived from the premises 
of the adversary system is not unique to the Kutak Commission.  The 1958 report of the 
ABA-AALS Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility made an eloquent case for 
“the limits partisan advocacy must impose on itself if it is to remain wholesome and 
useful” in achieving its purposes.  Joint Conference Report, supra note 209, at 1160.  
Eleanor Holmes Norton proposed a “functionalist model for negotiation ethics” that 
derives ethical limits from a conception of bargaining as an adversarial market process 
whose purpose is to achieve valid agreements.  See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining 
and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 525–41 (1989).  More recently, Robert 
Gordon has argued that a lawyer’s role as an agent for clients in a system designed to 
provide a public framework for securing rights gives rise to an obligation to refrain from 
overly adversarial strategic behavior that undermines the system’s effectiveness.  See 
Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 42 
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). 
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In the remainder of the essay, Kutak focused on how this general 
theory shaped the approach taken in the Model Rules toward issues of 
confidentiality and candor.229  It also helps to account —which the 
first story fails to do — for the presence in the Rules of a variety of 
other duties that favor systemic over client interests and go beyond 
the requirements of other law.230  For example, in ex parte 
proceedings before a tribunal, an attorney is obliged to disclose all 
material facts, even adverse ones,231 a departure from the 
nondisclosure norm that can be justified under the competitive theory 
because the adversary is deprived of any opportunity to benefit from 
its own competence by presenting its side of the story.  Statements to 
the media that are likely to materially prejudice an adjudicative 
proceeding are prohibited, because parties should only be able to 
benefit from competence exercised within the channels of adversary 
adjudication.232  Rules that prohibit direct communication with 
another lawyer’s client,233 restrict dealings with unrepresented 
persons,234 and forbid settlements that make a lawyer’s services 
unavailable to future clients235 are all designed to ensure that people 
have the opportunity to benefit from legal representation, which is 
 
229 See Kutak, supra note 220, at 178–87. 
230 See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A 
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 264 (1985) (noting that, even after 
discounting obligations that are either illusory or required by other law, the Model Rules 
contain a number of mandatory duties that are best explained as “duties imposed in the 
interest of safeguarding the boundaries of adversary justice,” which “protect the dominant 
jurisprudential model for dispute resolution and interest reconciliation by forbidding 
behavior that seeks to skirt its principles”). 
231 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2008); see also Dennis, supra note 
219.  The ban on ex parte communications with a judge or juror during an adjudicative 
proceeding performs a similar function.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.5(b) (2008). 
232 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2008).  Other rules address the 
danger that personal influence, rather than competence in arguing the facts and the law, 
will sway the adjudicator.  See id. R. 3.4(e) (prohibiting lawyers from asserting personal 
knowledge of facts or stating a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness, the 
culpability of a litigant, or the justness of a cause at trial); R. 3.7 (generally prohibiting 
lawyers from serving as a witness and an advocate in the same case). 
233 Id. R. 4.2. 
234 Id. R. 4.3 & cmt. 1 (requiring that a lawyer not give any legal advice to an 
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if there is a reasonable 
possibility of conflicting interests, and generally requiring the lawyer to disclose that she is 
acting on behalf of a client). 
235 Id. R. 5.6(b) & cmt. 2 (prohibiting a lawyer from participating in offering or making 
a settlement agreement in which the lawyer agrees not to represent other persons). 
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often a prerequisite to competent participation in the adversary 
process.236 
Rule 3.4(f)’s prohibition of witness noncooperation requests also 
fits comfortably into the framework of the competitive theory.  The 
official comment to Model Rule 3.4 begins by noting that the rule’s 
prohibitions are designed to secure “[f]air competition” in an 
adversary system that “contemplates that the evidence in a case is to 
be marshalled competitively by the contending parties.”237  A system 
that depends on competitive marshaling and presentation of the facts 
needs to ensure that litigants have a fair opportunity to obtain them.  
Voluntary cooperation by witnesses enhances the effectiveness of 
parties’ presentations of their claims by allowing them to probe and 
develop potential testimony before deciding whether to use it— a nd 
whether to file suit in the first place.  In a competitive system, 
disputants and their attorneys should be able to reap the benefits of 
their initiative and competence by interviewing willing witnesses.  
While a witness is free to decline informal interviews, neither side to 
a dispute should be able to exercise influence or offer inducements to 
deprive an adversary of access.  These arguments for a principle of 
access to ex parte witness interviews date back to the time of the 
ABA Canons and Formal Opinion 131, and have been invoked by 
courts since the time of Hickman v. Taylor.238 
 
236 As a foundation for an ethical code, the competitive theory leaves much to be 
desired.  Its assumption that zealous advocacy, untempered by any responsibility to 
account for whether the other side’s claims are being competently presented, will achieve 
just outcomes in the long run, is hard to defend when many disputants lack the resources to 
obtain legal representation.  Although the Model Rules’ preamble acknowledges that it is 
only “when an opposing party is well represented [that] a lawyer can be a zealous advocate 
on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done,” id. pmbl. 
para. 8, the Model Rules create no duty either to assure that the other side is well 
represented or to assume greater responsibility for achieving a just result when that 
condition does not hold.  See generally RHODE, supra note 77, at 55–56; SIMON, supra 
note 75, at 139–42.  My argument here is simply that the “competitive theory” does a 
reasonably good job of accounting for the systemic duties that the Rules do recognize, and 
provides insight into the purposes that those rules are designed to achieve. 
237 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (2008). 
238 That Rule 3.4(f) fits comfortably into an adversary-system-based conception of 
lawyers’ ethics is confirmed by the inclusion of a similar prohibition in the alternative 
ethics code that was put forward by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.  ATLA 
had strongly criticized the proposed Model Rules for being inconsistent with the values of 
the adversary system and insufficiently protective of clients’ rights.  See THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER’S CODE OF CONDUCT (1982), reprinted in 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 419 (Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 
2002).  Rule 3.5 in the American Lawyer’s Code provided that “[a] lawyer shall not 
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Thus, the principle embodied in Rule 3.4(f) should not be viewed 
as an oddball exception to the client-centered duties that are at the 
core of the ethics rules.  As with many of the non-client-focused 
duties that the Model Rules recognize, it can best be understood as a 
product of the competitive theory that underlies lawyers’ ethical 
obligations.  In itself, this does not answer the question of how 
broadly the rule should be read.  Expansive construction of a rule 
designed to preserve the adversary system’s proper functioning might 
sometimes threaten other core values protected by the Rules.  For 
example, the requirement that a lawyer report client perjury to the 
court239 is aimed at preserving the integrity of adversary adjudication, 
but it also has the potential to undermine the purposes served by 
confidentiality by making clients less likely to disclose information to 
their lawyers.  Furthermore, an erroneous report of perjury to the 
court may cause grave injustice to the client.  These concerns could 
justify a fairly narrow interpretation of the rule’s requirement that the 
lawyer know that the testimony was false, so that any reasonable 
doubt is resolved in the client’s favor.240  No risks of a similar 
magnitude are posed by a broad reading of the rule banning witness 
noncooperation requests.  All rules that restrict the permissible means 
for achieving clients’ ends infringe to some degree on the principle of 
client autonomy.  The particular interest impaired here — the client’s 
ability to request or demand noncooperation from a witness —
represents a very modest intrusion on the client’s freedom, and is not 
associated with fundamental rights such as the right to testify on one’s 
own behalf.  A liberal construction that resolves doubts in favor of 
achieving the rule’s intended purposes is therefore warranted. 
B.  The Contours of the Rules Against Requesting Noncooperation in 
the Context of Settlement 
1.  Settlements Are Not Exempt 
The basic issue of whether Model Rule 3.4(f) applies to 
noncooperation requests made in settlement proposals presents no 
difficult issues of interpretation; it rests on a straightforward 
 
knowingly . . . discourage a witness or potential witness from talking to counsel for 
another party.”  Id. at 433. 
239 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2008). 
240 See generally Lauren Gilbert, Facing Justice: Ethical Choices in Representing 
Immigrant Clients, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (2007) (analyzing an attorney’s ethical 
choices in deciding whether to disclose misrepresentations to the tribunal). 
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application of the rule’s language.  Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer 
from “request[ing] a person other than a client to refrain from 
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party” unless the 
person falls into one of the excepted categories.241  It contains no 
exception for requests made to an opposing party in the course of 
settlement negotiations.  In the only state ethics opinion to address the 
issue thus far, South Carolina’s bar ethics committee concluded that 
the rule, by its plain terms, prohibits a defense lawyer from 
conditioning a settlement offer on the plaintiff agreeing not to 
voluntarily provide relevant information to other parties suing the 
same defendant.242 
Courts sometimes refuse to apply the literal language of a rule to 
avoid absurd results that the drafters could not possibly have 
intended,243 but Rule 3.4(f)’s rationales apply just as strongly in the 
settlement context as in other settings.  If merely asking a person to 
refrain from voluntarily disclosing relevant information to other 
parties is unethical, offering payment in exchange for a binding 
promise is worse still.  If a lawyer approached a nonparty witness and 
said, “I’ll pay you five thousand dollars if you agree not to cooperate 
with anyone who’s suing my client,” unquestionably the rule would 
be violated.244  That the recipient of a noncooperation request 
happens to be a plaintiff suing the lawyer’s client is irrelevant to the 
rule’s purposes; it is precisely because the plaintiff is a potential 
witness in other cases, and to influence her behavior in that capacity, 
that the request is being made.  The fact that the ethics rules, and the 
law in general, encourage the settlement of disputes cannot mean that 
conduct expressly prohibited by the rules becomes permissible simply 
because it helps bring about a settlement.245 
 
241 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008). 
242 See S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993). 
243 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). 
244 The commentary to the provision based on Rule 3.4(f) in the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers states, “A lawyer may not offer threats or financial or other 
inducements to a witness not to cooperate with another party.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. c (2000). 
245 Cf. Gillers, supra note 10, at 14–15 (discussing why the public policy of promoting 
settlement does not make noncooperation agreements exempt from obstruction of justice 
laws).  In situations where the Model Rules’ drafters were concerned that a rule might be 
misread to interfere with legitimate settlement practices, they took pains to guard against 
this in the official commentary.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. 2 
(2008) (clarifying that the prohibition against giving legal advice to an unrepresented 
person does not prohibit informing a pro se adverse party of the terms on which the 
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Whether conduct that violates Rule 3.4(f) is also prohibited under 
the rule that bars lawyers from engaging in “conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice”246 is of little practical 
significance in the vast majority of jurisdictions because Rule 3.4(f) 
has been nearly universally adopted.247  But it is important to an issue 
 
lawyer’s client is willing to settle and explaining the lawyer’s view of the meaning of 
proposed settlement terms); id. R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (stating that some conventional negotiation 
ploys, such as exaggerating “a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement,” ordinarily 
are not understood as “statements of material fact” and therefore do not violate the rule on 
lawyer truthfulness).  The comments to Model Rule 3.4(f), in contrast, are devoid of any 
indication that the rule should not be applied to settlements. 
246 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981). 
247 California, New York, and Maine, the three remaining states with ethics codes not 
based on the Model Rules, have not adopted Model Rule 3.4(f).  California also never 
adopted the “conduct prejudicial” rule, but, as previously discussed, its rule against the 
secretion of witnesses may prohibit witness noncooperation requests, and its state bar has 
proposed adopting Model Rule 3.4(f).  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  The 
ethics codes in New York and Maine include the ABA’s “conduct prejudicial” rule.  See 
ME. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.2(f)(4) (2008); N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (2007).  Maine has adopted a version of the 
Model Rules, including Rule 3.4(f), that will go into effect in August 2009.  See ME. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2009).  New York’s judiciary recently promulgated 
a new set of attorney conduct rules, effective April 1, 2009, that follow the numbering 
system of the Model Rules, but in substance are an amalgam of provisions carried forward 
from New York’s version of the Model Code and language drawn from the Model Rules.  
See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008); 24 ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Prof’l 
Conduct 666 (Dec. 24, 2008).  Although Rule 3.4(f) had been included in a set of proposed 
rules put forward by the New York State Bar Association, see N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Proposed N.Y. Rules], 
R. 3.4(f), the final rules omit it.  See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2008).  
Because the judicial board that adopted the rules gave no explanations for its changes, it is 
unclear whether the proposed rule was rejected for being too restrictive, too permissive, or 
simply unnecessary in light of other prohibitions, including the “conduct prejudicial” rule. 
 Three other Model Rules jurisdictions have not adopted Model Rule 3.4(f).  In 
Washington state, the official commentary to Rule 3.4 indicates that subsection (f) was not 
adopted because its exception for requests made to a client’s employees was too broad in 
light of a state supreme court decision finding such requests improper.  The comment also 
states that noncooperation requests may violate Rule 8.4(d), the “conduct prejudicial” rule.  
See WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 5 (2006) (citing Wright v. Group 
Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)).  Oregon has retained the language of the 
Code’s witness secretion rule in its version of the Model Rules, instead of the ABA’s Rule 
3.4(f).  See OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2006).  A state ethics opinion holds 
that attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying on behalf of an adversary violates 
Oregon’s “conduct prejudicial” rule, id. R. 8.4(a)(4), and may run afoul of the witness 
secretion rule as well.  See Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2005-132 (2005).  Kentucky’s 
version of the Model Rules omits both Rule 3.4(f) and Rule 8.4(d).  See KY. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.130 (2008).  A handful of other states have made changes from the 
ABA’s version of Model Rule 3.4(f) which I will discuss when relevant to particular 
interpretive issues. 
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that I will take up in the next section: whether it is unethical for a 
plaintiff’s lawyer to negotiate a settlement requiring the plaintiff not 
to cooperate in other proceedings.248  Before reaching that issue, it is 
necessary to consider the scope of the “conduct prejudicial” rule. 
The rule’s extremely broad language poses an interpretive problem.  
Its inclusion in the Model Code and Model Rules reflects a judgment 
that specifically framed rules cannot capture the entire universe of 
lawyer conduct that is unethical and deserving of discipline.249  To 
limit the rule to behavior that is illegal would make it redundant and 
undermine its purpose.  On the other hand, the undefined nature of the 
duty raises concern that attorneys may face discipline without fair 
notice that their conduct was improper, and poses the danger of 
selective enforcement against attorneys pursuing unpopular causes.250  
Courts have resolved these competing concerns by upholding the 
rule’s application, even in the absence of a violation of an explicit 
statute or court rule, in situations where a lawyer has reason to know 
that conduct “impedes or subverts the process of resolving disputes” 
and “the fair balance of interests . . . essential to litigation.”251  The 
standard has been upheld against void-for-vagueness challenges 
because lawyers, as professionals, can be charged with knowledge of 
what is expected of them based on the guidance provided in case law 
and the legal profession’s traditions.252 
These criteria provide grounds for finding witness noncooperation 
requests, including those made in settlement negotiations, 
impermissible.  The idea that partisan interference with an adversary’s 
access to an otherwise willing witness interferes with the proper 
administration of justice has a long history in both the ABA’s ethical 
pronouncements and case law, as shown in Part III of this Article.  
 
248 Rule 3.4(f) prohibits only noncooperation requests made to “a person other than a 
client,” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008), and therefore does not apply 
to this situation. 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 167–70. 
250 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c (2000); 
2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12. 
251 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 628 (Alaska 2001) (characterizing what cases imposing 
discipline under the rule generally have required); see also In re Hopkins, 677 A.2d 55, 
59–61 (D.C. 1996).  See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 69, at 39–44, 63–64 
(discussing the obligation of attorneys, long recognized by courts and acknowledged in the 
“conduct prejudicial” provisions of ethical codes, to avoid conduct that undermines the 
integrity of the adjudicative process). 
252 See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Discipline of 
an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1079–81 (Mass. 2004); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 
370 S.E.2d 325, 328 (W. Va. 1988). 
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Disciplinary decisions have frequently relied on the “conduct 
prejudicial” rule to sanction attorneys who made noncooperation 
requests,253 and many of those decisions involved attempts to secure a 
noncooperation pledge as part of a plea deal or civil settlement.254  
The cases holding noncooperation clauses unenforceable are also 
based on the idea that buying witness silence through a settlement 
agreement undermines the proper functioning of the justice system.255  
Where courts have declared a particular type of agreement contrary to 
public policy precisely because it is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice, it is fair to charge lawyers who seek such a provision with 
engaging in prejudicial conduct.256  The principles articulated in court 
decisions and the profession’s own ethical statements provide 
sufficient guidance for lawyers to know that conditioning a settlement 
 
253 See supra notes 143, 177 and accompanying text. 
254 See People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982) (discipline imposed for offering 
civil settlement with suggestion that payment be used to travel to avoid being subpoenaed 
for criminal trial); Fla. Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1994) (upholding discipline of 
defense attorney who offered to set up a trust fund for victim in exchange for victim’s 
family not speaking at sentencing hearing); In re Lutz, 607 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1980) 
(discipline imposed for offering civil settlement conditioned on agreement not to testify in 
criminal case); In re Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 788–89, 790–91 (Or. 1987) (attorney 
disciplined for conditioning civil settlement on agreement not to testify at disciplinary 
hearing); In re Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242 (Wash. 2001) (disciplining prosecutor for offering to 
drop charges against defendant if he agreed to assert privilege to avoid testifying for 
another defendant); Morano v. Williams, Grievance Decision No. 98-0663 (Conn. 
Statewide Grievance Comm. 2002) (finding violation where attorney offered settlement 
payment to victim in exchange for his agreement not to testify or cooperate with police or 
prosecutors); cf. State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 481–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
that because it is improper for a prosecutor to request a witness not to speak with defense 
counsel outside of prosecutor’s presence, a fortiori it is improper to impose this condition, 
as part of a plea bargain, on a defendant who is a potential witness in another case). 
255 See supra text accompanying notes 185–203. 
256 The legislative history of the Model Rules suggests that putting unenforceable terms 
in a settlement agreement is not per se unethical.  A Kutak Commission proposal to 
prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting a client in the preparation of a written 
instrument containing terms that the lawyer knows are legally prohibited was eliminated in 
the ABA House of Delegates.  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 44.  The 
sponsor of the successful amendment argued that it is legitimate for lawyers to help clients 
“express an understanding, which they may recognize as being legally unenforceable, or 
which they may believe will become enforceable over time.”  Id. at 45.  However, where 
courts have found a particular type of agreement to be unenforceable because it is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, lawyers who seek such a provision are 
engaging in conduct that they should know undermines the justice system’s proper 
functioning. 
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on an opposing party’s agreement not to cooperate as a witness in 
other cases is harmful to the administration of justice.257 
2.  Selling Noncooperation 
Rule 3.4(f) prohibits lawyers from asking for noncooperation, but 
says nothing about the responsibilities of the lawyer who receives an 
improper request.  South Carolina’s ethics committee appropriately 
concluded that it would be unethical for a plaintiff’s lawyer to 
recommend that his client accept a settlement with a noncooperation 
clause: “Rule 8.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly assisting 
another to violate any Rule.  By recommending to his client an 
improper request of defense counsel, plaintiff’s counsel would be 
assisting the defense counsel in violating Rule 3.4(f) . . . .”258  
Because noncooperation settlements are prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, an attorney who counsels a client to enter 
into one violates Model Rule 8.4(d) as well.259 
What if the plaintiff’s attorney urges the client to refuse the 
request, but the client still wants to go forward?  If the plaintiff’s 
 
257 Cf. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-23 n.5 (observing that 
purchasing a witness’s silence “would obviously . . . be ‘prejudicial to the administration 
of justice,’” in addition to violating Model Rule 3.4). 
258 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993).  This analysis should not be 
affected by an official comment that the ABA added to Model Rule 8.4(a) in 2002, which 
states that the rule “does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the 
client is legally entitled to take.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 
(2008).  Recommending that the client accept an unethical proposal, or agreeing to 
negotiate such terms on the client’s behalf, is qualitatively different from informing the 
client that it is not illegal for the client to enter such an agreement without the attorney’s 
assistance.  As I will discuss later, it is neither futile nor inappropriate for ethics rules to 
prohibit attorney facilitation of agreements that are harmful to the administration of justice 
even though clients might not be legally barred from entering such agreements on their 
own.  See infra text accompanying notes 329–39. 
259 The fact that Rule 3.4(f) by its terms applies only to the lawyer requesting 
noncooperation cannot support an inference that the Model Rules’ drafters intended to 
permit attorneys to effectuate unethical requests made by opposing counsel.  One might 
argue that when the rule-drafters wanted to ban lawyers from accepting as well as offering 
something, they knew how to say so.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) 
(2008) (prohibiting lawyer participation in “offering or making” a settlement agreement 
that restricts the lawyer’s right to practice).  But Rule 3.4(f)’s focus on the requesting 
attorney’s role is explained by its context.  It is part of a rule that prohibits a variety of 
unfair litigation tactics that lawyers may be tempted to use to advance their clients’ 
interests.  Asking witnesses —who frequently are unrepresented —n ot to cooperate is one 
such form of strategic behavior.  The rule’s silence about what an attorney should do when 
faced with such a request cannot reasonably be construed as reflecting a judgment that it is 
ethical for an attorney to help bring about results that the requesting attorney cannot 
ethically seek. 
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lawyer participates in the drafting or execution of the agreement, she 
is helping to bring about the very results that the defendant’s lawyer is 
prohibited from seeking.  The rules relating to witness noncooperation 
exist to prevent harms to other litigants and the justice system; they 
are not something that a lawyer should be able to waive at the client’s 
request.  The plaintiff’s lawyer needs to explain to her client that a 
lawyer cannot ethically negotiate an agreement that requires witness 
noncooperation.  If the client insists, the lawyer should withdraw from 
the representation.  Model Rule 1.16 requires an attorney to withdraw 
if following the client’s instructions would result in an ethical 
violation.260 
Can a plaintiff’s lawyer affirmatively offer noncooperation as a 
sweetener to increase the value of a settlement?  This would not 
violate Rule 3.4(f), because the lawyer is not requesting that anyone 
besides the lawyer’s own client refrain from disclosures.261  However, 
even more than the passive acceptance considered above, this active 
instigation should be considered a violation of Rule 8.4(a), which 
makes it unethical to “knowingly assist or induce another” to violate a 
rule, or to violate a rule “through the acts of another.”262  Inviting the 
defendant to tender money in exchange for a noncooperation pledge is 
doing exactly that.  It also should be viewed as a violation of Rule 
8.4(d), the “conduct prejudicial” rule.  Like any witness, the lawyer’s 
client has the freedom to decide whether or not to cooperate in other 
cases.  However, it is quite another matter for a lawyer to participate 
in the sale of that right.  The reasons given by the District of 
 
260 See id. R. 1.16(a)(1) & cmt. 2; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
DR 2-110(B)(2) (1981).  Withdrawal is subject to the approval of the tribunal if the case is 
in litigation.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2008); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(1) (1981).  If permission to withdraw were denied, 
the plaintiff’s lawyer should still refuse to negotiate or sign off on the unethical settlement 
terms.  Denial of permission to withdraw might absolve the lawyer from responsibility for 
an ethical violation that would result from the mere fact of continued representation (e.g., a 
conflict of interest), but it could not justify carrying out a directive of the client that would 
require the lawyer to violate an ethics rule.  Imagine that a lawyer moved to withdraw 
because her client insisted that she present perjured testimony at an upcoming trial; if the 
motion were denied, clearly the lawyer would still have an ethical obligation to refuse to 
proffer the testimony. 
261 See Cohen & Bernard, supra note 11 (pointing out that Rule 3.4(f) “prohibits asking 
someone ‘other than your client’ from refraining to give information, and thus would not 
prevent offering the same from your own client”). 
262 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2008); see also Mo. Sup. Ct. 
Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 125 (2008) (stating that it violates Rule 8.4(a) “for an 
attorney to propose a settlement that includes a provision that would involve a violation of 
any of the Rules of Professional Conduct by another attorney”). 
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Columbia Court of Appeals for disciplining an attorney who offered 
to sell information about the identity of a witness
 
apply with equal 
force here: 
 The attempt to sell evidence is “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” . . . .  To permit one attorney to sell 
information is to permit another to buy it; thus, were the profession 
to countenance the selling of evidence (other than expert opinion 
evidence for a fee), it would also endorse an attorney’s decision, 
indeed obligation, to further a client’s interests by purchasing 
harmful factual evidence, in order to assure the seller’s silence. . . . 
Because a market in factual evidence would hinder the discovery of 
truth within the justice system and often taint the outcome of 
disputes, whether litigated or not, the [court] unanimously 
concludes that attorneys, as officers of the court, may not participate 
in such a market either as buyers or as sellers.263 
The ABA’s ethics committee has found that in one particular 
context it is not impermissible for a lawyer to use a client’s 
willingness to refrain from being a witness to gain leverage in 
settlement negotiations.264  The Model Code included a provision that 
prohibited using or threatening criminal prosecution to gain advantage 
in a civil matter,265 based on the idea that invoking criminal sanctions 
for private gain subverts the criminal process, which is “designed for 
the protection of society as a whole.”266  In a 1992 formal ethics 
opinion, the ABA concluded that the Model Rules’ drafters had 
deliberately omitted this rule because they viewed it as overly 
broad.267  The ethics committee noted that the crimes of 
compounding and extortion, as defined in the Model Penal Code, 
allow a crime victim to threaten prosecution in order to obtain 
restitution for harm caused by the offense.  It found that such threats 
do not subvert the criminal justice system if the threatened criminal 
liability is well-founded in fact and law and arises from the same facts 
 
263 In re Sablowsky, 529 A.2d 289, 293 (D.C. 1987).  The case involved a lawyer who 
obtained information from a nurse about an operation that was the subject of a malpractice 
suit, which cast doubt on the defendant hospital’s version of events.  The attorney, who 
was not involved in the litigation, approached the lawyer for the plaintiff and offered to 
provide information about the witness’s identity in exchange for a consulting fee.  See id. 
at 290; cf. Williamson v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 582 P.2d 126 (Cal. 1978) (employing 
similar reasoning in finding it impermissible for a defendant to buy a codefendant’s 
agreement not to use a witness at trial). 
264 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) 
(concerning the use of threats of prosecution in connection with a civil matter). 
265 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1981). 
266 Id. EC 7-21. 
267 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992). 
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or transaction as the civil claim.  The committee cautioned, however, 
that “exploitation of extraneous matters . . . to gain leverage in 
settling a civil claim” would tend to prejudice the administration of 
justice and may violate Model Rule 8.4.268 
Noncooperation offers of the sort I have been discussing fall on the 
unethical side of this line.  When a crime victim forgoes the right to 
ask law enforcement authorities to punish the offender, the potential 
criminal proceeding that is affected arises directly from a wrong 
committed against the victim.  In contrast, when a plaintiff agrees not 
to disclose relevant information to others with claims against the 
defendant, the affected proceedings have a basis independent of the 
wrong suffered by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff’s lawyer is exploiting 
“extraneous matters” to gain advantage in a way that has a tangible 
impact on other parties’ ability to prove their claims. 
3.  To Whom Must Disclosure Be Allowed? 
Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer from asking a nonclient to “refrain 
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party.”269  
The word “party” has a range of possible meanings in ordinary and 
legal usage.  In its narrowest sense, it means a person who is a formal 
party to a legal proceeding, such as the plaintiff or defendant in a civil 
lawsuit.  It can also mean a person who is involved or has an interest 
in a dispute or transaction, regardless of whether a formal proceeding 
has been filed.  For example, someone whose rights have been 
adversely affected by another’s actions can be referred to as an 
“aggrieved party.”270  In its broadest sense, “party” can simply mean 
“person,” as in the phrase “third party.”  The rule’s language is also 
ambiguous as to when the person’s status as a “party” matters.  Does 
“another party” refer only to someone who is a party at the moment 
the noncooperation request is made, or does it also extend to future 
 
268 Id.  Two years later, the committee found that the use of threats to bring a 
disciplinary complaint against opposing counsel to gain advantage in a civil settlement, 
although not expressly prohibited in the Model Rules, generally would constitute “conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” under Rule 8.4(d), in part because such a 
threat introduces “extraneous factors” unrelated to the merits of the client’s claim into the 
decision whether to settle or proceed to trial.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994). 
269 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008) (emphasis added). 
270 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004) (definitions of “party” and 
“aggrieved party”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
“party” as “[a] person concerned or having or taking part in any affair, matter, transaction, 
or proceeding, considered individually”). 
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parties (i.e., to someone who is a “party” when the act of “voluntarily 
giving relevant information” occurs)? 
The interpretive approach taken by the ABA’s ethics committee in 
a 1995 opinion that addressed similar issues is instructive.  The 
committee considered how the word “party” should be construed in 
Model Rule 4.2, which at the time prohibited communications “with a 
party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer.”271  It 
looked to the purposes that the rule is intended to serve, and 
concluded that the rule’s goals of protecting against interference with 
lawyer-client relationships and avoiding the risk of attorney 
overreaching are best achieved by reading the word “party” in its 
broadest sense, as being equivalent to “person.”272  Interpreting 
“party” to refer only to those who are formal parties in litigation 
would make little sense, the committee found, since Rule 4.2’s 
purposes are equally applicable to persons who have retained counsel 
“when litigation is simply under consideration, even though it has not 
actually been instituted.”273 
Ambiguities in Rule 3.4(f) should also be resolved in light of its 
purposes.274  The rule is aimed at preventing harms to the integrity of 
adversary litigation that result when lawyers block the flow of 
relevant information, not only to persons who have actually sued their 
clients, but also to those investigating potential claims.  The original 
articulation of the principle in the ABA’s Formal Opinion 131 made 
this clear.  The ABA found witness noncooperation requests unethical 
because such conduct tends to “prevent the truth from being presented 
to the court in the event litigation arises.”275  Among the rationales 
that courts have given for a principle of unimpeded witness access are 
that the interests of the justice system are furthered when attorneys 
are able to ascertain the facts before filing suit, so that meritorious 
cases will be filed or settled and meritless ones will not be brought 
 
271 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1994). 
272 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).  The 
committee also proposed that to eliminate ambiguities arising from the use of the word 
“party,” Rule 4.2 should be amended to substitute the word “person” for “party.”  Id. at 
nn.2 & 16.  The ABA House of Delegates later made this change.  See LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 150, at 534. 
273 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, at n.17 
(1995). 
274 See supra Part IV.A. 
275 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935) (emphasis 
added). 
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solely to obtain discovery.276  Accordingly, “another party” in Rule 
3.4(f) should be read to mean a person with a potential claim against 
the lawyer’s client, regardless of whether suit has actually been 
filed.277 
Rule 3.4(f) should be construed to cover future parties as well as 
current ones.  The rule is aimed at preventing interference with 
voluntary disclosures of relevant information to parties with claims 
against the lawyer’s client.  Whether the claim already exists at the 
time of the noncooperation request or arises later should make no 
difference.  The settlements that lawyers for the Archdiocese of 
Boston negotiated in the 1990s in at least seventy cases alleging child 
molestation by priests, which required the plaintiffs to remain silent 
about the underlying facts, illustrate the point.278  The information 
known by a settling plaintiff would be highly relevant in any later suit 
alleging that the same priest abused another victim, both to establish a 
pattern of conduct by the abuser and the archdiocese’s awareness of 
the danger.  Making the ethical propriety of the defense lawyer’s 
noncooperation request depend on whether the priest had already 
abused another child or would do so in the future would be arbitrary 
in relation to the purposes that Rule 3.4(f) is intended to serve.  In 
either situation, it would be foreseeable that the first victim’s 
testimony would have evidentiary value in any similar suits against 
the defendant. 
Another question raised by the phrase “another party” is whether 
Rule 3.4(f) prohibits requesting a witness to refrain from testifying at 
a trial or hearing unless subpoenaed.  South Carolina’s ethics 
committee concluded that such a provision, “useless as it . . . may be,” 
would not violate Rule 3.4(f).279  This is a sound interpretation of the 
rule’s language, inasmuch as the tribunal deciding a dispute cannot 
 
276 See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261–62 (S.D. Iowa 
1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 178–84. 
277 Note that this represents a rejection of the broadest definition of “party” (as 
“person”) as well as the narrowest (as formal participant in a legal proceeding).  Rule 
3.4(f)’s reference to “relevant information” and its placement in a rule that is entitled 
“Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel” suggest that “party” is intended to refer to a 
person who has some sort of claim against the lawyer’s client, rather than any person at 
all. 
278 See Carroll et al., supra note 26. 
279 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993). 
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plausibly be described as a “party” to the dispute.280  However, 
requesting or offering inducements to a witness to withhold voluntary 
testimony should be considered a violation of Rule 8.4(d).  Even if it 
is relatively easy for an opposing party to subpoena the witness, it still 
places an obstacle in the path of the core fact-finding function of a 
hearing, and sometimes it may matter a great deal, such as when a 
witness is beyond the geographic reach of a subpoena.  The “conduct 
prejudicial” rule has frequently, and appropriately, been applied to 
discipline lawyers for requests or agreements aimed at discouraging 
witnesses from testifying.281 
A public agency that is conducting an investigation to determine 
whether to file charges or bring an enforcement action should be 
considered a “party” covered by Rule 3.4(f).  Agency officials acting 
in this role are a “party” in the same sense as private litigants who are 
investigating a possible lawsuit — they are seeking to assess whether a 
potential legal claim is well-founded and should be pursued.282  In an 
employment discrimination case, for example, it would violate Rule 
3.4(f) for a defense lawyer to offer a settlement that would prohibit 
the plaintiff from making voluntary disclosures to the EEOC or a 
comparable state agency investigating other discrimination 
complaints against the same defendant. 
4.  The Employee Exception 
Rule 3.4(f) contains an exception clause that allows a 
noncooperation request to be made if “the person is a relative or an 
employee or other agent of a client” and the lawyer reasonably 
believes the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by 
withholding information.283  The official comment explains the 
 
280 But see In re Kornreich, 693 A.2d 877, 878, 883 (N.J. 1997) (holding, without 
discussion of the rule’s “another party” language, that an attorney violated Rule 3.4(f) in 
attempting to dissuade a witness from attending court). 
281 See supra note 254. 
282 Under Title VII and many similar administrative schemes, the agency plays an 
adjudicatory role in the sense that it acts on a complaint made by an aggrieved party, hears 
both sides, and issues a ruling.  The purpose of the proceeding, however, is not to 
determine the rights of the parties but to assess whether there is sufficient cause to bring an 
enforcement action before a court or administrative law judge.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 
(2008) (enforcement provisions of Title VII). 
283 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) & (2) (2008).  The rule’s language 
is clear that both requirements must be satisfied in order for the exception to apply; i.e., the 
person in question must be a relative, employee, or other agent of the client, and the 
lawyer must reasonably believe that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected.  
See In re Alcantara, 676 A.2d 1030, 1034–35 (N.J. 1995); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., 
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employee exception by noting “employees may identify their interests 
with those of the client,” and cross-references Rule 4.2, the rule 
prohibiting lawyer contacts with represented parties.284  According to 
the Restatement, such requests are permitted because individuals in 
the specified relationships may have a “special loyalty to the lawyer’s 
client” and a duty to protect confidential information.285 
The exception has not been, and should not be, read to extend to 
former employees.286  It is phrased in the present tense (“the person is 
. . . an employee . . . of a client”287), which suggests that the drafters 
 
Op. 120 (2008).  But see Cohen & Bernard, supra note 11 (incorrectly describing Rule 
3.4(f)(2) as a “catch-all” exception that allows lawyers to request noncooperation 
whenever they reasonably believe that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected 
thereby). 
284 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 4 (2008).  Because Rule 3.4(f) uses 
the word “request,” it is possible to read the exception as forbidding a lawyer from 
requiring, as opposed to requesting, that employees refuse to be interviewed by someone 
suing the company.  See Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-07-01 (2007); 
Proposed N.Y. Rules, supra note 247, Reporter’s Note to Rule 3.4 (interpreting Rule 3.4(f) 
in this manner).  It seems doubtful that the rule was intended to have this effect.  The word 
“request” is used in reference to the general prohibition rather than the exception (“A 
lawyer shall not request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving 
relevant information to another party unless . . . .”), and the prohibition clearly reaches 
demands as well as nonbinding requests.  Employers are ordinarily free to request their 
employees to do something to serve its interests, or else be fired.  See 2 HAZARD & 
HODES, supra note 8, § 30.12, illus. 30-8 (concluding that a lawyer does not violate the 
rule by informing a client’s employees that they should not speak to a lawyer or 
investigator for a plaintiff suing the company unless he is present and that they will be 
fired if they do so). 
285 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e (2000).  
The Restatement also explains that the exception for “other agent[s]” is designed to reach 
“an investigator or expert witness” retained by the lawyer’s client or the lawyer.  Id.; see 
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993). 
286 See, e.g., Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 n.3 (D. Mont. 1986).  
The Restatement takes the position that noncooperation requests are permissible with 
respect to former employees “only if the person continues to maintain a confidential 
relationship with the former employer, such as an employee continuing to consult with 
respect to the matter involved in the representation” — in other words, with someone who 
remains a current agent of the employer —or if the individual “possesses extensive 
confidential information of the former employer.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e (2000).  That last qualification runs parallel to the 
Restatement requirement that lawyers not communicate with persons who are known to 
have had extensive exposure to privileged or otherwise legally protected information 
through their employment and “who likely possess[] little information that is not 
privileged.”  Id. § 102 cmt. d.  This applies only in “situations in which confidentiality 
occurs by operation of law and not solely, for example, through a contractual undertaking 
of the agent.”  Id. 
287 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) (2008).  Virginia is the only state 
that has modified the exception to allow noncooperation requests to be made to “a current 
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intended it to be applicable only to current employees.288  The 
assumptions of special loyalty and shared interests that underlie the 
employee exception generally hold true only while the employment 
relationship lasts.  The cross-reference to Rule 4.2 indicates that Rule 
3.4(f)’s exception is designed to parallel the no-contact rule: in 
situations where an opposing lawyer is prohibited from speaking with 
employees of a represented entity, it is appropriate for the entity’s 
lawyer to ask its employees not to speak to opposing counsel.289  Rule 
4.2 has been interpreted to allow ex parte interviews with former 
employees so as not to unduly restrict adversaries’ access to the 
facts.290  Rule 3.4(f)’s core principle of noninterference with witness 
access would be severely undermined if its exception were read to 
allow employers’ lawyers to effectively foreclose such interviews by 
 
or former employee” where “the information is relevant in a pending civil matter.”  VA. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2004) (emphasis added). 
288 Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that 
Congress’s use of the present indicative verb form in defining a statutory term means that 
a person must be presently in that condition to qualify); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 
U.S. 337, 341–42 (1997) (finding that the terms “employees” and “employed” in Title VII 
could be read to include former employees because of the absence of any temporal 
qualifier such as would exist if the statute said “is employed”). 
289 The exception in Rule 3.4(f) is broader than Rule 4.2 insofar as it authorizes asking 
all current employees to withhold cooperation from an adversary, while Rule 4.2 permits 
the opposing lawyer to seek interviews with some categories of current employees.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 100 cmt. f (2000).  Three states have narrowed the 
exception to bring it into closer alignment with the no-contact rule.  North Carolina’s 
version of Rule 3.4(f) limits the exception to managerial employees.  N.C. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) (2006).  In Pennsylvania, noncooperation requests are 
allowed under the employee exception only when “such conduct is not prohibited by Rule 
4.2.”  PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d)(2) (2006).  The Supreme Court of 
Washington has held that noncooperation requests may be made only to those employees 
who would be considered represented parties under the no-contact rule, reasoning that 
“[a]n attorney’s right to interview corporate employees would be a hollow one if 
corporations were permitted to instruct their employees not to meet with adverse counsel.”  
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984); see also WASH. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 5 (2006) (explaining that Washington did not adopt 
Model Rule 3.4(f) because it is inconsistent with Wright). 
290 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (finding that neither the text nor the 
commentary to Rule 4.2 suggest that coverage of former employees was intended and that 
“expand[ing] its coverage to former employees by means of liberal interpretation” is 
inappropriate where the effect would be “to inhibit the acquisition of information”). 
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engineering agreements that require former employees to withhold 
cooperation.291 
The exception should be understood to carry with it the 
requirement that any noncooperation obligation placed on an 
employee not extend beyond the period of that person’s employment.  
For example, consider the case of a plaintiff who files a sexual 
harassment complaint without quitting her job.  As long as she 
remains an employee, the company’s lawyer can ask for a 
noncooperation clause as part of a settlement without violating Rule 
3.4(f).  But if the agreement would continue to bar her from 
voluntarily disclosing relevant information to other litigants after she 
leaves the job, the lawyer’s request should be considered unethical.  
The rule’s language is ambiguous as to whether the condition that 
“the person is . . . an employee” must be satisfied only at the time the 
noncooperation request is made, or whether it also must hold true at 
the time of “voluntarily giving relevant information to another 
party.”292  The latter reading best serves the rule’s purposes.  
Otherwise, the exception’s limitation to current employees could be 
rendered a nullity by requiring every employee, while still employed, 
to sign an agreement pledging to never cooperate with anyone suing 
the company. 
5.  Placing Restrictions on the Type of Information That May Be 
Disclosed or the Manner of Disclosure 
Is it ethically permissible to require in a settlement agreement that 
the plaintiff not disclose (even to other litigants) certain types of 
information, such as the terms of the settlement agreement, 
information learned through discovery, privileged information, or 
trade secrets?  Can a defendant require that the plaintiff not initiate 
contacts with other litigants, insist on a right to be present at any 
interviews, or impose other restrictions to minimize the risk of overly 
broad disclosure? 
Answers to these questions should be informed by the rule’s raison 
d’être, which is to give litigants a fair opportunity to gather 
information that “may be useful . . . in establishing the true facts and 
 
291 Cf. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (“In construing provisions . . . in 
which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the 
exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.”). 
292 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008). 
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circumstances affecting the dispute.”293  Although part of the rule’s 
purpose is to enable litigants to develop their cases without the 
expense and constraints of formal discovery, it is founded on the same 
conception of party responsibility for finding and developing the facts 
that informs the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The phrase “relevant information” in Rule 3.4(f) should 
be read as broadly as the discovery rules’ definition of relevance—
anything relating to a party’s claim or defense that “appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”294 
a.  Secrecy of the Amount or Terms of a Settlement 
This standard suggests that it should be permissible to prohibit 
disclosure of a settlement agreement’s monetary terms.  Settlement 
amounts are nearly always inadmissible in subsequent proceedings 
and have generally been held to be beyond the scope of discovery.295  
The settlement terms are a construction of the settling parties, rather 
than historical facts having evidentiary significance.296  While the 
information may be very useful to future litigants bringing similar 
cases, because it sends signals about the defendant’s assessment of 
the strength of the claim against it and how much it is willing to pay 
to avoid trial, the defendant has a legitimate interest in keeping these 
matters confidential.  Part of what Rule 3.4(f) is designed to 
protect — the availability of ex parte witness interviews so that parties 
can learn facts without revealing their litigation strategies — rests on 
 
293 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935). 
294 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
295 See FED. R. EVID. 408; Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  
Prior settlement payments may be discoverable in unusual circumstances where a 
compelling need can be shown.  See Doré, supra note 9, at 815 n.139 (giving examples). 
296 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES 
ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES 
45 (2007) (recommending that courts assessing whether to approve or enforce a 
confidential settlement “should distinguish between ‘settlement facts,’ such as the amount, 
terms and conditions of a compromise, and ‘adjudicative facts’ that are relevant to the 
merits of the underlying controversy”); Doré, supra note 27, at 398–99 (arguing that 
agreements to keep settlement terms confidential should be enforced by courts because, 
“[u]nlike the historical facts giving rise to the settlement, settlement facts lay peculiarly 
within party control and would not exist but for the litigation in which they were 
generated”); see also Doré, supra note 9, at 814.  The cases holding noncooperation 
agreements unenforceable in other proceedings have generally limited this principle to 
factual information surrounding the settled case, but not the amount a case settled for.  See, 
e.g., Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993). 
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the idea that the adversary system works best when work product of 
this sort is shielded from disclosure.297  A large settlement may be 
based on factors unrelated to the merits, such as the defendant’s risk 
averseness, concerns about a biased tribunal, or fear of adverse 
publicity.  Disclosure could have the effect of encouraging frivolous 
lawsuits.298 
Nonmonetary provisions that are designed to prevent the 
recurrence of wrongful conduct are another matter.  The settlement of 
a sexual harassment claim, for example, might contain a requirement 
that the employer institute sexual harassment training, and a Clean 
Water Act settlement might set forth steps that a factory will take to 
avoid future chemical spills.  In subsequent cases alleging similar 
misconduct, settlement terms of this sort may constitute or lead to 
 
297 See supra text accompanying notes 112–31, 158, 181–84. 
298 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2685 (1995) 
(arguing against generally making settlements public because good settlement “requires 
the revelation of . . . ‘nonlegally relevant facts,’ such as the parties’ real and underlying 
needs and interests . . . including such factors as emotional needs and motives, future 
business needs, financial data, . . . [and] psychological and social issues like risk 
aversion,” and because disclosure of settlement terms will chill the willingness of parties 
to reach agreement based on such factors); Weinstein, supra note 16, at 517 (“Sometimes 
a defendant will give a premium to a particularly effective advocate or appealing case 
because going to trial might result in an unusually high verdict, ratcheting up settlements 
across the board.  At other times the defendant will agree to a settlement in a completely 
meritless case because the jurisdiction is notoriously pro-plaintiff . . . .”); Alison Lothes, 
Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ 
Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 460–63 (2005) (arguing that disclosure of 
settlement amounts may reveal more about a defendant’s strategies than its culpability and 
create incentives for frivolous suits). 
 A case for making settlement data available to other litigants can be made on grounds of 
economic efficiency.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 570 (6th 
ed. 2003) (suggesting that confidential settlement agreements impose costs on other 
litigants and impair the efficiency of the court system because if plaintiffs “knew the terms 
of . . . earlier settlements they would be able to make a more accurate estimate of the value 
of their own claims”); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of 
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 886–903 (2007) (arguing that a rule 
prohibiting confidential settlements once suit has been filed would lead to more accurate 
settlement valuation, more early settlements, and less frivolous litigation).  Greater public 
availability of settlement information may also send valuable signals about the extent and 
seriousness of problems such as workplace discrimination and defective products, assist in 
the evaluation of how effectively laws are functioning, and help people make better 
informed decisions about where to work or what to buy.  See Moss, supra, at 903–10; see 
also Kotkin, supra note 52, at 961–71.  These are good reasons to consider enacting 
statutes or rules to forbid settlement on secret terms, but they have little bearing on how 
Rule 3.4(f), which exists to safeguard litigant access to relevant evidence, should be 
interpreted. 
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admissible evidence relevant to liability or damages on issues such as 
the defendant’s awareness of the nature or extent of a problem and 
whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent recurrence.299  Under 
Rule 3.4(f), disclosure of such settlement terms to other litigants must 
be allowed. 
b.  Information Learned Through Discovery 
An argument might be made for limiting the scope of disclosure 
under Rule 3.4(f) to knowledge that a person acquired independently 
of the lawsuit but not information learned by means of discovery.  In 
holding that protective orders which prohibit the further dissemination 
of discovery materials do not violate litigants’ First Amendment 
rights, the Supreme Court has reasoned that a party’s access to those 
materials exists only by virtue of the court’s discovery processes, and 
limitations on the use of the information can be imposed as a quid pro 
quo for broad access.300  A settlement agreement that requires the 
return of all discovery materials or prohibits their disclosure to 
anyone (including other litigants) arguably rests on the same bargain; 
the information does not “belong” to the plaintiff but was made 
available with the implicit understanding that it be used only for 
purposes of trying the plaintiff’s case.301 
Rule 3.4(f), however, is not about the plaintiff’s ownership of 
information or interest in disseminating it.  Its purpose is to forbid 
adversarial interference with other parties’ access to relevant 
 
299 A New Jersey trial court followed this line of reasoning in holding that a 
confidentiality agreement that barred disclosure of the terms of a sexual harassment 
settlement was unenforceable when the information was sought by a plaintiff who later 
brought a similar harassment claim against the same defendant.  The court found the 
settlement terms relevant to ascertaining what the company knew, when they knew it, and 
how they responded when the existence of a hostile work environment was brought to 
their attention.  See Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 736, 739 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 2002).  It is not clear, however, why the court concluded that the monetary 
amount of the settlement was relevant. 
300 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1984).  The Court has 
given more stringent First Amendment protection to the dissemination of information 
obtained independently of judicial processes.  See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 
631–32 (1990) (holding that a state statute that was used to prohibit a grand jury witness 
from ever disclosing the facts about which he testified — information that he already 
possessed and did not learn about as a result of his participation in the grand jury 
process —was unconstitutional). 
301 Cf. Béchamps, supra note 47, at 151 (arguing, by analogy to the First Amendment 
cases, that stipulated gag orders should be limited to information obtained through the 
discovery process, and “should not restrict dissemination of information which the parties 
acquired prior to the litigation or from independent sources”). 
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information.  The fact that a court has the authority to issue a 
protective order prohibiting the further dissemination of discovery 
materials does not entitle a defendant to such protection; the rules of 
procedure require that protective orders be issued only upon a 
showing of good cause.302  If there are legitimate reasons for 
restricting the use of certain discovery materials, because they contain 
trade secrets or implicate personal privacy interests, for example, a 
party can apply for a protective order.303  In the absence of a court-
approved protective order, neither the text nor the objectives of Rule 
3.4(f) provides a basis for exempting information learned in discovery 
from the rule’s requirement that a party’s lawyer not interfere with an 
adversary’s ability to seek relevant information from a person who 
has it.304 
c.  Privileged Information, Trade Secrets, and “Irrelevant” 
Information 
Prohibiting the disclosure of privileged information that is subject 
to a preexisting legal duty of confidentiality should be permissible 
under Rule 3.4(f).  For example, if the plaintiff in a wrongful 
discharge suit is a former manager who communicated with corporate 
counsel, the defendant’s lawyer can legitimately ask for a settlement 
provision that categorically bars the plaintiff from disclosing 
information subject to the attorney-client privilege.  Rule 3.4(f) makes 
no express exception for privileged information, but the nondisclosure 
obligation would exist even in the absence of the lawyer’s request, 
 
302 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
303 Protective orders generally should allow for disclosure to other litigants who have a 
legitimate need for the information.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
Procedural safeguards, such as requiring that such litigants only use the information for 
purposes of the litigation, may be appropriate. 
304 In the absence of an order or agreement to the contrary, parties are free to disclose 
discovery materials to whomever they wish.  See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 
296, at 7 (citing case authority).  Since there is no preexisting obligation to keep the 
information confidential, Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer from requesting a nonclient to 
refrain from disclosing such materials to other parties with claims against the lawyer’s 
client when the information is relevant to those claims.  This does not mean that 
contractual agreements to keep discovery materials confidential are per se prohibited under 
Rule 3.4(f); they simply need to include an exception that allows for the limited class of 
disclosures that the rule protects.  If a party believes that no such exception is appropriate, 
the claim should be decided by the court.  Offering inducements to obtain the other side’s 
agreement not to oppose such a motion should be considered a violation of Rule 3.4(f); it 
is tantamount to asking a witness to voluntarily refrain from making disclosures covered 
by the rule.  Cf. Koniak, supra note 13, at 805 (arguing that payoffs to get an opposing 
party to agree to a protective order should be sanctionable). 
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and it would serve no purpose to read the rule to prevent a lawyer 
from taking steps to ensure compliance.305  There is no interference 
with the legitimate informational interests of other litigants: 
privileged information is beyond the scope of discovery,306 and a 
lawyer conducting informal interviews is prohibited under the ethics 
rules from seeking privileged information.307 
A harder issue is presented by confidentiality obligations that are 
recognized in law, but generally yield in judicial proceedings to the 
interest of other litigants in obtaining relevant evidence through 
discovery.  Employees have a common law and/or statutory duty not 
to disclose trade secrets or other proprietary commercial information 
of their employer, which continues after the employment relationship 
ends.308  Unlike privileged information, trade secrets are 
discoverable, but a party may apply for a protective order, and if good 
cause is shown a court can order that the information “not be revealed 
or be revealed only in a specified way.”309  The usual judicial 
response is to grant a protective order that allows the discovery if the 
information is relevant, but limits its use to the litigation and contains 
safeguards to ensure the information is not publicly disclosed.310 
 
305 The Restatement takes this position in its commentary on the rule against 
noncooperation requests.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e (2000).  Two states have modified Model Rule 3.4(f) to provide an 
explicit exception for information that is subject to a legal duty of confidentiality.  See 
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d)(2) (2008) (creating exception where “the 
person may be required by law to refrain from disclosing the information”); GA. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(2) (2008) (creating an exception for information “subject to 
the assertion of a privilege by the client”). 
306 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”). 
307 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a), R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (2008) (prohibiting 
lawyers from using methods of obtaining evidence that violate a person’s rights, including 
intrusions into privileged relationships); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (stating that an attorney interviewing a former employee of an 
adversary party “must be careful not to seek to induce the former employee to violate the 
privilege attaching to attorney-client communications” so as not to violate Rule 4.4). 
308 See Becker, supra note 179, at 967–76 (discussing the scope and sources of legal 
protection of trade secrets and proprietary information held by former employees).  Trade 
secrets and proprietary information are distinct concepts, but for ease of discussion I will 
use “trade secrets” to refer to both. 
309 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G). 
310 Similar protection is often given to information that implicates personal privacy 
interests, such as sensitive medical or financial information.  See id. R. 26(c)(1) 
(authorizing the issuance of protective orders “to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”). 
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An agreement that prohibits the voluntary disclosure of trade secret 
information relevant to other parties’ claims runs counter to the 
purposes of Rule 3.4(f) to the extent that it impairs the ability of other 
litigants to gather discoverable evidence through ex parte interviews.  
On the other hand, such an agreement reflects a preexisting legal 
obligation not to disclose in the absence of legal compulsion, and 
ensures that the defendant has the opportunity to obtain the safeguards 
of a protective order.  On balance, it probably should be allowed.  
This interpretation is consistent with the case law on enforceability; 
courts have found noncooperation agreements void as contrary to 
public policy only when such agreements go beyond protecting trade 
secrets and privileged information.311  However, it is important to 
note that information concerning an employer’s illegal or tortious 
conduct generally cannot qualify as a trade secret.312  Seeking to 
block the disclosure of information about wrongful conduct that is 
 
311 See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135–37 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (holding agreements that precluded former employees from being interviewed about 
company’s allegedly illegal activities void as contrary to public policy, but stating that 
agreements to keep privileged information, trade secrets, or highly personal medical 
information confidential are legitimate); Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4484 (SS), 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (invalidating agreement 
that prevented employees from being interviewed about allegedly illegal payroll practices, 
while suggesting that the result might be different if “competition-related information . . . 
such as pricing strategies, customer lists, or secret recipes” were involved); Chambers v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding confidentiality 
agreement invalid insofar as it prohibited disclosures relevant to age discrimination claim 
but legitimate with respect to “genuine trade secrets or other legitimately privileged 
information”); cf. Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916–17, 920–23 (D. 
Nev. 2006) (holding confidentiality agreement that was limited to trade secrets and 
confidential product information was enforceable against ex-employee who voluntarily 
disclosed such information to a plaintiff suing his ex-employer). 
312 See JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1135–36 (holding that 
“whistleblower-type information about allegedly unlawful acts” do not constitute trade 
secrets and that a confidentiality agreement cannot be enforced to prevent another litigant 
from seeking relevant information about such misconduct through ex parte interviews); 
Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that 
trade secret protection cannot be claimed for information relating to a defendant’s illegal 
acts); McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(noting that “[d]isclosures of wrongdoing do not constitute revelations of trade secrets 
which can be prohibited by agreements binding on former employees”); Carol M. Bast, At 
What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 627 (1999) (arguing, based on contract, trade secret, and agency principles, that 
agreements protecting trade secrets and confidential business information are not 
enforceable to prevent disclosures of illegal or tortious conduct or dangers to health and 
safety); Garfield, supra note 35, at 327–28 (concluding that “a court is unlikely to protect 
information about an employer’s tortious conduct as a trade secret” under principles 
established in case law and the Restatement of Unfair Competition). 
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relevant to the claims of other litigants or investigating agencies, 
under the guise of trade secret protection, would violate Rule 3.4(f). 
A defense lawyer whose goal is to draft a settlement agreement that 
prohibits all disclosures relating to the underlying facts, except for 
what must be allowed under Rule 3.4(f), might object to leaving it 
entirely up to the plaintiff’s judgment to determine what constitutes 
“relevant information to another party” and isn’t privileged or a trade 
secret.  These risks, however, are unavoidable by-products of the 
policy balance struck in the rule: the harms to the truth-seeking 
function of the adversary system that arise when lawyers interfere 
with a witness’s freedom to convey relevant evidence to opposing 
parties in ex parte interviews have been deemed to outweigh the 
benefits of restricting contacts to the judicially supervised setting of 
the formal discovery process. 
A settlement agreement that allows for the disclosures that Rule 
3.4(f) contemplates can nonetheless provide significant guidance as to 
the scope of permissible disclosure and incentives to avoid going 
beyond it.  Clear language describing the types of information that are 
privileged or subject to trade secret protection, and imposing penalties 
for violations, will give a plaintiff ample incentive to be cautious 
about crossing the line into impermissible disclosures.  And while the 
term “relevant information” is inherently fuzzy, a plaintiff who 
gratuitously discloses disparaging information that bears no 
reasonable relationship to another party’s claim will run the risk of 
being found in breach of the agreement. 
d.  Monitoring Interviews and “Don’t Tell Unless Asked” Provisions 
One settlement condition that should not be allowed is a 
requirement that the defendant have the opportunity to attend and 
monitor any interviews.  While this could help to deter improper 
disclosures, it runs counter to Rule 3.4(f)’s policy of preserving 
access to ex parte interviews, not only because they are less costly 
than formal discovery (in this regard, the adversary’s presence at an 
informal interview would not create any additional expense), but also 
because the adversary’s presence may chill a witness’s willingness to 
disclose relevant facts.  Opposing counsel’s presence also hinders the 
interviewing lawyer’s ability to “explore the witness’[s] knowledge, 
memory and opinion . . . in light of information counsel may have 
developed from other sources” without disclosing the work product 
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that informs the lawyer’s questions.313  Under Rule 3.4(f) and the 
identical principle that has developed in the criminal case law, courts 
have found it improper for a lawyer to request a witness not to submit 
to an interview unless the lawyer is present.314 
Can a defendant’s lawyer demand that the plaintiff agree not to 
initiate contact with other parties and disclose information only if 
approached?  A few of the enforceability cases suggest this might be 
an acceptable way of ensuring that the plaintiff does not cross the line 
from providing relevant information to actively fomenting 
litigation.315  Such a restriction, however, is hard to square with the 
text and goals of Rule 3.4(f). 
To be sure, some restrictions on how information is disseminated 
should be permitted.  Running advertisements or sending out a press 
release could help to ensure that people with potential claims learn of 
relevant evidence, but also would broadcast information harmful to 
 
313 IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 508–14 (1947) (explaining why materials memorializing ex parte witness 
interviews are work product ordinarily shielded from discovery).  In one of the cases 
holding that a noncooperation agreement could not be used to prevent witness interviews, 
the judge’s order provided that the defendant would be permitted to have a representative 
present as an observer, unless the defendant had previously interviewed the witness.  See 
Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 445–46.  This procedure would likely lead to guarded responses 
that would substantially undermine the value of informal interviews, and it runs counter to 
the logic of Hickman and Edelstein, which found that confidential witness interviews play 
an essential role in the search for truth.  See supra text accompanying notes 112–23.  Other 
decisions have rejected the Chambers court’s requirement that the defendant be given the 
opportunity to attend.  See JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1138; 
Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4–*7. 
314 See, e.g., Davis v. Dow Corning Corp., 530 N.W.2d 178, 179–81 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995) (holding that plaintiffs’ lawyer’s letter to plaintiffs’ treating physicians requesting 
that they not speak to defense attorneys unless plaintiffs’ counsel was present violated 
Rule 3.4(f)); State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 480–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (listing and 
discussing decisions finding requests that witnesses not speak to defense counsel except in 
the prosecutor’s presence to be improper); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-14 
(1999) (finding that prosecutor’s request that public safety officers not discuss cases with 
criminal defense attorneys outside his presence would violate Rule 3.4(f)).  But see 
BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 146, at 245 n.2 (expressing the view that requesting a 
witness “to notify one whenever he or she is contacted by the opposition so that one can 
arrange to be present at any interview” would be ethically permissible). 
315 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921–22 (relying in part on the fact that a former 
employee initiated disclosures to another litigant, rather than waiting to be contacted, as 
reason for holding the agreement enforceable); Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 444 (limiting 
holding that noncooperation agreements are unenforceable to situations “where the former 
employee is not the initiating party” and expressly declining to reach the issue of whether 
“restrictions on recruiting others to complain or sue” are permissible). 
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the defendant’s reputation to the public at large.316  However, a 
“don’t tell unless asked” requirement goes too far in the other 
direction.  A person who has settled with a defendant may have 
information highly probative of another party’s claim.  The other 
claimant may be unaware of the witness’s knowledge and thus have 
no reason to contact the witness; without the information, the person 
may even be unaware that he or she has the basis for a claim.  It is not 
uncommon for a witness, upon hearing about a case or harmful 
conduct by a defendant, to contact the injured party or an 
investigating agency to volunteer relevant information.317  Rule 
3.4(f), which prohibits interference with “voluntarily giving relevant 
information to another party,” contains no language limiting this to 
situations where the witness has first been contacted, and the rule’s 
core purpose, preventing adversary interference with a party’s access 
to information that can assist in ascertaining the truth, militates 
against an interpretation that would categorically exclude witness-
initiated disclosures.318 
A settlement clause along the following lines would strike the 
appropriate balance: 
The plaintiff shall not encourage or solicit litigation against the 
defendant, but may voluntarily disclose relevant information to a 
person or agency that has filed, is investigating, or is known to have 
the basis for a claim against the defendant. 
 
316 Cf. Marcus, supra note 32, at 499–500 (discussing the problem of how information 
may be disseminated under protective orders that provide for discovery sharing). 
317 See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(describing how a person alleging that Wal-Mart failed to hire him because of mobility 
impairments contacted the EEOC to offer his services as a possible witness after hearing 
about a disability discrimination claim that had been filed against Wal-Mart); Palmer v. 
Pioneer Inn Assocs., 59 P.3d 1237, 1239 (Nev. 2002) (describing how an employee of the 
defendant company contacted the attorney for a plaintiff who had brought a sex 
discrimination claim, offering information showing that the reasons given by the company 
for refusing to hire the plaintiff were pretextual). 
318 Alan Garfield, in his article analyzing promises of silence under contract law, argues 
that contracts that suppress information about tortious conduct should be unenforceable 
because they frustrate public policy “by creating barriers for tort victims attempting to 
identify wrongdoers and thereby vindicate their rights.”  Garfield, supra note 35, at 325.  
He gives the example of a person who witnesses one neighbor break another neighbor’s 
window.  “If the negligent neighbor pays the witness for promising not to tell the injured 
neighbor,” a court ought not to enforce the contract.  Id.  Rule 3.4(f) protects similar 
interests and should likewise be construed to prohibit the negligent neighbor’s lawyer from 
inducing the witness to refrain from disclosing to the injured party information that 
supports a claim for redress. 
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This would preclude wide-scale publication as a means of reaching 
potential litigants, but allow targeted disclosures when the plaintiff 
has reason to know that the recipient has a claim to which the 
information is relevant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has made the case that certain settlement terms 
lawyers frequently demand or accede to are impermissible under the 
ethics rules.  This includes not only agreements that explicitly require 
noncooperation, but also settlements that mandate secrecy concerning 
the facts and make no exception for voluntary disclosures of 
information relevant to other parties’ claims.  In this concluding 
section, I will address several general objections that my analysis 
invites. 
One might argue that the very prevalence of such agreements 
shows that they are consistent with professional ethics norms.  If most 
attorneys have concluded that the ethics rules leave it in the client’s 
hands to decide whether to offer or accept settlement terms that 
preclude voluntary cooperation, and there is no rule that explicitly and 
unequivocally says otherwise (Model Rule 3.4(f), after all, says 
nothing directly about settlements), shouldn’t we defer to lawyers’ 
widely shared understanding of the rules governing their behavior?  
The best short answer to this line of reasoning was given by the first 
great American legal ethicist, David Hoffman, in 1836: 
 What is wrong, is not the less so from being common. . . . If, 
therefore, there be among my brethren, any traditional moral errors 
of practice, they shall be studiously avoided by me, though in so 
doing, I unhappily come in collision with what is (erroneously I 
think) too often denominated the policy of the profession.319 
Lawyers face substantial economic and cultural pressures to view 
their obligations through the lens of a partisan, client-centered 
approach that subordinates systemic and societal values to zealous 
advocacy and produces immediate financial benefits for their clients 
and themselves.320  When interpreting ethics rules that place 
 
319 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 765 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d 
ed. 1836). 
320 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1324–26 (1995) (discussing factors that have caused civil 
litigators to gravitate toward a client-centered approach that emphasizes purely partisan 
conduct and ignores provisions of ethics codes that protect other values); Matasar, supra 
note 207, at 979–80 (discussing the strong pressure lawyers face to engage in client-
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limitations on client advocacy, there is good reason to distrust the 
profession’s prevailing wisdom. 
Moreover, the fact that settlements requiring noncooperation are 
common probably has less to do with lawyers making a considered 
judgment that they are ethical than with a simple lack of awareness of 
Rule 3.4(f) and its application to settlement.321  As previously 
discussed, many plaintiffs’ lawyers are uncomfortable with blanket 
secrecy requirements but have felt obliged to go along based on their 
belief that the ethics rules tie their hands.322  Professional conduct 
rules, as Murray Schwartz has pointed out, can fulfill an important 
“reinforcement function” by 
enabl[ing] lawyers who do not want to assist clients in questionable 
transactions to decline on the grounds that the [rules do] not permit 
them to go forward, and thus to avoid the unpleasantness of refusing 
to assist on a basis that is seen by the client as a personal 
condemnation.323 
As more plaintiffs’ lawyers become aware that the rules provide a 
strong argument against noncooperation provisions, more of them can 
be expected to tell opposing counsel, and explain to their clients, that 
they simply cannot agree to terms that would violate their 
professional obligations.324 
A defense lawyer who refuses to back down in the face of an 
objection could face a disciplinary complaint.  Even if the plaintiff 
and her counsel are not inclined to take this step, other litigants who 
later learn that a potential witness cannot be interviewed because of a 
noncooperation settlement might grieve the lawyers who negotiated 
the agreement.  Although disciplinary boards are often reluctant to 
impose sanctions for conduct deemed acceptable by a large segment 
of the bar, courts and disciplinary authorities have imposed discipline 
for conduct that is closely analogous to settlement noncooperation 
demands, so the possibility of enforcement cannot be discounted.325  
 
serving conduct that goes beyond what the rules permit but is deemed acceptable by large 
numbers of practitioners). 
321 See supra text accompanying notes 8–11. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 50–62. 
323 Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. 
L. REV. 669, 682 (1978). 
324 Explaining why proposed settlement terms violate an ethical rule may be enough to 
convince opposing counsel to withdraw them.  See Bauer, supra note 9 (containing sample 
letter informing defense counsel that settlement demand for noncooperation is 
unacceptable because it violates Rule 3.4(f)). 
325 See supra note 252. 
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If disciplinary decisions begin to be issued, lawyers’ incentives to 
abide by the rules will be strengthened.326  Plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
object to defense demands for noncooperation can also seek advisory 
opinions from ethics committees; one such ruling has already been 
issued.327  Although nonbinding, ethics opinions may help to develop 
a consensus that the practice is professionally unacceptable.328 
One might question the efficacy of prohibiting lawyers from 
negotiating settlement terms that are not illegal for their clients.329  
Barring lawyers from negotiating noncooperation clauses would be an 
exercise in futility if it causes parties to bypass their lawyers and 
negotiate such agreements on their own.  While one can imagine the 
possibility that a plaintiff or defendant, upon being told by her lawyer 
that legal ethics rules prohibit the lawyer’s involvement in a 
noncooperation agreement, might enter into direct discussions with 
the opposing party and conclude the settlement without further legal 
assistance,330 this seems unlikely.  Litigation tends to be acrimonious, 
and both plaintiffs and defendants are prone to view their opponents 
as unpleasant, unreasonable, and difficult to deal with.  The vast 
majority of clients will be reluctant to forgo the filter of having their 
negotiations conducted by a representative, and nervous about the 
traps they may fall into if they try to conclude an agreement without 
legal counsel.331  A party could also seek out a new lawyer who takes 
a different view of the ethical issue, but the financial cost, delay, and 
 
326 See Zacharias, supra note 320, at 1348 (noting that “[t]o the extent that the 
prohibitive rules are enforced . . . , lawyers have reason to obey [them],” even when they 
are in tension with a client-centered ethos). 
327 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993), discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 240, 257. 
328 See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 749–50 (2002). 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 79–84 and infra Appendix (explaining why 
noncooperation agreements generally will not violate criminal statutes). 
330 David Luban has criticized Richard Zitrin’s proposed ethics rule that would prohibit 
lawyers from negotiating secret settlements involving public safety risks on the ground 
that it would lead clients to do an end run around their lawyers and agree to secrecy on 
their own.  See Luban, supra note 72, at 128. 
331 Luban raises the further objection that accountants could negotiate the banned 
secrecy terms on behalf of their clients, and would escape liability for unauthorized 
practice of law on the theory that conduct prohibited to lawyers cannot be part of the 
practice of law.  See id.  This strikes me as implausible.  The function of negotiating an 
agreement resolving a client’s legal dispute is likely to be viewed by courts as a 
quintessential aspect of the practice of law inseparable from the giving of legal advice and 
the exercise of legal skills, even if it involves a settlement term prohibited under lawyers’ 
ethics rules. 
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emotional toll of dismissing counsel and hiring a new one make it 
unlikely that many clients will take this step.332  Moreover, many 
plaintiffs start out with a strong desire to help others harmed by a 
defendant’s wrongful conduct, and have significant qualms about 
settlement terms that make it harder for others to bring claims.  Being 
informed that a defendant’s noncooperation demand is prohibited 
under lawyer’s ethics rules can serve a reinforcing function for such 
clients, strengthening their commitment to resist when faced with a 
settlement offer.333 
Nor is it likely that prohibiting lawyer participation in 
noncooperation agreements will prevent cases from settling.  There is 
no evidence that settlements have been chilled in the states that have 
enacted statutes or court rules limiting secrecy.334  The unavailability 
of noncooperation clauses should have little impact on defendants’ 
willingness to settle or the size of settlement offers, especially when 
the types of secrecy most valuable to defendants— k eeping the 
monetary amount confidential and prohibiting statements to the 
media — are still allowed.  Defendants will have ample incentive to 
 
332 See Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 455, 497 (2006). 
333 See supra note 60.  A retainer agreement that informs the client, at the outset of the 
representation, that the lawyer cannot negotiate a settlement involving noncooperation, 
and will have to withdraw if the client insists on doing so, can enhance the likelihood that 
the client will not waver when faced with a settlement offer.  Ethics committees have 
found that engagement agreements that prohibit a client from accepting a settlement with 
terms that the lawyer deems unacceptable (including retainers that preclude confidential 
settlements) are impermissible under Model Rule 1.2, because they interfere with the 
client’s right to decide whether to settle.  See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 289 
(1999); see also Newman, supra note 47, at 374.  But see L.A. County Bar Ass’n Prof’l 
Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 505 (2000) (finding no ethical bar to an 
engagement agreement that provides that a client who accepts secrecy terms in a 
settlement will be required to pay the lawyer’s full hourly fee instead of the reduced rate 
otherwise offered).  There can be no serious objection, however, to an agreement that 
explains what the ethics rules require of the lawyer, and obtains the client’s commitment to 
allow the lawyer to act in conformity with the rules.  See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 805 (2007) (stating that a retainer agreement that accurately describes 
circumstances in which a lawyer is permitted to withdraw is ethically permissible). 
334 See David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions 
Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1225 & n.18; 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended 
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 101, 110–14 (2006); cf. Ramsey et al., supra note 60 
(reporting that a plaintiff’s firm that stopped agreeing to secret settlements has not 
encountered any case that failed to settle or settled for less as a result). 
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settle to avoid the financial exposure and greater publicity that would 
result from a trial.335 
Prohibiting lawyers from assisting in conduct that clients can 
engage in themselves without violating the law may also be objected 
to from the standpoint of client autonomy.  Stephen Pepper has 
argued that making the law accessible to individuals so that they can 
pursue their goals constitutes an important social good, and that it is 
destructive of individual autonomy, diversity, and equality for 
lawyers to impose their moral values on clients in situations where the 
conduct has not been determined by society to be intolerable and 
made explicitly unlawful.336  But it is only in a very weak sense that 
noncooperation agreements can be said to be “lawful.”  Numerous 
courts have declared them to be contrary to public policy and refused 
to enforce them.337  Even if parties violate no positive command of 
law by entering into noncooperation agreements, a public institution 
has determined that such agreements inflict serious harm on the 
justice system.  By virtue of their role as officers of the court, lawyers 
have a “special responsibility for the quality of justice.”338  There is 
nothing incongruous or objectionably paternalistic in requiring 
lawyers to refuse to participate in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, regardless of whether such conduct is illegal 
when engaged in by clients who do not share the lawyer’s special 
role.339 
 
335 See Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing 
settlement negotiation in which, after plaintiff refused to accept a nonassistance clause that 
the defendant had insisted on including, defendant sought to enforce oral settlement 
agreement without it); Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 95–96 (discussing why even a total 
ban on confidentiality provisions is unlikely to be a major deterrent to settlement). 
336 Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and 
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615–19.  The “equality” portion of 
the critique, which argues that it is unjustifiable “[f]or access to the law to be filtered 
unequally through the disparate moral views of each individual’s lawyer,” id. at 618, 
would not be applicable to a rule that obliges all lawyers to refrain from participating in 
certain conduct. 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 185–203; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 112–23, 171–84, 253–57 (discussing judicial articulations of policies disfavoring 
noncooperation in other decisional contexts). 
338 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008). 
339 Many of the “officer of the court” duties that the ethics rules impose on lawyers 
involve conduct that is not illegal if engaged in by an unrepresented party.  See, e.g., id. R. 
3.3(a)(2) (obligation to disclose controlling legal authority to the court); R. 3.3(d) 
(requiring disclosure of all material facts in ex parte proceedings); R. 3.4(e) (placing 
limitations on trial statements); R. 3.6(a) (limiting extrajudicial statements). 
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To those who favor greater moral activism by lawyers, my reading 
of the ethics rules may be criticized on the grounds that it leaves 
untouched the most objectionable sorts of secret settlements — those 
that hide safety dangers and information about unlawful conduct from 
the public.340  But my concern in this Article is with the constraints 
on settlement secrecy that can be derived from the rules as they are.  
The Model Rules, even after the Ethics 2000 expansion of the public-
regarding exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, provide very 
limited scope of action for placing societal or third-party interests 
over those of the client.341  For better or worse, the tenor of the 
lawyers’ ethics codes is that lawyers generally are not barred from 
assisting clients in conduct that is harmful to third parties or socially 
undesirable, unless legislatures or the courts have prohibited the 
behavior.  But the existing system of professional regulation does 
recognize the need for lawyers to legislate for themselves restraints on 
advocacy that are designed to preserve the proper functioning of the 
adversary system. 
This Article has focused attention on one such duty, the obligation 
not to impede other parties’ access to relevant evidence by inducing 
witnesses to withhold cooperation.  The principle has a long pedigree 
and is firmly rooted in the ethics codes.  Too often, the duty has been 
ignored when lawyers settle cases on behalf of clients. 
 
340 However, requiring lawyer-negotiated settlement agreements to permit disclosure of 
information relevant to other parties’ claims will have the incidental effect, in many cases, 
of exposing wrongdoing and helping to prevent and remedy public harms. 
341 See supra text accompanying notes 63–78. 
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APPENDIX: ARE NONCOOPERATION AGREEMENTS CRIMINAL? 
Obstruction of Justice 
Stephen Gillers342 rests his argument that noncooperation 
settlements violate federal obstruction of justice laws primarily on § 
1512(b) of Title 18, which makes it a felony to “knowingly   . . . 
corruptly persuade[] another person, or attempt[] to do so,     . . . with 
intent to . . . cause or induce any person to withhold testimony, or 
withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official 
proceeding.”343  An “official proceeding” is defined in the statute to 
include any proceeding before a federal court or agency, which “need 
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.”344  
Relying on the broad construction that a number of courts of appeal 
have given to the word “corruptly,” Professor Gillers concludes that 
offering a financial reward to secure a person’s pledge to not 
voluntarily provide information to the government or private parties 
in pending or future federal proceedings violates the statute’s 
terms.345  He also relies on two other criminal statutes that apply 
when there is an already-pending federal proceeding.  Section 1503(a) 
of Title 18 makes it a crime when any person “corruptly . . . 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, 
or impede, the due administration of justice” in pending federal 
judicial proceedings.346  Section 1505 contains similar language and 
covers pending proceedings before federal agencies and Congress.347 
 
342 Gillers, supra note 10. 
343 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008). 
344 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(f)(1), 1515(a)(1) (2008).  The Supreme Court, however, has read 
the statute to require that the defendant act “in contemplation [of a] particular official 
proceeding in which those documents [or testimony] might be material.”  Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005). 
345 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 7–13.  Some circuits have held that the “corrupt 
persuasion” element is satisfied if the defendant acted with an “improper purpose” and 
have suggested that a request that a witness withhold testimony, without more, can satisfy 
this standard.  See id. at 11–12.  Other circuits have held or suggested that the statute 
requires proof that the defendant’s efforts were aimed at persuading a witness to violate a 
legal duty to provide information.  See id. at 8; see also Jeremy McLaughlin & Joshua M. 
Nahum, Obstruction of Justice, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 793, 815 & n.133 (2007). 
346 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2008).  The Supreme Court has read into the statute a 
requirement that there be a pending case in federal court, of which the defendant has 
knowledge or is chargeable with notice.  Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 
(1893) (construing a virtually identical predecessor statute). 
347 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2008) (“Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes 
or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law 
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Gillers’s conclusion that these statutes reach noncooperation 
agreements that forbid voluntary disclosures to other parties in a 
current or future proceeding (rather than just those agreements that 
would block disclosure to the court or agency presiding over a 
proceeding) is hard to square with the statutory language and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the obstruction laws.  Section 
1512(b) speaks in terms of withholding information “from an official 
proceeding.”348  Section 1503(a), which includes no such limiting 
language, has nonetheless been read by the Supreme Court to require 
a showing of a probable impact on specific judicial proceedings.  In 
United States v. Aguilar,349 the Court, emphasizing the need for 
“restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,”350 held 
that a defendant who made false statements to investigating FBI 
agents, with knowledge that a grand jury proceeding was pending, 
could not be found guilty of obstruction in the absence of proof that 
he knew that his false statements would actually be conveyed to the 
grand jury and be likely to affect its proceedings.351 
It is extremely unlikely that entering into a noncooperation 
settlement that prohibits voluntary disclosures to other litigants, while 
allowing disclosure in response to a subpoena or court order, could 
constitute obstruction under Aguilar.  Forcing an opposing party to 
resort to formal discovery processes in order to obtain information 
does not render the evidence unavailable to a tribunal or have the 
probable effect of ensuring that the information will never be 
presented in court.352 
 
under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the 
United States” or in a congressional inquiry commits a felony.). 
348 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008). 
349 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
350 Id. at 600. 
351 The government’s theory was that the defendant knew and hoped that his false 
statements would be conveyed to the grand jury through the agents’ testimony, and 
therefore made the statements with an intent to thwart the grand jury investigation.  Id.  
The Court held that “uttering false statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or 
might not testify before a grand jury” is insufficient and that the government must prove 
“that respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury” in 
order to establish the “nexus” required by the statute: proof that the defendant’s action had 
the “natural and probable effect” of interfering with the tribunal’s administration of justice.  
Id. at 600–01. 
352 Efforts to conceal or destroy information requested in discovery might well be 
found, consistent with Aguilar, to violate the obstruction statutes, since such conduct 
presents a high likelihood of affecting the evidence presented in court.  See United States 
v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to dismiss indictment 
against two former Texaco officials under § 1503(a) for willfully destroying documents 
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A stronger case can be made that settlements that prohibit 
voluntary cooperation with a federal agency in connection with a 
pending agency proceeding constitutes obstruction under § 1505.353  
In federal administrative proceedings, obtaining testimony or 
documents from an unwilling witness generally requires having the 
agency follow specified procedures for issuing an administrative 
subpoena, and obtaining enforcement of the subpoena may require the 
agency to go to court.354  Here the costs of a noncooperation clause 
are borne by the agency itself (not merely other parties to the 
proceeding), and thus might be said to impede the agency’s “due and 
proper administration of the law.”355 
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
United States356 also makes it doubtful that a defendant who seeks a 
noncooperation clause can be found to have engaged in “knowingly 
corrupt” conduct, one of the requisites of criminal liability under § 
1512(b).357  In overturning the accounting firm’s conviction for 
urging employees to destroy documents in accordance with the firm’s 
document retention policies, so that they would be unavailable in 
anticipated Enron-related lawsuits, the Court read the statutory 
language to mean that the violator must be “conscious of 
wrongdoing.”358  The Court noted that the use of corporate document 
 
that had been requested at a deposition in an employment discrimination class action).  As 
I argue elsewhere in this Article, noncooperation settlements that deprive other litigants of 
the ability to obtain evidence through informal investigation impose significant costs, 
impair the proper functioning of the adversary system, and may prevent meritorious suits 
from being brought.  The point here, however, is that Aguilar requires more to make out a 
criminal violation.  The Supreme Court found no violation in conduct that made it harder 
for the United States, the prosecuting party, to obtain information that it could have 
presented in court. 
353 At least in those circuits that take a broad view of what constitutes a “corrupt” 
motivation.  See supra note 345. 
354 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (2008) (EEOC regulations on issuance and 
enforcement of subpoenas); see also supra text accompanying notes 185–86. 
355 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2008).  A request that a witness not cooperate with a federal 
agency in a pending or anticipated proceeding would also be an attempt to induce a person 
to “withhold testimony . . . from an official proceeding” within the meaning of § 1512(b).  
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008).  However, for reasons discussed in the next paragraph, 
it is unlikely that liability could be established under that section’s more stringent 
culpability standard. 
356 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
357 The “knowingly” requirement is omitted from §§ 1503(a) and 1515, which require 
only a showing that the defendant “corruptly” engaged in the conduct in question.  See 
supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text. 
358 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 704–06. 
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retention policies “to keep certain information from getting into the 
hands of others, including the Government” is routine and not 
inherently malign.359  Under this reasoning, it would be difficult to 
establish that a defendant who sought a noncooperation clause had the 
requisite knowledge of wrongfulness, considering the widespread use 
of such agreements and the fact that no court has squarely held that 
they violate any criminal statute. 
Noncooperation agreements that fail to include an exception 
allowing for disclosure in response to a lawful subpoena or court 
order do run a high risk of violating federal obstruction of justice 
laws.  It can be reasonably assumed that most people are aware that 
refusing to comply with judicial process, or paying another to do so, 
is wrongful conduct.360  In addition, separate subsections of the 
obstruction statute specifically make it a crime to cause or induce any 
person to evade or flout legal process.361 
Witness Tampering 
The state law equivalent to the federal provisions that Gillers 
considered are witness tampering statutes, which are typically 
patterned on section 241.6 of the Model Penal Code.  The crime of 
witness tampering is there defined to include situations where a 
person, “believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, . . . attempts to induce or otherwise 
cause a witness or informant to . . . withhold any testimony, 
information, document or thing.”362  The reach of witness tampering 
laws is significantly limited by the “pending or about to be instituted” 
qualification.  In many, probably most, situations where defendants 
seek noncooperation clauses, they act out of concern that similar 
lawsuits may be filed in the future but without specific knowledge of 
another case that is pending or imminent.  In addition, the statutory 
language appears to contemplate a withholding of information from 
the official proceeding or investigation.  While attempts to stop a 
 
359 Id. at 703–04. 
360 See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 36 (concluding that agreements that purport to 
require a witness to disobey a subpoena or court order are impermissible); EEOC v. 
Severn Trent Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 442–43 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (stating in 
dicta that an effort to use a confidentiality clause in a settlement agreement to block 
compliance with a subpoena would be obstruction of justice). 
361 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(C)–(D) (2008); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 
241.6(1)(c)–(d) (1962) (containing similar provisions). 
362 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6(1)(b) (1962). 
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person from voluntarily testifying in court or providing information to 
an investigating government agency can easily be construed as 
witness tampering,363 it seems unlikely that the offense extends to 
efforts to induce a person to refrain from making voluntary 
disclosures to private litigants or their lawyers.  The interpretive 
principle that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in 
favor of the defendant would support the narrower reading. 
Compounding 
The crime of compounding, the basis for Susan Koniak’s364 and 
John Freeman’s365 arguments that much settlement secrecy is illegal, 
is defined in the Model Penal Code as follows: 
 A person commits a misdemeanor if he accepts or agrees to 
accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from 
reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or 
suspected commission of any offense or information relating to an 
offense.  It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 
Section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which 
the actor believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for 
harm caused by the offense.366 
 
363 The Model Penal Code’s commentary makes clear that the offense reaches efforts to 
induce a witness to withhold cooperation, even if the witness is not legally obliged to 
produce the information.  “One is liable for efforts to cause an informant to maintain 
silence even though there is no legal obligation to inform.  Similarly, one who bribes a 
witness to invoke the fifth amendment is guilty of tampering even if that witness is entitled 
to refuse to testify.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6 cmt. 2 (1980). 
364 Koniak, supra note 13. 
365 Freeman, supra note 13. 
366 MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (1962).  There is no federal compounding statute, but 
two federal crimes are somewhat analogous.  The misprision of felony statute applies to a 
person who has knowledge of the commission of a federal felony and “conceals and does 
not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or 
military authority under the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 4 (2008).  Most courts construing 
the statute have interpreted it to require more than just a failure to notify the authorities; 
there must be some positive act designed to conceal the offense from the authorities.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Davila, 698 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir. 1983).  That element may be 
satisfied by a refusal to testify in violation of a valid court order, see United States v. 
Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1996), but it is unclear whether an agreement to refrain 
from voluntarily reporting the offense to the authorities would suffice. 
 The federal obstruction of criminal investigations statute prohibits “willfully 
endeavor[ing] by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of 
information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any 
person to a [federal] criminal investigator.”  18 U.S.C. § 1510(a).  Unlike compounding, 
the payor, rather than the payee, is the offender.  Some courts have found that the statute 
applies only if a specific federal criminal investigation is under way or is being 
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The information covered by secrecy clauses in settlements of civil 
lawsuits often relates to conduct that violates criminal statutes as 
well.367  The crime of compounding, however, applies only when the 
paid-for promise is to refrain from reporting to law enforcement 
authorities and does not reach agreements that bar disclosures to civil 
litigants.368  Moreover, the Model Penal Code’s affirmative defense is 
easy to establish for the vast majority of civil settlements, because the 
consideration paid for a secrecy clause, and even the total amount of 
the settlement, will generally be less than the amount of 
compensatory damages that the plaintiff sought in the lawsuit or 
demand letter.369  The common law crime of compounding, however, 
recognized no affirmative offense, and in states with compounding 
statutes that track the common law rather than the Model Penal Code, 
noncooperation agreements that are drafted broadly enough to 
prohibit voluntary disclosures to law enforcement agencies about 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense very likely are criminal.370 
In sum, parties negotiating noncooperation settlements need to pay 
careful attention to potentially applicable federal and state criminal 
laws.  In most jurisdictions, however, an attorney could reasonably 
reach the conclusion, and advise her client, that the risk of criminal 
liability for a carefully drafted noncooperation agreement is 
negligible.  Some guideposts for minimizing the risk of a criminal 
 
contemplated by the authorities at the time the payment is made.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 21 (2d Cir. 1983). 
367 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 840–41. 
368 The same is true of the federal misprision of felony and obstruction of criminal 
investigations statutes.  See supra note 366. 
369 Some settlements exceed any amount that the plaintiff could plausibly claim as 
restitution, either because secrecy is particularly valuable to the defendant or the defendant 
fears a large punitive damage award.  An example of a settlement that would likely violate 
the Model Penal Code’s compounding provision, assuming that the suppressed 
information related to criminal conduct by the defendant, is the one in the heart valve case 
described by Zitrin and Langford.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
370 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 cmt. 6 (1980) (discussing the elements of common 
law compounding); Freeman, supra note 13, at 835–36.  At least ten states have 
compounding laws that contain no affirmative defense for settlement.  See ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-54-107 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-90 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/32-1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3807 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.149 (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.020 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
22-6 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 543, 544 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-9-370 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8 (1998); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 
(West 1999) (exception only for “cases provided for by law, in which crimes may be 
compromised by leave of court”).   The federal obstruction of criminal investigations 
statute, discussed supra note 366, also contains no defense for money paid as part of a 
settlement. 
 2008] Buying Witness Silence 573 
violation would be to draft the agreement to permit disclosures in 
response to a subpoena or court order or as otherwise required by law; 
allow voluntary disclosures to the relevant court or agency if an 
official proceeding is known to be pending or imminent; and, if a 
compounding statute applies, ensure either that the settlement satisfies 
the criteria for an affirmative defense or that disclosures to law 
enforcement authorities are permitted. 
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